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Three Essays in Asset Management: Ethical and Investment
Exclusions
Vaska Charlz Atta-Darkua
Abstract
This dissertation contributes to the existing body of knowledge on ethical and investment
exclusions. Accordingly, the first chapter examines the consequences of ethical exclusions
from the point of view of excluded firms. Specifically, it makes use of the Norway GPFGs´
ethical exclusion announcements and documents a post-announcement negative return impact
on firms’ stock prices which is not reversed in the short term. Furthermore, I find that product
exclusion announcements influence some ethics-sensitive investors who also divest negatively
screened firms. Therefore, the chapter demonstrates that ethical exclusions can adversely
affect firm equity value, at least in the short term. The second chapter examines the impact
of sector exclusions on the portfolio of a long-term well-diversified investor. Using industry
indices spanning 1900–2018, we identify a number of risks associated with sector exclusion
strategies. Focusing on the part of the portfolio which is being substituted away from a given
sector, we show that negative screenings can give rise to substantial drawdowns and unintended
geographical tilts. We conclude that over the long run the consequences of sector exclusion
for investors are likely to be non-trivial. The third chapter conducts a survey of industry
professionals’ views on divestments. Respondents consider negative portfolio screenings most
useful for attracting funds from ethically concerned investors and are least in favour of using
them for risk management purposes. Furthermore, professionals express the lowest levels
of disagreement about the expected returns of non-controversial sectors, relative to those of
controversial sectors. We also classify respondents into clusters depending on their opinions
regarding sector exclusions. Those who are divestment “sceptics” form risk estimates with higher
resemblance to historic performances than divestment “devotees”. Overall, survey responses
imply that exclusions scepticism does not stem from an expectation that controversial sectors
have superior performance to non-controversial sectors.
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Introduction
In this dissertation, I have compiled three essays in the field of asset management. Specifi-
cally, I have focused on the practice of negative portfolio screenings. I examine how they can
affect both excluded firms and the investors who engage in the practice. I also survey industry
professionals on their viewpoints on sector exclusions.
Crucially, investment exclusions can be performed for multiple reasons, including ethical
considerations not related to expected firm financial performance. Consequently, part of the
thesis is dedicated to examining the impact of expressing ethical preferences via the practice.
This is the case for Chapter 1, where I analyse investor reactions to ethical firm exclusions.
Chapter 2, in contrast, takes a more agnostic view and examines the impact on investment
portfolios when negatively screening both controversial and non-controversial sectors. Similarly,
the survey in Chapter 3 allows for both financial and ethical motivations for exclusions to be
considered alongside one another. I describe the three chapters in more detail below.
The first thesis chapter “Corporate Ethical Behaviours and Firm Equity Value and Ownership”
analyses the consequences of ethical negative screenings from the point of view of the excluded
firm, by making use of the Norway GPFG’s1 exclusion announcements. It documents a negative
return impact which is not reversed in the short run. It also shows that the Fund’s exclusions
under the product criteria are followed by some ethics-sensitive investors. The implications
are that firms lose value in the short term and can experience a reduction in their investor base
over the longer term. I hypothesise that the two findings are connected whereby a reduced firm
investor base leads to lower firm equity value at present and higher expected future returns. This
is in order to compensate the remaining investors for experiencing increased portfolio risks by
holding a higher number of firm shares than would be optimal for them.
Next, the second chapter “The Long-run Consequences of Portfolio Sector Exclusion”
examines the impact of negative screenings on the portfolio of a long-term well-diversified
investor. It takes a broader view on divestment and performs a general analysis which can apply
to both ethical and non-ethical sector exclusions. A dataset for the UK and USA, from 1900 to
2018, is used to provide a long-run historic perspective on how sector exclusions would have
1Government Pension Fund Global
1 1
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affected investment portfolios. We focus on the effect on the part of the portfolio which is
being replaced by other assets. We identify a number of risks associated with sector exclusion
strategies. One way of viewing negative screening is as allocating a portion of the portfolio to a
strategy that is long the market and short the divested sector. However, sectors have substantially
different returns from the general market, making the market a poor substitute for any one sector.
Furthermore, such a strategy would introduce unwanted geographic tilts into the portfolio, and it
could suffer substantial and lengthy drawdowns. Therefore, over the long run the consequences
of sector exclusions are likely to be non-trivial for investors.
The third and final chapter of the dissertation is named “Survey on Sector Exclusions”. In
it we query industry professionals’ views on the merits of various motivations to engage in
exclusions. We document that they consider negative screenings to be most useful for attracting
funds from ethical investors. This is followed by conforming to moral beliefs. Respondents
deem risk management to be the least useful goal of the practice. We also segment our sample
into three groups based on the exclusion preferences of respondents. These are “sceptics”,
“questioners” and “devotees”. Using these clusters, we show that exclusions scepticism does not
seem to be a result of a belief that controversial sectors have superior performance to that of
non-controversial sectors. Moreover, negative screening “sceptics” form sector risk estimates
with higher resemblance to recent historic performances than “devotees”.
The remainder of the thesis contains the three chapters described above. References are
listed separately within each chapter. There is also a separate References section at the end of the
thesis in order to include work cited within the rest of the dissertation (Declaration, Introduction,
and Conclusion).
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Chapter 1
Corporate Ethical Behaviours and Firm
Equity Value and Ownership
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Corporate Ethical Behaviours and Firm Equity Value
and Ownership: evidence from the GPFG’s⇤ ethical
exclusions†
Vaska Atta-Darkua‡
Abstract
This paper investigates the implications for firm equity value and ownership structure when
a large institutional investor publicly excludes a firm from its portfolio due to unethical be-
haviour. To achieve this, it makes use of the GPFG’s ethical exclusions. On average, firms
lose 1.72% of equity value around exclusion announcements, which is not reversed in the
short term. For firms excluded under the product criteria, the effect seems to be driven by the
divesting behaviour of ethics-sensitive investors.
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1 Introduction
Ethical investing practices have gained attention in recent years, with an increasing number
of investors employing Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) and/or Socially Responsi-
ble Investing (SRI) factors in the construction and monitoring of their portfolios.1 In the UK, the
Department for Work and Pensions (2018) has proposed that some occupational pension schemes
should disclose “how they take account of financially material considerations, including (but not
limited to) those arising from Environmental, Social and Governance considerations, including
climate change”.2 Furthermore, in the United States, the US Social Investment Forum (2018) cal-
culates that total US-domiciled assets under management employing SRI strategies make up one
out of four dollars of professionally managed assets. In consequence, while firms have traditionally
been assessed primarily on performance metrics, they are increasingly facing pressure to disclose
and improve their ethical behaviours.3 If they fail to live up to investor standards they may face
exclusion from portfolios and/or active investor pressure to change practices which are deemed un-
ethical.4 According to the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2018), negative/exclusionary
screening is the largest global sustainable investment strategy, comprising $19.8 trillion out of
$30.7 trillion. In particular, Arabella Advisors (2018) calculates that 985 institutions have collec-
tively announced fossil fuel divestments of $6.24 trillion assets.5
This paper aims to investigate if ethical exclusions can affect firm equity value and whether this
is due to firms falling out of favour with other ethical investors. The GPFG’s ethical exclusions
announcements are used as an experimental tool to conduct the analysis. They provide a unique and
interesting setting as they are not based on the firms’ financial performance but introduce detailed
information to the market about their (perceived) unethical behaviour. Furthermore, the Fund has
sold any firm shares which it owned prior at the time of announcement so information about the
fund selling firm shares is separated from information about the firm’s ethical behaviour. Crucially,
exclusions are based not just on past perceived unethical behaviour, but also on reasonable beliefs
that such behaviour will continue into the future.
There are several plausible ways in which equity value would be affected by a large institutional
investor excluding a firm from their portfolio for ethical reasons. First, there could be demand-
driven price changes whereby prices decline as fewer investors are willing to hold firm shares.
This increases the non-diversifiable firm risk for investors still owning shares in the firms. On one
1 Ram (2016), Oakley (2016), Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2018)
2In addition, there is also an engagement clause, whereby the Statement of Investment Purpose (SIP) should de-
scribe “their policies in relation to the stewardship of investments, including engagement with investee firms and the
exercise of the voting rights associated with the investment”
3 Thompson (2017)
4 Ralph (2017), Grene (2016)
5also see https://gofossilfree.org/divestment/commitments/
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hand, such reduced investor base could be purely a result of investor ethical considerations. On the
other hand, investors may also believe that ethical exclusions reveal bad firm fundamentals such
as lower expected growth or higher firm risk. In both cases price changes should not be transitory
in the short run but firms are likely to have higher expected returns in the future to compensate
investors for the higher risks they are exposing themselves to. If investors are correct in revaluing
firm fundamentals and risk based on the exclusions, we would also expect to observe changes to
firm performance or risk metrics in the future.
A second potential consequence of the exclusion announcements could be investor overreac-
tion. Then, there would be a short-term price decline and a subsequent price reversal. Third, a
switch in the clientele base could also be at play. In such a framework, once unethical behaviour is
revealed, ethically minded investors sell their firm shares. However, when prices decline, investors
who do not use ethical concerns in their investment decisions would buy the reduced-price shares
and push prices back up. The key difference between the mechanisms is (1) whether a price re-
versal is observed or not and (2) whether there is a change in the investor base of the firms. The
paper evaluates the price reaction to the exclusion announcement as well as the observed ownership
changes in order to determine which mechanism seems to best describe the setting. Preliminary
analysis on firm performance is also described.
The analysis makes use of hand-collected information on exclusion recommendation announce-
ments. The data on recommendations are collected from the website of the Norwegian Council on
Ethics, and Norges Bank Investment Management(NBIM, for coal exclusions). The websites con-
tain press releases, and individual recommendations for companies and specific sectors (e.g related
to nuclear weapons). The exclusion announcement date is considered to be the date information of
the exclusions was posted on the Council on Ethics or/and NBIM websites. The paper employs an
event study methodology to analyse abnormal returns around the exclusion announcement dates.
Ownership levels for institutional investor categories likely to be ethics-sensitive are examined
before and after the announcement dates to determine if selling behaviour by ethics-sensitive in-
vestors6 is present.
The events data consists of exclusions made by the GPFG for ethical reasons. The Fund is a
large institutional investor and is currently ranked as the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world
by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.7 It has assets of over 1TN USD, up to 70% of which
can be allocated to equities. It invests in around 9,000 companies worldwide, owns 1.5% of the
equity of all listed companies worldwide, and 2.57% of the equity of listed companies in Europe.8
6I define ethics-sensitive investors as those who incorporate firm ethical behaviour into their portfolio decisions
and react to news of firm ethical behaviours. Investors who do not consider ethics in their portfolio selection and
management are referred to as ethics-insensitive investors.
7https://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/
8https://www.nbim.no and https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/how-we-invest/, Accessed in September 2019
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The Fund provides considerable information to the public with regards to its decisions to exclude,
monitor or re-include companies due to ethical reasons. Following exclusion (and any re-inclusion)
decisions it makes a public announcement and in most cases also publishes a detailed report on the
motivations behind the exclusion. Exclusions can be for product-based reasons (involvement with
nuclear power, tobacco, coal, etc.) or conduct-based reasons (environmental damage, corruption,
human rights violations, and so on) which adds further depth to the dataset.
Notably, exclusion recommendations are based on thorough research into the companies and
as well as looking at past behaviour also rely on a reasonable expectation that such behaviour
will persist in the future. This is in contrast to standard ESG metrics such as the KLD (Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics), which measure past exposures.9. It is important to note
that ESG is related to but not identical to the firm ethical behaviours which I analyse. In particular,
ESG scores reflect company behaviour across a number of metrics so in practice subpar behaviour
in one aspect could conceivably be compensated by stellar conduct in another. The GPFG and
the Council on Ethics, on the other hand, judge company unethical behaviour in comparison to
the moral standards that they believe companies should uphold. Therefore, if a company is found
to breach one of their conduct or product criteria, they are excluded regardless of their behaviour
across other dimensions. The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is also related to
ESG. CSR practices cover firm activities related to Environmental and Social concerns10, some of
which will be picked up quantitatively by the E(nvironmental) and S(ocial) scores in ESG metrics.
Information on when a particular recommendation was submitted by the Council on Ethics
becomes public once the recommendation decision is published.11 NBIM physically divests any
firms in which they own shares prior to the exclusion announcements. However, the exact sales
date remains unclear.
The main results are the following. For ethical exclusion announcements, I document a neg-
ative return impact. On average firms lose $30.6 million around the announcement day (-0.94%,
CARs12 -1 to 0 days) and $168 million of Market Capitalization by day five (-1.72%, CARs-1 to
5 days). This suggests that ethical investing can affect stock prices in the short run. Furthermore,
9and have been criticised for not taking full advantage of publicly available data by Chatterji, Levine and Toffel
(2009)
10The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) defines CSR as ”a management concept
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and interactions with
their stakeholders, https://tinyurl.com/y5usp4fq, accessed in August 2018.
11Until 2015, the Council on Ethics would submit recommendations to the Ministry of Finance, which made the
final decisions to accept or reject recommendations to negatively screen a company and to revoke existing exclusions.
Norges Bank was then responsible for acting on the decision taken. From 2015 onwards, the Council on Ethics
reports directly to Norges Bank, which then decides on accepting or rejecting the recommendation. The changes were
implemented in the hope of increased coordination of exclusion and engagement initiatives. (Council on Ethics for the
Government Pension Fund Global (2014)).
12Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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the negative return impact is not reversed in the short term (in 6 to 12 days relative to the event).
This is consistent with a demand driven effect or a revelation of bad fundamentals. Regression
analysis shows that the return impact is stronger for more liquid firms. I then document divestment
behaviour by ethics-sensitive investors for product exclusions, and coal-excluded firms in particu-
lar, which further strengthens the demand driven hypothesis. Preliminary analysis shows no effect
on firm performance.
The returns analysis results could be a consequence of investors reacting to the announce-
ment that the GPFG fund will not invest in a given firm rather than a reaction to the revelation
of information about firm unethical behaviour. However, I find that firms for which an exclusion
recommendation was published but where the final decision was not to exclude them have similar
CARs to excluded firms. This suggests that the reactions are more likely to be driven by the ethics
component of the announcement rather than the news that the Fund will no longer own shares in
the firms.
Looking at mimicking behaviour by ethics-sensitive investors, I select two types of investors
which are likely to be ethics-sensitive. The first is global pension funds, which are long term
investors with a large base of beneficiaries and are considered to be constrained by social norms by
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). Overall, there is a reduction in the number of funds owning shares in
product-excluded firms, which is more prolonged for coal-based exclusions. There is no reduction
in ownership for conduct-based exclusions. Furthermore, I note significant regional variation in
the reactions of pension funds. Both European and US funds react to the product-based exclusion
recommendations, with fewer funds owning shares in the firms following the exclusions. However,
since European pension funds have already sold out of some excluded firms, their reaction is more
subdued than that of US pension funds. Reactions to the exclusions can be nuanced. In the case
of Coal, fewer US pension funds hold shares in firms following their exclusion. In contrast, for
tobacco, US funds show no reduction in the number of funds owning shares in the firms, but
the exclusion announcements halt the previous trend of increasing number of US pension funds
owning shares in tobacco firms. Therefore, in some cases the exclusion announcements lead to
funds selling out of firms, while in others they act to dissuade funds which are not firm shareholders
from becoming such.
The second type of potential ethics-sensitive investors analysed is US responsible mutual funds,
classified as mutual funds with a social or ethics criterion.13 The sample needs to be limited to US-
registered mutual funds and US-listed firms due to availability of holdings data in the CRSP14
database. The reactions of these mutual funds are similar to those of the pension funds, although
the firms sample cannot be broken into too many categories due to the lower sample size. Fewer US
13using information from Thomson Reuters Eikon fund research platform
14Wharton Research Data Services Center for Research in Security Prices
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Responsible mutual funds own shares in product-excluded firms following the exclusions. Con-
versely, they tend not to react to announcements of conduct violations. I also show that firms
improve their ESG ratings following exclusions, which is driven by higher Environmental scores.
In contrast, there is indicative evidence that governance ratings are decreasing.
Taken together, the results suggest that ethical investing has a negative impact on equity value
which is not reversed in the short term. Observed divestment by ethics-sensitive investors of prod-
uct exclusions supports a demand driven explanation.
The paper is linked to several strands of literature. One contribution is to expand on the litera-
ture of “sin” stock returns. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) famously report higher returns for “sin”
stocks relative to comparable stocks. However, for such “sin” stocks to achieve higher returns, they
need to have become undervalued at a prior point. In this paper I examine one of the mechanisms
via which this can occur, which is ethical exclusions. Therefore, the paper investigates whether eth-
ical exclusions announcements have an impact on stock returns and, if so, in what manner. This is
similar to papers which analyse firm returns around investor base expansions such as cross-listings
in other territories (Foerster and Karolyi (1999)), except it analyses the opposite situation where
the investor base is likely to contract rather than expand. Finding a demand-driven impact extends
on prior evidence that firms have non-flat demand curves (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)). The
paper is also unique in investigating clientele changes and investor overreaction in an ethical in-
vesting setting, while other papers have focused on clientele changes around corporate events such
as stock splits (Dhar, Goetzmann and Zhu (2004)) and dividend policy (Pettit (1977)), as well as
investor overreaction to recent stock returns (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler (1985).
The main contribution of the paper is to document a way in which firms perceived to be un-
ethical can fall out of favour with some investors and lose equity value. It analyses the effect of
corporate unethical behaviour on equity value by making use of a unique quasi-natural experimen-
tal setting provided by the GPFG’s ethical exclusion announcements. It shows that there is an
effect, and it is at least partially driven by the divestment of ethics-sensitive investors. The analysis
is notable for identifying the mechanism through which unethical behaviour affects equity value.
The paper also contributes to the literature on herd behaviour. This has been modelled in general
by Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and in a investor setting by Bar-
beris and Shleifer (2003). While Sias (2004) provide evidence of institutional investor herding,
this paper documents mimicking behaviour by ethical institutional investors. Notably, Friedman
and Heinle (2016) develop a model where firm CSR activities impact firm investor composition
and vice versa. Investor reactions to negative CSR events have broadly been found to be adverse
(for example, see Kru¨ger (2015) and Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan and Kobeissi (2012)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the hypotheses I analyse, and
Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 describes the data. The returns analysis is
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presented in Section 5. Changes to firm ownership are reported in Section 6. Section 7 provides a
brief analysis on possible customer reactions to the exclusions. Section 8 examines the evolution of
firm ESG ratings following the announcements. Section 9 concludes and summarises the findings
in the paper.
2 Hypotheses
I have three main hypotheses which could explain the impact of the GPFG’s ethical exclusions
on the firms it excludes. The first one is that the exclusions reduce the investor base of firms and
cause a demand driven downward shock to returns. This is because remaining investors are forced
to hold a higher proportion of firm shares than would be optimal in their portfolios and require a
higher return for compensation. The reduced investor base could be as a result of investors selling
out of firms due to ethical reasons and/or because the exclusions cause them to negatively revalue
the strength of firm fundamentals and firm specific risk in a negative manner. In both cases there
should be a an adverse return impact which is not reversed in the shirt run. If investors are correct
to revalue firm fundamentals we should expect to also see firm performance changes in the future.
The second hypothesis is that investors overreact to the exclusion news, which are a negative
piece of information. Overreacting investors then sell out of the excluded firms causing their prices
to go down. However, later on they realise the exclusion news does not impact firm fundamentals
and buy back the sold shares resulting in prices recovering. Therefore, the net impact is a short
term dip in prices and no change in the clientele base.
The third and final hypothesis is that there is a switch in the investor base. Once ethics-sensitive
investors become aware of the exclusions they sell out of firms. However, when prices go below
those justified by firm fundamentals, ethics-insensitive investors step in and purchase firm shares,
driving prices back up. As a result there is a short term negative return impact and longer term
clientele change as ethics-sensitive investors are replaced by ethics-insensitive investors.
The observed changes in price, investor composition and firm performance should distinguish
which mechanism is at play. The first hypothesis involves a non-transient drop in firm prices. In
contrast, the second and third hypotheses involve transient price changes. The first hypotheses
relies on divestment by some investors, while the third hypothesis implies a switch in the investor
base.
3 Prior Literature
Our paper is an investigation of how ethical exclusions can impact firms. In particular, it
examines how firms negatively screened out of the GPFG’s portfolio for ethical reasons are im-
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pacted in terms of returns, ownership structure, and ESG and financial performance. This sheds
light on the mechanism via which ethical exclusions can impact firm value. In contrast, Aguilera,
Bermejo, Capape´ and Cun˜at (2019) examine the mirror issue of how firms are affected by being
owned by the GPFG fund. Specifically, they analyse the implications of a GPFG announcement in
2012 where the Fund introduced updated specific governance expectations for its portfolio firms.
The authors document that portfolio firms improve their governance metrics in reaction to the
announcement. This together with the fund tilting its portfolio towards higher governance firms
increases the overall governance score of the GPFG. Notably, the majority of the fund’s governance
score improvement comes from the actions of portfolio firms to align with the fund’s expectations.
The analysis of firm ethical behaviours in this paper is directly related by seminal work by
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) shows that “sin” stocks outperform comparable “non-sin” stocks.15
A similar result is found by Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) and Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant (2008).
In contrast, Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) adjust sin stock returns for the Fama French 5 factors and dis-
cover that out-performance disappears. However, they do not benchmark firms against a matched
samples, as in the case of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009).
For firms to have higher returns in the future, they should have become undervalued at some
point in the past. A reduction in firm investor base seems a plausible candidate to have driven such
a change in firm value. Indeed, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show lower institutional ownership
levels for their sample of sin stocks. Theoretically, according to Merton (1987), a larger investor
base is expected to reduce the cost of capital (returns) of firms and increase their value. This is
consistent with empirical analysis by Foerster and Karolyi (1999), who find reduced long term
returns of firms cross-listing their shares in the US. Similarly, Shleifer (1986) documents positive
abnormal returns for stocks added to the S&P500 which is not reversed up to three months after the
announcements.16 By that logic, a reduced investor base will in contrast lead to lower firm value
(short term) and higher cost of capital (long term). Similarly, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)
argue that stocks have non-flat demand curves due to lack of perfect substitutes, which creates
limits to arbitrage. Therefore, reduced shares demand following an ethical exclusion can reduce
firm value due to non-flat demand curves and a lower investor base.
Directly related to ethical exclusions, Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) build a model where
if a threshold is reached of a number of institutional investors divesting firms for acting unethically
to the point that firm increased cost of capital is higher than the cost of reform, then firms would be
induced to improve their practices. In such a framework, divestment is a tool to improve corporate
ethical behaviour. It presents ethical exclusions as a dynamic process, the effectiveness of which
15The authors define “sin” firms as those belonging to the alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries.
16However, Patel and Welch (2017) argue that the return impact from additions and exclusions from the S&P500
index is no longer permanent.
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may depend on the reaction of other investors to the announcement of exclusion, and not just the
physical divestment of the announcing entity. On the other hand, Davies and Van Wesep (2018)
build a model where divestment can be ineffective in changing firm behaviour as managers with
large portions of their compensation based on stock options are likely to benefit from short run
price reductions followed by longer term price increases.
In terms of investor behaviour, Roth Tran (2018) argues that philanthropic institutions have a
monetary incentive to overinvest in firms which are run in a manner opposite to the institution’s
mission as this provides hedging benefits. For example, a charity providing support fort lung cancer
patients would benefit from having more revenues when demand for tobacco products is high and
correspondingly tobacco firm prices increase. Baker, Hollifield and Osambela (2019) expand on
the idea and show that other factors may be counteracting the hedging benefits. In particular,
they explore the possibility of environmentalist investors to coordinate in order to internalise the
damages of pollution and for non pecuniary dis-utilities from owning shares in polluting stocks to
affect the actions of investors.
For other investors to follow the Fund’s exclusion behaviour, the information about firm uneth-
ical behaviour which they Fund brings to attention should be both credible and of importance to
other investors. The Fund’s exclusions under the different product criteria can be argued to bring
no new information about general firm behaviour as investor would presumably be aware of which
companies produce tobacco or coal outputs. However, they may serve to frame that behaviour as
unethical. As a large institutional investor, the GPFG could be playing the role of a monitor of
firm ethical behaviour for investors with limited resources which can be dedicated to monitoring.
Models show that even in the presence of the free-rider problem, monitoring by large sharehold-
ers will occur (Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994)), although the level of monitoring can be
sub-optimal (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).
Prior work by Teoh, Welch and Wazzan (1999) investigates the consequences of the South
African divestment campaign in the 1980s which was in response to the Apartheid regime in the
country. The authors find no effect on the valuations of firms being listed on the South African
stock markets or operating in the country.
Other research has documented that in the short term investors seem to react negatively to
adverse CSR firm events (Kru¨ger (2015)) and to deteriorations in CSR indicators such as firms
leaving the Domini 400 Social Index (Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan and Kobeissi (2012)). Similarly,
firms experience negative returns when they are found to have behaved irresponsibly with regard to
the environment, and positive returns in the opposite case (Flammer (2013)). Firms experiencing
chemical disasters also face a negative market reaction, especially those with bad prior records
(Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010)). However, the papers do not examine the change in firm
investor base around these events and the events.
12
In contrast, in this paper, I focus specifically on unethical behaviour and attempt to link the
return impact to changes in the investor base around the exclusion announcements. Empirically,
clientele changes have been documented in other settings such as around stock splits (Dhar, Goet-
zmann and Zhu (2004)) and negative returns for financially distressed stocks (Da and Gao (2010)).
Additionally, while Modigliani and Miller (1958) state the irrelevance of firm capital structure in
perfect markets where there are no transaction costs and taxes, they also recognise the potential
existence of clientele effects if market imperfections exist (Miller and Modigliani (1961)). Pettit
(1977) documents such dividend clientele effects among individual investors with varying ages
and estimated different tax and capital gains rates. Closer to the ethics literature, Friedman and
Heinle (2016) develop a model where firm investor composition and CSR activities are determined
by investor CSR preferences.
A priori, one can also expect the reaction to the exclusion to be temporary and a result of in-
vestor overreaction to the exclusion news. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) document that monthly
stock returns in CRSP are consistent with an investor overreaction hypothesis whereby investors
“overreact” to stock recent returns history and portfolios of past “losers” outperform portfolios of
past “winners”. This implies that prices experience reversal in the longer term (up to three years).
The impact is asymmetric with the “loser” portfolios experiencing much larger excess returns than
“winner” portfolios. In a follow-up paper, De Bondt and Thaler (1987) find the results are ro-
bust to various factors such as the size effect and changes in risk as measured via CAPM betas.
Using a sample of larger UK firms (from the FT 500 Index), Dissanaike (1997) also provides anal-
ysis in support of the investor overreaction hypothesis. Accordingly, the analysis in this paper
investigates if the investor reaction is consistent with an overreaction hypothesis, whereby an ini-
tial negative reaction to the exclusion announcements is subsequently reversed without significant
investor composition changes.
Additionally, the vast literature on CSR and long-term firm value touches on ethical behaviour
issues. Empirically, Ferrell, Liang and Renneboog (2016) find a positive relationship between
CSR and firm value. Similarly, Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang (2011) show that firms which rank
favourably on CSR metrics compared to their peers benefit from a reduced cost of capital after
starting to disclose CSR. Furthermore, such disclosures attract dedicated institutional investors as
well as increased coverage by analysts. Similarly, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra (2011)
find that firms with better CSR scores have lower costs of equity while firms in “sin” sectors, such
as tobacco and nuclear, have higher cost of equity. Looking at the cost of debt, Goss and Roberts
(2011) show that firms with CSR concerns are offered higher-spread bank loans (an economically
modest but statistically significant effect). Along the same vein, Chava (2014) provides analysis
that firms excluded by environmental screens face higher costs of capital and debt.
Aguilera, Bermejo, Capape´ and Cun˜at (2019) and this paper are not the only ones which ex-
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amine the consequences of GPFG announcements. In particular, several studies have analysed the
GPFG’s ethical exclusions impact on firm returns previously. Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2010)
examine the effect of sovereign wealth fund investments as well as divestments on firm returns.
While they separate out the GPFG’s exclusions (19 cases), they do not focus on ethical exclu-
sions per se or find significance for those exclusions. Similarly, Beck and Fidora (2008) analyse
firm exclusions from the GPFG portfolio at the stock level and also find no statistically significant
abnormal returns for divested stocks (20 cases). The overall results are that there is no return sig-
nificance. However, both studies make use of a much smaller sample of exclusions than this paper
(144 cases) as the Fund has significantly increased the number of exclusions in the last few years.
Furthermore, they do not focus on uncovering the mechanism via which equity value would be
impacted.
Examining the effect on home investors, Vasudeva (2013) demonstrates that the ethical ex-
clusions increase the likelihood that the cross-border investments of focal Norwegian firms are
in responsible firms (data prior to 2011). Similarly, Vasudeva, Nachum and Say (2018) find that
during 1998–2011, Norwegian and Swedish firms acquire full equity ownership in firms domiciled
in countries where the GPFG holds larger investments. In terms of consequences for the investor
portfolio, focusing on GPFG and AP Fund exclusions, Hoepner and Schopohl (2016) show that
the exclusions lead to the portfolio of the Fund having higher risk, while the same is not the case
for exclusions by Sweden’s AP Funds. Performance, on the other hand, is not affected.
Other papers have also investigated the effects of actions of a single institutional investor. For
example, Smith (1996) examines shareholder activism by CalPERs and shows shareholder value
increases for compliant firms. Similarly, Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) document the rel-
atively successful engagements (more than 95%) with management by TIAA-CREF on corporate
governance issues. Dimson, Karakas¸ and Li (2015) find positive abnormal returns following suc-
cessful SRI-related activism by an unnamed large institutional investor. Furthermore, Hebb and
Wo´jcik (2005) document emerging market countries strengthening regulatory standards in order to
converge to global standards following exclusion from the portfolio of CalPERs due to lowmetrics.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
I collect in formation on the exclusions announcements from Norwegian Council on Ethics
website, for all exclusions except coal exclusions, which are announced by Norges Bank Invest-
ment Management on their website. The exclusion announcements are reported via press releases
as well as individual recommendations for companies and specific sectors depending on the type of
exclusion. I consider the announcement date to be the date an exclusion is listed on either website.
These are usually picked up by the media on the same day and on subsequent dates.
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Table 1 Panel A shows the sample construction for the daily returns exclusion analysis. Al-
though there were 150 firms which have been excluded in the analysis period, which goes up to
end of May 2017, a number of cases were removed from the analysis, such as cases where there
was no returns data available on Datastream. After cleaning the data, we are left with 144 events,
36 for conduct-based exclusions and 108 for product-based exclusions.
Firms returns data was collected from Datastream. Regional Global Fama French factors are
used to benchmark firm returns. The results are presented relative to the Fama French 5 factors.
All statistics are also calculated relative to the Fama French 3 factors as a robustness check and
are almost identical. These are updated factors of those initially described in Fama and French
(2012), and are calculated using data from 23 countries.17 Stocks are sorted into four regions
(North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia-Pacific exc. Japan).
Two datasets are used to analyse changes to the ownership structure of firms. First, Capital IQ
provides data on institutional share holdings of firms. I use their dataset to identify pension fund
ownership in the excluded firms. Second, CRSP has data of US-registered mutual fund holdings
of US-listed firms. I use Thomson Reuter’s Eikon to identify responsible mutual funds, defined as
mutual funds with an ethical or social criterion. Then, I analyse their levels of ownership for the
sample of the excluded firms which is available in CRSP. Finally, I employ MSCI ESG Intangible
Value Assessment (IVA) Ratings data to document how excluded firms perform across ESGmetrics
following the announcements.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the sample. The event distribution over time is shown
in Panel C. The coal exclusions in April 2016 significantly increase the 2016 numbers, making
up 44 of the 64 cases. The exclusion sample is global and comprises of a variety of countries,
as displayed in Panel D. Although the United States is the single largest country by events, the
most frequent region is the Asia-Pacific, with 50 events. The sample also represents numerous
industries, shown in Panel E. Unsurprisingly, the most frequently represented industries tend to be
those more likely to be excluded for unethical products, such as tobacco, coal, and defence. Table 2
summarises the main firm characteristics for the firms in the sample, where the data is available. It
demonstrates that the firms display variety across the metrics displayed.
17Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, United
States
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5 Impact of Exclusions on Firm Returns
5.1 Methodology
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are used to detect if abnormal performance was present.
CARs regressions are also used to supplement the analysis, where CARs are regressed on firm
characteristics and relevant dummies.
Expected returns are calculated for an estimation window before the event which includes day
-250 to -50 days versus the event as in Kru¨ger (2015).18 Following that, the model is forecast over
the event window and abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the expected and
actual returns.
The market model factors used to estimate expected returns are the Daily North America,
Asia-Pacific ex Japan, Europe, Global ex US, and Japan Fama French 3 and 5 factors (referred to
as FF3 and FF5 factors). The results are presented for the FF5 factors, with the FF3 being used
as a robustness check (not displayed). Standard abnormal returns statistics are used, which are
described below. The formulas for abnormal returns are taken from Chapter 4 of Campbell, Lo,
MacKinlay et al. (1997), Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010) and Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2010).
CAR(t1,t2) is defined as the cumulative average abnormal return from t1 to t2 (event time dates).
The first metric used was Average CARs divided by standard deviation of average CARs (as in
Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2010)):
CAR(t1,t2)
sCAR(t1,t2)
(1)
The J1 Statistic is also used (also described in Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay et al. (1997)):
J1 =
CAR(t1,t2)
[bs2(t1,t2)]1/2 a⇠N (0,1) (2)
The J1 Statistic is also used (also described in Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay et al. (1997)):
where: bs2(t1,t2) = 1N2 NÂi=1 bs2i (t1,t2) = bs
2
A(t1,t2)
N
(3)
where:
18A slightly smaller estimation window was employed for one company where the full window data was not avail-
able. Other estimation windows such as -250 to -30, achieve similar results. These are similar to the windows described
in Aktas, de Bodt and Cousin (2007) and Edmans (2011)
16
bs2A(t1,t2) = 1N NÂi=1s2i (t1,t2) (4)
Standardised CARs are also calculated (from Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay et al. (1997)):
dSCARi(t1,t2) = dCARi(t1,t2)bsi (5)
These are then averaged:
SCAR(t1,t2) =
1
N
N
Â
i=1
dSCAR(t1,t2) (6)
which can be used in the J2 (Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay et al. (1997)) and J⇤2 , from Kolari and
Pynno¨nen (2010)) statistics . The J⇤2 is also called the modified Patell statistic.
J2 =
✓
N(L1 4)
L1 2)
◆1/2
SCAR(t1,t2)
a⇠ N(0,1) (7)
J⇤2 = SCAR(t1,t2)
 s
L1 2
N(L1 4)(1+(N 1)r¯) (8)
The r¯ being the average cross-sectional correlation coefficient of abnormal returns (model
residuals) in the estimation period. N is the number of events, L1 is the event estimation win-
dow. As the J2 and J⇤2 statistics formulas assume a single factor model, the calculations have been
adjusted to use the correct subtractions for the three and five Fama French factors.
Z-score, used in Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2010) is also calculated:
Zscore= Â
N
i=1 SCARi(t1,t2)p
N
(9)
Notably, while the majority of statistics assume cross-sectionally independent events, while the
J⇤2 accounts for cross-sectional correlation in order to correct for event clustering, which is present
in the data.
The abnormal return statistics are used to investigate whether there is an effect on stock per-
formance after the exclusion announcements, and if so, how the shape of the impact compares
to the one anticipated by the different mechanisms described previously. As mentioned above,
the announcement return impact not being reversed would be consistent with the demand-driven
mechanism, while a reversal would be supportive of the overreaction and clientele change mecha-
nisms.
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The analysis uses the announcement date of the exclusions to measure when information about
unethical behaviour is made public. The Fund sells shares prior to announcement. Therefore, at
the point of physical divestment, other investors may observe increased number of shares being
offered for sale but would not have information about the reasoning behind their disposal. On
the other hand, on the exclusion announcement date, investors receive detailed information about
unethical behaviour but have no expectation that the Fund will be selling shares in the future.
To investigate if there is anticipation of the exclusions prior to their announcement, raw and
FF5-adjusted returns are plotted from the last 10 trading days before the event to 10 days after the
event. Figure 2a shows raw returns, where there does not seem to be a strong pattern before or
after the event. However, after adjusting raw returns for FF5 (the regional Fama French 5 Factors),
Figure 2b shows a dip in abnormal returns from day -1 relative to the event. Therefore, to account
for the possibility that news may have been anticipated prior to the announcements, abnormal
returns are presented from day -1. Similar results are obtained if the day of the announcement date
is used as a starting point.
5.2 Returns Analysis
The various exclusions abnormal returns metrics are showed in Table 3. The results are anal-
ysed over different horizons. -1 to 0 days relative to the event is used to examine the immediate
impact of the exclusion announcements. A wider window, -1 to 5 days (seven days) is used to ex-
amine the returns impact up to five working days after the announcement. Following that period,
the next seven working days are examined for a reversal in the returns impact. 5 days relative to
the exclusions was chosen as the cut-off point as it represents the point at which abnormal negative
returns peak (see Figure 3) so choosing the date should increase the chances of documenting a
returns reversal. Crucially, the J⇤2 accounts for event clustering, which the data suffers from.
In the total sample, the abnormal returns are statistically significant in both the short (-1 top
0) and longer horizons (-1 to 5 days). The impact of the exclusions is stronger in the longer
period. A longer horizon is not analysed to avoid confounding firm events interfering with the
event identification.
The main results are the following. After accounting for clustering, the post-exclusion period
(6 to 12 days) does not experience a statistically significant reversal. In fact, there is no statistically
significant reversal across any of the subsamples, when the clustering of the events is taken into
consideration. If clustering is not accounted for there is a reversal, however, this is always of lower
magnitude than the initial impact and its statistical significance tends to be at a lower level than is
observed for the initial impact (5 and 10% rather than 1%).
In economic terms, looking at CARs, on average firms lose $30.6 million around the announce-
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ment day (-0.94%, CARs -1 to 0 days) and $16819 million of Market Capitalization by day five
(-1.72%, CARs -1 to 5 days).
If the sample is split into product and conduct exclusions (Panels B and C), product exclusions
have statistically significantly negative returns over the longer period (-1 to 5 days), while conduct
exclusions are not significant in either the shorter or longer horizons. However, the conduct ex-
clusions sample is relatively small (36 cases) which is likely to . Therefore, this result is further
investigated in the regressions section.
In general, one reason why investors may place higher importance on product exclusions com-
pared to conduct ones is that the product for which firms are excluded can be a major revenue
source for firms and in consequence, product-based unethical behaviour may seem harder to al-
ter than conduct-based one. At the same time, disposing of an unethical product would not be
so onerous for a diversified firm. Therefore, the stronger reactions for product-excluded firms
could incorporate investor beliefs that these firms are not diversified enough to have the capacity
to change ethical behaviour.
Coal is by far the largest category of product exclusions (68) and also comprises almost half
of the total sample (47%). Therefore, it is logical to wonder if coal exclusions may be driving
the short term return impact. Panels D and E display the results for abnormal returns when only
coal exclusions are analysed and when the rest of sample is examined. Coal exclusions have a
statistical negative return impact in the larger horizon -1 to 5 days), but not in the shorter horizon
-1 to 0 days), while the opposite is true for the rest of the sample. Therefore, while investors seem
to react to both types of exclusions, there may be a difference in the manner of the reactions. This
is investigated further in the ownership section of the paper.
Splitting exclusions by region (Panels F to H), the results are strongest for North American
firms, while they are insignificant for exclusions from the Asia-Pacific region. This is also the case
for and European exclusions where the sample is relatively small (20) limiting the power of the
test.
Taken together, the results suggest that ethical exclusion cause companies to become out of
favour with investors.
5.3 Regression Analysis
This section investigates which factors affect the level of CARs in a regression setting. I employ
this method of analysis in order to look at the impact of exclusions on firm value while controlling
for firm characteristics and other relevant variables.
19CAR are converted into dollar amounts for each firm and then averaged for the sample to calculate the number.
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Factors similar to those in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), who analyse the performance of “sin”
stocks, are also included. Such firm characteristic data is available for 135 of the 144 companies
in the main sample. These include the log size of firms (market capitalisation, $M), log Market-to-
Book (MtB) ratio, average past returns, stock turnover (in as a percentage of free float shares), and
firm age. Firm size and MtB are taken from the -3 day versus the event. Turnover is the average
share turnover over days -14 to -3 relative to the event divided by the number of free float shares of
the firm at day -3 (times 100). Average past return is the average return in the 5 previous working
days. Firm age is taken as the year when company accounts are first available (from Datastream)
versus the event date. The dependent variables are CARs relative to the FF5 factors. Errors are
clustered at the exclusion announcement date.
Additionally, dummies are included for the region of the firm and for the exclusion being
conduct-based (36 cases).20 Table 5 shows summary statistics for the independent variables. The
base equation is:
CARt =C+DConduct +Log(size)t 3+Log(M/B)t 3+ rt 14,t 3+TurnoverPerct 14,t 3
+Log(age)t 3+DAsia Paci f ic+DNorthAmerica+DEurope+ et
The market is not included as a factor since the abnormal returns are relative to the Regional
Fama French Factors, which already include a market factor. Therefore, market exposure on firm
returns is contained in the fitted returns component which is removed from realised returns to
calculate abnormal returns. Consequently, the abnormal returns component should not contain any
market exposure.
Table 6 displays the results of the regressions, which are run for the strongest commutative
abnormal returns, from day -1 to day 5 relative to the announcement date. After accounting for
firm characteristics, firms excluded for unethical conduct have similar CARs to those negatively
screened for product violations. Therefore, while when splitting the two samples it seems that
investors react less strongly to conduct exclusions, one cannot conclude that there is no reaction to
them.
In the next column, a dummy for coal-related exclusions is instead included in the base re-
gressions, to check if coal-exclusions have stronger return impact once firm characteristics are
accounted for. The dummy is also not significant. Therefore, again I cannot conclude that coal
exclusions in particular cause a stronger return reaction than non-coal negative screenings as the
20Industry fixed effects were not included as the distribution has a long tail (see Table 1, Panel E) so including
dummies would largely exclude firms in the smallest categories from the calculations by attributing their CARs in the
dummy variable. The larger categories, on the other hand, largely overlap with product-based exclusions and would
cloud that analysis.
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difference could be due to firm characteristics.
Looking at European firm, they have lower (absolute) abnormal returns than other exclusions.
In contrast, older firms and more liquid firms (proxied via higher turnover as a percentage of free
float) have stronger abnormal returns. Surprisingly, North American firms do not have statistically
significantly different returns from total exclusions, while their subsample results were more pro-
nounced than the total (Table 3 Panel G). It seems that this could have been driven by liquidity as
North American firms have almost twice the turnover of the next most liquid region (see Table 7 ).
In fact, average CARs tend to become less negative (and positive) with lower firm turnover. This
trend is true for all regions but the last one, which is a grouping of eight firms headquartered in
either Africa, Central or South America. Therefore, liquidity is emerging as an important factor
associated with the potential negative impact of exclusions.
Results in columns 3 and 4 are discussed in the Robustness checks sections. Finally, a dummy
was included in the base specifications to test for the change in the final decision-maker for exclu-
sions from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance to Norges Bank (not reported). The dummy was
not significant, suggesting that the market does not distinguish between the two.
5.4 Robustness Checks
Abnormal returns were also analysed for the sub-sample of firms which were re-included in
the Fund’s investment universe, following an improvement in their conduct or a termination of
the production of an excluded category (eleven cases, see Table 4). The announcement date of
the revocation of the exclusion is used as the event date. The abnormal returns metrics were
insignificant across both the short (-1 to 0 days) and longer (-1 to 5 days) horizons. If anything,
there seems to be a statistically significant negative return reaction in the subsequent period (-6
to 12 days). However, both the lack of reaction in the main event window and the small sample
size cast doubt on the validity of that finding. Nevertheless, overall, there is indicative evidence
that investors do not react positively to news that firms have changed their behaviour and are re-
included into the Fund’s investment universe.
To investigate the possibility that firms for which the exclusion was later revoked were different
from other excluded firms to begin with, a dummy is included in the base CAR regressions (dis-
played in column 3 of table ,Table 6) to indicate if a firm was later re-included into the universe of
the Fund’s portfolio. The dummy is insignificant, suggesting that the later re-included firms were
not different from the rest of the excluded firms at exclusion.
Another argument against the validity of the results could be that the abnormal returns are a
reaction to the information that firms are being excluded from the investment universe of the Fund
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rather than a reaction to the news that the exclusion is for ethical reasons. I show evidence against
this hypothesis in the fourth column of Table 6. This column displays CARs regressions which
include “non-excluded” firms. These are cases where the Fund published an exclusion recom-
mendation which was not followed and the firms were not excluded from the Fund’s investment
universe (ten cases). For the non-excluded firms, the event date is the announcement data of the
decision not to exclude, which is usually accompanied with a detailed report of a recommendation
to exclude the firms, similarly to those which are approved. The overall dummy a recommendation
not being followed is insignificant, indicating that abnormal returns of such cases are the same as
those of normal exclusions. Graphically, in Figure 4, CARs for Exclusions and Non-exclusions
show that non-exclusions have similar abnormal returns, although as can be expected due to the
lower sample size, non-exclusions are more volatile.
On 16th November 2017, NBIM21 proposed dropping Oil and Gas stocks from the portfolio
benchmark for diversification purposes. It received considerable media attention. While the ex-
clusion proposal was made for non-ethical reasons, fossil fuels have faced pressure from ethical
investors, and the Fund has a coal ethical exclusion criterion in place. I analyse the reaction using
event study methodology. Returns of the stocks in Thomson Reuters’ Global Oil and Gas index are
tested for an effect around the announcement.22 Returns are benchmarked relative to the Global
Fama French 5 factors. Since this is a one-off event and all 290 firms are clustered at the same date,
it is imperative to look at the J⇤2 statistic for significance inferences. The statistic is not significant
in either the main or subsequent period.
Overall, the lack of significance lends support to the hypothesis that announcements of ethical
exclusions may have a stronger impact than those negatively screened for diversification purposes.
However, the Oil & Gas sector has not yet been excluded and I have not yet analysed subsequent
announcements with regards to the exclusion proposal. Furthermore, there may have been mixed
messages in the media as to whether the exclusion would be made for ethical or diversification
reasons23. Therefore, cautious interpretation is in order, since this result is based on a single
announcement on one date. Ideally, further announcements of this or similar exclusions for non-
ethical reasons would be analysed in order to form more robust inferences.
6 Ownership Analysis
Having observed that ethical exclusion reduce firm value, this section investigates if a reduced
owner base is responsible for the effect. To achieve this, I examine ownership by investors whom
21Norges Bank Investment Management, the managers of the GPFG
22where returns are available, for 289 out of 294 cases
23See https://tinyurl.com/reuters-1, https://tinyurl.com/guardian-1
22
are likely to be ethics-sensitive - global pension funds and responsible mutual funds.
Looking at the Capital IQ ownership data, Table 9 shows “# Firms Available” which for each
event time quarter shows the maximum number of excluded firms (out of the total sample of 144)
which could have been owned by investors. This provides information on sample consistency over
time and shows that the sample size was fairly stable for Quarters -6 to 4. Inferences outside of
this window using Capital IQ data would not be representative of the full sample, so they are not
attempted when other investor holdings are analysed.
6.1 Changes to firm ownership by global pension funds
Pension funds, in general, are likely to have a longer run outlook when investing and can po-
tentially be an investor group which sympathises with the ethical concerns of the Fund. Notably,
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) include pension funds in their list of “norm-constrained” investors,
which they define to include “institutions whose positions in stocks are public information, institu-
tions with diverse constituents, and institutions that can be readily exposed to public scrutiny (e.g.,
picketing by an unhappy minority)”.
Therefore, in this section, I employ the Capital IQ dataset, with ownership data to end March
2018, to investigate global pension fund reactions to the GPFG exclusions announcements. Each
table shows the mean number of pension funds owning shares in excluded firms in the quarter
before exclusion is announced (Q-1), which is compared to the number of pension funds owning
shares in Quarters -4 before exclusion to Quarter 4 following the announcements. Quarter 0 is the
announcement quarter.
The reference quarter is always Quarter -1. For that quarter I calculate the average number
of funds owning shares in the excluded firms. For example, if we had only two excluded firms,
Firm A and Firm B and Firm A was owned by 10 pension funds in Q-1 while Firm B was owned
by 8 pension funds in Q-1, then number for the “Funds Q-1” column would be the average of the
two numbers, which is 9. Intuitively, the average for Q-1 should be the same in each comparison.
However, as we move forwards in event time firms get re-included in the Fund universe and some
firms do not have data as the event quarter is past the database end quarter. This is recorded in
the “Funds Sample” column. For those quarters the average for Q-1 and the comparison quarter is
calculated using only the firms available in both quarters. One firms gets excluded from the sample
in Q2 and then three more in Q4. After that point more firms start dropping off from the sample
making it less representative so I do not report results past Q4. For the full exclusion sample, this
column is equivalent to the “# Firms Available” column in Table 9 where I show the firms the
GPFG has excluded for which there is data in each quarter.
The “Funds Q#” column reports the average fund ownership per firm in the relevant comparison
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quarter. For each row the quarter is listed in the first column (Quarter # Before or After). So
continuing the previous example, if in Quarter 2, Firm A is owned by 6 funds and Firm B by 4
funds, the average fund ownership would be 5, which would be recorded in the “Funds Q#” column
in the row corresponding to comparison Quarter 2. The “Difference” quarter presents the difference
between the two ownership levels, subtracting average ownership in the reference Quarter -1 from
the relevant comparison quarter in each row. The number is negative if the comparison quarter has
lower ownership than the reference quarter. Finally, the “Funds Sample” column records howmany
pension funds owned shares in at least one firm in the reference or comparison quarters. A paired
t-test is used to determine if the before and after ownership levels are statistically significantly
different.24
Table 10 shows the main results.25 In Panel A we see ownership changes for the full sample.
Average fund ownership of excluded firms falls following the exclusion announcements. Owner-
ship is also lower compared to Quarter -1 for Quarters 0 to 3, but it is only statistically significantly
lower for Quarter 0. However, this decrease is not long-lasting, and is reversed by Quarter 3. Fur-
thermore, ownership was not stable in prior quarters. The mixed overall picture is driven by the
variation in responses by pension funds in the different geographies, which is explored further
later in this section. The total results are similar to those for product exclusions, shown in Panel
B. Conduct negative screenings, shown in Panel C, are associated with no statistically significant
changes in pension fund ownership.
Exclusions under the coal criterion are the largest sub-category. These are analysed in Panel D.
Pension fund ownership in Quarters 0 to 4 is lower than that in Quarter -1, and this is statistically
significant for Quarters 0 to 3. Therefore, pension funds seem to decrease ownership of coal-
excluded firms in a more prolonged manner than other exclusions. Graphically, the story is more
complex. Looking at Figure 5a, which is the chart for coal exclusions, it seems that the reduction
of coal ownership is part of a continuing trend. This seems to be the case due to selling European
pension funds, which I will explore further in the regional analysis part of this section.
In contrast, looking at all exclusions except those under the coal criterion, in Panel E, pension
funds seem to generally be increasing ownership of the excluded firms prior to announcements.
They serve to pause this trend for the quarter of the announcement and the next quarter, but the
pattern resumes afterwards.
This is also the case for Tobacco-excluded firms who were also experiencing increasing own-
ership by pension funds prior to the exclusion announcements, which is partially halted following
24equivalent to testing if the difference in ownership is statistically significantly different from zero
25In results which are not reported, the firm sample to companies which were owned by at least one pension fund
in the quarter before announcement. The results for this restricted sample are slightly stronger, but this is due to not
considering the case where a firm may have had no ownership by pension funds prior to the exclusion announcement
and had pension funds purchase shares in it during later quarters.
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the announcements. This is shown in Panel F and Figure 5b. Quarters -4 to -2 all have statistically
significantly lower pension fund ownership than Quarter 2, indicating a steady increase in owner-
ship. Conversely, following the exclusion announcements, the latter quarters are not statistically
significantly different from Quarter -1. The impact for tobacco-excluded firms is driven by US
pension fund (in)activity.
It is plausible that pension funds which are geographically closer to Norway may have more
aligned ethical concerns to those of the GPFG. Consequently, I split the pension fund sample
into regions and check if European, USA, and Asia-Pacific funds have different reactions to the
exclusion announcements. The results for European pension funds are displayed in Table 11, while
those for US Pension funds are in Table 12. Pension funds in Asia Pacific owned on average less
than one excluded firm so these were not examined separately.
For the total sample of exclusions, European funds decrease ownership following the announce-
ments. This is statistically significant for Quarters 0 and 2. However, we can see graphically that
their ownership of the excluded firms has also been slowly decreasing over time prior to the an-
nouncements (Figure 6). on the other hand, US and Asia-Pacific pension funds show no reactions
in the quarter of the exclusions. There is a reduction in ownership for US funds in Quarter 1.
The reduction in holdings for product firms is similar to that for the total exclusion sample
in the case of European pension funds. US pension funds, on the other hand, reduce ownership
of product-excluded firms in the quarters following the announcements, which is statistically sig-
nificant for the quarter of the exclusion. Furthermore, overall they experience less fluctuation in
ownership in the quarters prior to the exclusion, suggesting they were less prone to selling be-
haviour prior to the announcements, unlike the European pension funds. Neither European nor
United States pension funds react to conduct exclusions.
For Coal exclusions, both European and US pension funds reduce ownership in the exclusion
announcement quarter. However, European Funds have reduced ownership in quarters prior to
the exclusion (Quarters - 4 and - 3, also graphically in Figure 6a), and do not have statistically
significantly lower ownership in the quarters following the exclusions. In contrast, US pension
funds do not change ownership in the quarters prior to the exclusion announcements, but do have
lower ownership in the exclusion quarter and the four quarters following it, although this is only
statistically significant up to quarter 3. Therefore, it seems that European Funds were already
significantly reducing ownership in coal firms when the Fund made its exclusion recommendation,
and thus their subsequent reaction was more subdued. US pension funds, on the other hand, had not
made such changes and had a stronger and longer lasting reaction to the GPFG’s announcements.
Looking at all exclusions except for coal, European Pension and US pension funds react similarly
to the total pension funds sample.
Tobacco exclusions have lower ownership by European Funds following the exclusion an-
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nouncements, but this is only statistically significant in the event quarter. An increasing number of
US pension funds, on the other hand, were owning shares in tobacco firms over time prior to the
exclusions, a trend which was no longer statistically significant following the exclusions. There-
fore, the fund announcements seems to have dissuaded current non-investing US pension funds
from buying tobacco shares, while not changing the minds of existing US pension fund owners.
Overall, there is significant regional variation in the reactions of pension funds to the exclusion
recommendations. Among European and US pension funds, it seems that the GPFG influences US
funds more. Both categories react to product exclusions. However, European funds have already
been selling out of coal firms by the time the GPFG officially recommends excluding them. As a
result, their reaction to the exclusion recommendation is part of a pre-existing pattern of declining
ownership. Their reaction to tobacco exclusions is also subdued. US pension funds, on the other
hand, have not been selling out of coal firms significantly and start doing so in the quarter of the
exclusion announcements. They then continue having lower ownership levels in the subsequent
quarters. Similarly, for tobacco exclusions, the GPFG’s exclusion announcements put a stop to an
existing trend of increasing ownership of tobacco firms by US pension funds.
Taken together, the results suggest that investors likely to have very similar ethics beliefs to
those of the GPFG may have already incorporated these into their portfolios. Therefore, the Fund
may have more scope for affecting the behaviour of investors whose existing ethics beliefs are
similar to its own but not too close, such as US pension funds.
6.2 Changes to firm ownership by responsible US mutual funds
Another category of ethics-sensitive investors are mutual funds with explicit mandates to con-
sider non-financial metrics. These are identified using Thomson Reuters’ Fund Screener (via
Eikon). The universe of mutual funds consists of US-registered mutual funds with Ethical or
Social screens, which also have a cusip number which matches the WRDs CRSP database. The
data goes as far as end November 2017, so the last quarter I can analyse is end September 2017.
The number of funds analysed is 177 (see Table 13 Panel A). Since the overlap between fund with
Ethical or Social screens is very large (176 out of 177), the analysis is performed for the total
number of responsible funds identified. Holdings are analysed at the quarterly event time level.
The procedure is as follows. If a fund has reported holdings in the event time quarter for a firm,
the holdings will be set to (1) the values reported for the firm, (2) 0 if no holdings for the firm are
reported in the particular quarter, or (3) to missing if the firm’s exclusion has been revoked. Data
for quarters in which the fund has not reported holdings are also set to missing. Responsible index
funds were excluded from the analysis (20) 26 since they do not make active decisions on which
26Funds having Index, Indx or Idx in their name
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firms to own.
The total number of excluded firms which were matched to firms in the CRSP database is 60
(out 144, Table 13 Panel B). Of these, 57 were at some point owned by a responsible fund in
the database. A breakdown of the total firm sample and the matched firms in CRSP by various
categories is presented in Table 1. Panel B shows that of the 36 conduct exclusions, 13 were
identified in CRSP, while of the 108 product exclusions, 47 were matched to the database. Panel
C displays the distribution of matched exclusions by year. The low matching rate is caused by
the nature of the database which only covers US-listed firms. Therefore, the majority of matched
firms are head-quartered in the United States, (see Panel D). Of the 60 matched firms, 45 are from
the United States, and only 15 have headquarters elsewhere. The overlap is not complete as some
firms are head-quartered outside the United States but are listed on a US Stock Exchange. Finally,
Panel E presents the industry breakdown of exclusions.
Similarly to the pension funds analysis, I examine how many responsible funds report own-
ing shares of the excluded companies before and after exclusion. The comparison is done for the
quarter before exclusion is announced (Quarter -1) relative to the quarters following the announce-
ments. Quarter 0 is the quarter which includes the exclusion announcement, Quarter 1 is be the first
quarter following the exclusion announcement, Quarter -1 is one quarter prior to the exclusion, and
so forth. The analysis is limited to Quarter 4 after the event as the sample size drops significantly
after that. The results are presented in Table 13.27 Panel A compares average fund ownership by
all firms matched to the CRSP holdings data. Panel B restricts results to product-excluded firms
and Panel C to conduct-excluded firms.
The format and interpretations of the tables is the same as for the pension funds analysis,
with one exception. Since in CRSP some mutual funds do not consistently report holdings in
each quarter, I need to keep track of which mutual funds have reported data in both the reference
and comparison quarters and only analyse holdings where I have mutual funds reporting in both.
Therefore, even for quarters where the firms sample is the same, the average ownership levels for
the reference quarter will vary depending on over how many mutual funds it is calculated.
For example, if for Firm A in Q-1 10 mutual funds report holdings data, in Quarter 2 only 8
of them report data, while in Q3 9 report holdings, then the reference and comparisons ownership
levels for Q-1 compared to Q2 will be calculated using holdings data for the 8 mutual funds, while
the averages for Q-1 versus Q3 will use ownership data for the 9 mutual funds. This can then result
in different average ownership levels for Q-1 if one the fund which did not report holdings in Q2
but reported holdings in Q3 had positive share ownership in Firm A in Q-1.
Looking at ownership by all responsible funds in Panel A, ownership does not seem to change
27In unreported results the sample is restricted to firms owned by responsible funds prior to exclusion. The results
are slightly stronger but with the same implications as the ones presented in the main part of the paper here.
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in the quarters prior to exclusion and declines in the quarters following the exclusion. However, this
change is no longer statistically significant after the exclusion quarter. Similarly to the abnormal
returns and the pension fund ownership analysis, the results are more pronounced for product
exclusions (Panel B), where quarters 2 and 3 after the exclusion also have statistically significantly
lower ownership. Unfortunately, as the sample size of excluded firms is already small, it cannot be
broken down further into the different product exclusion categories. Conduct exclusions show no
statistically significant change in ownership. While the overall level of ownership by responsible
funds is low, at just over one fund on average owning an excluded firm, these funds are different
for the various firms and the results are not driven by just one or two responsible funds.
In summary, fewer US-domiciled responsible funds own shares in product-excluded firms fol-
lowing the exclusion announcements, but the funds do not react to conduct-based exclusions.
Therefore, there is evidence that US responsible mutual funds follow some of the GPFG’s ex-
clusion recommendations.
7 Potential Customer Reactions
Since the exclusion announcements are not based on any financial information about the ex-
cluded firms, the expectation would be that firm performance metrics would not be affected by
them. On the other hand, firm customers could react adversely to the announcements. This section
aims to determine if there are any indications of such negative consequences. Specifically, changes
in Receivables to 5 Year Average Assets were used to test for potential negative customer reactions.
The metric is likely to increase if customers postpone paying bills to excluded firms. Furthermore,
Net Sales to Lag 1 of Assets is used to check is customers decide to purchase fewer goods from
the excluded firms.
The performance metrics are disclosed annually and consequently the granularity of the data is
not large. The results are displayed in Table 14. The sample size is representative of the total when
looking up to one year following the exclusion and drops significantly afterwards. Nevertheless,
results confirm the base hypothesis that the metrics does not deteriorate following the announce-
ments. There are no statistically significant changes for receivables, shown in Panel A. Net Sales
also do not change in the event year or the year after it. Curiously, they do increase for conduct
exclusions two years after the exclusion events, but given the lack of change in the previous years
it is unlikely that the exclusion announcements are the cause of this. Therefore, it seems that firm
customers do not react negatively to the exclusions.
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8 Changes to Excluded Firm ESG Performance
In this section, I examine firm performance on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)
dimensions in event time. The aim is to determine if firms change their ESG scores following the
exclusions. I use the MSCI’s ESG Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) Ratings28 data from 2007
to October 2018. MSCI Research combines over 35 key issue metrics for each company into a
composite score (Weighted-Average Key Issue Score). This is then industry-adjusted to generate
a score comparable across companies with different lines of business (Final Industry-Adjusted
Company Score). This score is translated into an ESG rating score ranging from A to CCC. For
the purpose of this analysis, I examine the numerical scores. These range from 0 to 10, with 0
being the worst possible score on the given metric and 10 representing a top score.29 I start by
looking at the industry adjusted and raw weighted ESG score. I also look at the Environmental,
Social and Governance key pillar scores into which the individual theme scores can be collated.
The results are shown in Table 15.
For each score we use a paired t-test to compare firm values inMonth -1 relative to the exclusion
announcement month in event time to their values in five other event time months (0, 3, 6, 12, and
18), displayed in each row. Panel A displays the results for the total sample, while Panels B and
C show the results for product and conduct exclusions respectively. The matched firms sample
(maximum 69) is lower than the total exclusions (144) for several reasons. First, our exclusions
sample starts in 2005 while the MSCI data starts in 2007. Second, not all firms are covered in the
database. Third, firms start to drop out as we move forwards n event time if the exclusion is recent.
Finally, firms which are re-included are also excluded from the comparison once they have been
re-included.
Nevertheless, I still find significant changes to the ESG metrics following the exclusions. For
the total sample (Panel A), firms have statistically significantly higher their industry-adjusted com-
pany scores starting from a quarter following the announcements. This improvement is long-
lasting and is still significant in 18 months (event) time. In contrast, the unadjusted raw ESG score,
(weighted-average key issues score), remains unchanged up to half a year following the announce-
ments. However, it also records an improvement in the long term (12-18 months). This seems to be
driven by higher Environmental Pillar scores. Conversely, the Social and Governance pillar scores
do not change significantly. In absolute terms, there is minimal alterations to the Social pillar score
and the Governance pillar score deteriorates.
The results for product exclusions are similar to those of the total sample (Panel B). However,
28described at https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/123a2b2b-1395-4aa2-a121-ea14de6d708a, accessed
September 2019
29This is in contrast to some “risk exposure” metrics in the data where 0 is the lowest possible exposure and 10 the
highest
29
there is a stronger change in the Social Pillar score, which is significant at the six months horizon.
Similarly. the deterioration of the Governance Pillar score is significant at the six and eighteen
month horizons. The conduct exclusion sample (Panel C) s relatively small, with a maximum of
16 excluded firms being matched across the metrics. Therefore, the only significant change is a
higher industry-adjusted score six months following the announcements.
Since the results for the main sample appear to be driven by changes in the Environmental
pillar metrics, next I analyse the four themes which the score is comprised of. These are “Climate
Change”, “Natural Capital”, “Pollution & Waste” and “Environmental Opportunities”. The results
are displayed in Table 16. Over the longer term (a year and a half), three out of the four themes
are higher relative to their pre-exclusion levels. The climate change score records the highest
rise, which starts being statistically significant at 12 months. Product exclusion results (Panel B)
mirror those for the main sample. Conduct exclusions (Panel C) have a sample below 10 which
contributes to their changes not being statistically significant.
Therefore, I document that firms increase their overall ESG scores following exclusions, es-
pecially after adjusting it for firm industry affiliation. In particular, over the longer term, environ-
mental metrics are improved over the majority of themes tracked by MSCI. In contrast, there is no
change to social metrics and there are indicative results that firm governance may be deteriorating.
9 Summary and Conclusions
This paper analysed the consequences of corporate unethical behaviour by examining changes
to firm equity value and ownership structure as a result of the GPFG’s ethical exclusion announce-
ments. It documents a negative return impact around the announcements, which is not reversed in
the short term. Some ethics-sensitive investors also mimic the behaviour of the GPFG and divest
product-excluded firms, in particular those under the coal criterion. Taken together, the results
support a demand driven mechanism where firm prices are pushed down by a reduced investor
base. Therefore, the paper documents one of the ways in which firms perceived to be unethical can
fall out of favour with ethics sensitive investors and lose equity value. In conclusion, it seems that
ethical divesting has an impact on equity value and at least part of this is due to ethics-sensitive
investors selling firm shares in product-based exclusions. Furthermore, the adverse impact of ex-
clusions is stronger for more liquid firms. In addition, I document that firms seem to improve their
overall ESG scores following the exclusions, which is driven by higher Environmental ratings. In
contrast, firm governance may be decreasing, especially for product-excluded firms.
The paper suffers from some drawbacks. While the sample of excluded firms is global, the
returns analysis is based on US Dollar prices, so the results are from the perspective of a US
investor. Moreover, firm ownership data is only available at the quarterly level. This means that
30
only longer-term ownership changes can be analysed as investors who have purchased and sold
shares (or the opposite) within a given quarter, leaving their quarterly holdings unaffected, are not
visible in the data.
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10 Figures
Figure 1: Overview of Data
(a) Exclusions by type
This Figure displays how the GPFG’s exclusions are split by the type of exclusion. Product exclusions are
also split by their sub-category.
(b) Regional composition of exclusions
This Figure displays how the GPFG’s exclusions are split by the geography of exclusions, measured by the
location of the headquarters of the excluded firms.
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Figure 2: Information Anticipation Charts
(a) All Exclusions, mean raw returns, around exclusion announcement time
This Figure plots the average raw returns for a GPFG excluded firm around the exclusion announcement
date.
(b) All Exclusions, mean FF5-adjusted returns, around exclusion announcement time
This Figure plots the average abnormal returns for a GPFG excluded firm around the exclusion
announcement date. Abnormal returns are calculated versus the Global Fama French 5 factors.
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Figure 3: Exclusions Mean CARs relative to FF5 Factors, thick line if J⇤2s significant at 10%
The Plots graph the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a GPFG excluded firm around the
exclusion announcement date. Abnormal returns are calculated versus the Global Fama French 5 factors,
and are cumulated from Day -1 in event time.
(a) All Exclusions
Mean CARs for all excluded firms
(b) Product Exclusions
Mean CARs for firms excluded under the product criterion
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(c) Conduct Exclusions
Mean CARs for firms excluded under the conduct criterion
(d) Reinclusions
Mean CARs for excluded firms whose exclusion is later revoked. CARs calculated around the reinclusion
announcements.
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Figure 4: Non-Exclusions and Exclusions Mean CARs relative to FF5 Factors
This Figure plots the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a GPFG excluded firm and for firms
which were recommended but not approved for exclusion (”non-exclusions”) around the exclusion
announcement date.
Figure 5: Pension Fund ownership of excluded firms
The Figures plot the mean number of pension funds which own shares in an excluded firm in the quarters
around the exclusion announcements
(a) Coal Firms
Graph of pension fund ownership levels for firms excluded under the coal criterion
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(b) Tobacco Firms
Graph of pension fund ownership levels for firms excluded under the tobacco criterion
Figure 6: European Pension Fund ownership of excluded firms
The Figures plot the mean number of pension funds which own shares in an excluded firm headquartered in
Europe in the quarters around the exclusion announcements
(a) Coal Firms
Graph of pension fund ownership levels for firms excluded under the coal criterion
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(b) Tobacco Firms
Graph of pension fund ownership levels for firms excluded under the tobacco criterion
Figure 7: US Pension Fund ownership of excluded firms
The Figures plot the mean number of pension funds which own shares in an excluded firm headquartered in
the USA in the quarters around the exclusion announcements
(a) Coal Firms
Graph of pension fund ownership levels for firms excluded under the coal criterion
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(b) Tobacco Firms
Graph of pension fund ownership levels for firms excluded under the tobacco criterion
Figure 8: US Non-index Responsible Fund Ownership
The Figures plot the mean number of US non-index mutual funds with an ethical or social component in
their mandates which own shares in an excluded US-listed firm in the quarters around the exclusion
announcements. The blue bars report average ownership levels in Quarter -1 relative to the event and the
red bars display the levels of ownership in the Quarter on the x-axis (2 to 4). Not all funds report ownership
levels in each quarter so the fund sample size changes over time which is why the Quarter -1 number also
changes in the following quarters.
(a) All firms
Graph of ownership levels for US-listed excluded firms
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(b) Product Firms
Graph of ownership levels for US-listed firms excluded under the product criteria
(a) Conduct Firms
Graph of ownership levels for US-listed firms excluded under the conduct criteria
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11 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The tables describe the summary statistics for the sample used in the paper
Panel A: Norges Bank excluded companies sample as of end May 2017 - Returns Analysis
This Panel shows the construction of the final sample from the total list of exclusions and how this splits
into conduct and product-based exclusions
Status Events
excluded (any time) 150
exclusion revoked 13
excluded again 2
returns or factor data issues 2
misc (lack of clarity on status) 4
Total Sample 144
conduct-based exclusions 36
product-based exclusions 108
currently excluded 126
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Panel B: Norges Bank excluded companies sample as of end May 2017 - Exclusions by Category
This Panel displays the exclusions sample split by sub-category. The second column shows many of the
exclusions in each split are matched to firms in the CRSP data, which includes only US-listed firms. The
CRSP-matched sample is used in the US Ethical mutual funds ownership analysis
Exclusions Events Events in CRSP Database
Conduct 36 13
conduct - other particularly serious
violations of fundamental ethical norms 7 5
conduct - serious violations of human
rights 3 1
conduct - severe environmental damage 21 7
conduct - companies supplying arms or military
equipment to Burma 1 0
conduct - serious violations of individuals rights
in war or conflict 3 0
conduct - gross corruption 1 0
Product 108 47
production of cluster munitions 6 4
production of nuclear weapons 14 9
production of tobacco 20 10
production of coal or coal-based energy 68 24
Panel C: Exclusion Sample, events over time, until end May 2017
This Panel displays the sample by year of exclusion. The second column shows many of the exclusions in
each year are matched to firms in the CRSP data, which includes only US-listed firms. The CRSP-matched
sample is used in the US Ethical mutual funds ownership analysis
Year Events Events in CRSP Database
2005 8 6
2006 10 6
2007 4 2
2008 5 2
2009 5 3
2010 19 9
2011 5 2
2012 1 0
2013 9 3
2014 0 0
2015 4 1
2016 64 24
2017 10 2
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Panel D: Exclusion Sample, events by country , until end May 2017
This Panel displays the exclusions sample by firm headquarters. The second column shows many of the
exclusions in each country are matched to firms in the CRSP data, which includes only US-listed firms.
The third column shows the region of the exclusions in each country. The final column displays the Fama
French regional factors which are applied for the firms in each country when calculating abnormal returns
around the exclusion events.
Country Events Events in CRSP Database Region Fama French Factors
United States 45 45 North America North America
China 13 2 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
India 12 1 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Malaysia 9 0 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
United Kingdom 8 3 Europe Europe
Japan 7 0 Asia-Pacific Japan
Hong Kong 6 0 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
South Korea 5 2 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Canada 5 3 North America North America
Israel 4 1 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Australia 3 0 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Poland 3 0 Europe Europe
France 2 0 Europe Europe
Mexico 2 0 Central America Global ex US
South Africa 2 1 Africa Global ex US
Chile 2 0 South America Global ex US
Czech Republic 2 0 Europe Europe
Brazil 2 0 South America Global ex US
Philippines 2 0 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Netherlands 1 0 Europe Europe
Italy 1 0 Europe Europe
Russia 1 0 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Indonesia 1 0 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Sweden 1 1 Europe Europe
Peru 1 0 South America Global ex US
Greece 1 0 Europe Europe
Ireland 1 0 Europe Europe
Thailand 1 0 Asia-Pacific Asia-Pacific ex Japan
Bermuda 1 1 West Indies North America
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Panel E: Exclusion Sample, events by industry, by end May 2017
This Panel displays the exclusions sample by firm industry. The second column shows many of the
exclusions in each industry are matched to firms in the CRSP data, which includes only US-listed firms.
Industry Events Events in CRSP Database
Electric Utilities 31 14
Independent Power Producers
and Energy Traders 22 5
Aerospace and Defense 17 12
Tobacco 16 9
Coal and Consumable Fuels 12 3
Diversified Metals and Mining 6 2
Industrial Conglomerates 5 1
Construction and Engineering 4 1
Forest Products 4 0
Gold 3 2
Fertilizers and Agricultural
Chemicals 3 2
Multi-Utilities 3 3
Oil and Gas Exploration and
Production 4 2
Hypermarkets and Super Centers 2 1
Steel 2 1
Copper 1 1
Environmental and Facilities
Services 1 0
Automobile Manufacturers 1 0
Real Estate Operating
Companies 1 0
Specialty Chemicals 1 0
Paper Products 1 1
Trading Companies and
Distributors 1 0
Casinos and Gaming 1 0
Communications Equipment 1 0
Heavy Electrical Equipment 1 0
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Table 2: Exclusion Sample, firm characteristics, sample up to end of May 2017
This Panel displays the characteristics of the exclusions sample across several metrics, taken from
Datastream. Age is the year when company accounts are first available for a firm versus the event date.
Firm size is market capitalisation at day -3 relative to the exclusion day. The market-to-book ratio is also
taken from event day -3. Average share turnover is calculated as the mean share turnover in days -14 to -3
relative to the event.
Metric N Mean Median Min Max Stdev
Age 141 20.25 19 1 36 8.65
Size ($bn) 144 12.01 4.28 0.03 201.68 22.27
Market to Book 140 2.44 1.58 0.00 26.95 3.49
Turnover as a % of Free Float (in %) 139 0.8 0.5 0.0004 13.0 1.4
Table 3: Abnormal Returns for Exclusions
This table displays the abnormal returns for the exclusions sample and relevant splits. The abnormal
returns are calculated relative to the regional Fama French Factors. The statistics are described in detail in
the Methodology subsection of the paper.
Panel A: All Exclusions, N = 144
Abnormal returns for full exclusions sample
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 -0.94 -3.51*** -2.82*** -2.81*** -1.82*
-1 to 5 -1.72 -3.62*** -3.98*** -3.96*** -2.57**
6 to 12 0.60 1.51 1.96* 1.95* 1.26
Panel B: Product Exclusions, N = 108
Abnormal returns for firms excluded under the product criteria
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 -1.08 -3.64*** -2.47** -2.45** -1.45
-1 to 5 -1.92 -3.60*** -3.92*** -3.90*** -2.30**
6 to 12 0.91 1.73* 2.06** 2.05** 1.21
Panel C: Conduct Exclusions, N = 36
Abnormal returns for firms excluded under the conduct criteria
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 -0.49 -0.90 -1.37 -1.37 -1.24
-1 to 5 -1.11 -1.17 -1.18 -1.18 -1.06
6 to 12 -0.34 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.31
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Panel D: Coal Exclusions, N = 68
Abnormal returns for firms excluded under the coal criterion
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 -1.31 -3.30*** -2.02** -2.01** -1.10
-1 to 5 -2.58 -3.67*** -4.49*** -4.47*** -2.46**
6 to 12 1.56 1.97** 2.46** 2.45** 1.34
Panel E: Total ex. Coal Exclusions, N = 76
Abnormal returns for all excluded firms except those excluded under the coal criterion
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 -0.60 -1.66* -1.98** -1.97** -1.72*
-1 to 5 -0.94 -1.45 -1.23 -1.23 -1.07
6 to 12 -0.26 0.18 0.37 0.37 0.32
Panel F: Asia-Pacific Exclusions, N = 64
Abnormal returns for excluded firms in the Asia-Pacific region
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 0.02 -0.23 -0.44 -0.44 -0.33
-1 to 5 -1.09 -1.66* -1.63 -1.62 -1.21
6 to 12 0.03 0.19 0.45 0.45 0.34
Panel G: North American Exclusions, N = 51
Abnormal returns for excluded firms in the North America region
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 -2.45 -5.96*** -4.03*** -4.01*** -2.36**
-1 to 5 -3.81 -4.97*** -5.18*** -5.16*** -3.03***
6 to 12 1.56 2.42** 2.19** 2.17** 1.28
Panel H: European Exclusions, N = 20
Abnormal returns for excluded firms in Europe
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.12
-1 to 5 1.01 0.52 0.88 0.88 0.82
6 to 12 -0.36 -0.23 0.46 0.46 0.43
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 4: Abnormal Returns for Reinclusions
This table displays the abnormal returns for excluded firms which are later reincluded in the investment
universe. The abnormal returns are calculated around the reinclusion announcements and are relative to the
regional Fama French Factors. The statistics are described in detail in the Methodology subsection of the
paper.
Reinclusions, N = 11
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 0.58 0.69 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
-1 to 5 0.10 -0.06 -1.01 -1.00 -0.98
6 to 12 -3.17 -1.76* -2.20** -2.19** -2.13**
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 6: CAR FF5 Model regressions
The table shows the regression results of a number of OLS regressions where the independent
variable is firm cumulative abnormal returns for days -1 to relative to the exclusion
announcements and the independent variables are various firm and event characteristics, described
in Table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the exclusion announcement time
Dependent variable:
CARs -1 to 5 CARs -1 to 5 CARs -1 to 5 CARs -1 to 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 7.00 6.75 7.03 7.94⇤
(4.52) (4.64) (4.52) (4.49)
Conduct  0.39  0.35  0.31
(1.01) (0.98) (1.11)
Coal Exclusions (prod)  0.25
(1.82)
Later Reincluded Companies  0.58
(1.73)
Not Excluded  0.59
(3.47)
Log size ($M)  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.14
(0.87) (0.89) (0.87) (0.68)
Log M/B  1.07  1.27  1.05  1.22
(1.05) (1.69) (1.04) (1.14)
Average past return  0.23  0.23  0.20  0.85
(0.53) (0.51) (0.52) (0.54)
Turnover as % of Free Float  1.42⇤⇤  1.45⇤⇤  1.42⇤⇤  1.34⇤⇤
(0.59) (0.58) (0.59) (0.59)
Log firm age  5.58⇤⇤  5.31⇤  5.62⇤⇤  5.08⇤⇤
(2.34) (2.95) (2.33) (2.21)
Asia Pacific 0.53 0.51 0.55  1.59
(1.68) (1.69) (1.68) (2.50)
North America 0.36 0.38 0.41  1.55
(1.83) (1.79) (1.88) (2.56)
Europe 3.12⇤ 3.10⇤⇤ 3.20⇤ 1.00
(1.60) (1.56) (1.66) (2.56)
Observations 133 133 133 143
R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
Residual Std. Error 6.62 (df = 123) 6.62 (df = 123) 6.65 (df = 122) 6.76 (df = 132)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at divestment announcement time
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Table 7: Turnover and CARs by region
This table displays how firm turnover as a percentage of free float and cumulative abnormal returns differ
by the region where an excluded firm’s headquarters is based.
Region Turnover as% of Free Float CARs -1 to 5 N
North America 1.26 -3.87 50
Asia-Pacific 0.65 -1.09 64
Europe 0.54 0.54 17
Africa, Central and South America 0.21 1.56 8
Table 8: Abnormal Returns for the Oil & Gas sector exclusion proposal, 16 November 2017
This table displays the abnormal returns around the NBIM (Norges Bank Investment Management)
proposal o drop Oil and Gas stocks from the portfolio benchmark. The announcement was made on 16th
November 2017. The sample is the constituents of the Thomson Reuters’ Global Oil and Gas index, where
return data is available in Datastream ( 289 out of 294 cases). Abnormal returns are benchmarked relative
to the Global Fama French 5 factors. The statistics used are described in he Methodology subsection of the
paper
Oil & Gas, N = 289
Event
Days
avg CARs
FF5
J1
FF5
z-score
FF5
J2
FF5
J⇤2
FF5
-1 to 0 -0.72 -1.48 -5.77*** -5.74*** -1.34
-1 to 5 -0.58 0.43 -2.72*** -2.71*** -0.63
6 to 12 -1.12 -3.54*** -3.46*** -3.44*** -0.80
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 9: Capital IQ ownership data of excluded firms, up to end March 2018
The table shows the availability of Capital IQ ownership data for the excluded firms in event time. The
maximum number of firms for which data can be available is 144 (sample size). Going forwards in event
time, firms drop out when a firm is re-included in the portfolio universe or the exclusion quarter is past
March 2018 for a particular firm (latest data point). De-listed, merged, and otherwise contaminated firms
are also excluded. Data is not available prior to 2004, so the oldest exclusions start dropping out in event
time as we move backwards in event time for them.
Event Time
Quarter # Firms Available
-8 134
-7 136
-6 143
-5 144
-4 144
-3 144
-2 144
-1 144
0 144
1 144
2 143
3 143
4 140
5 130
6 116
7 115
8 68
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Table 10: Average number of All Pension Funds owning shares in Excluded companies, Quarter
-1 vs Quarters -4 to 4, data up to end March 2018
This table shows the average number of pension funds owning shares in excluded firms around the
exclusion announcements. In each row we compare the mean ownership number in the quarter prior to the
exclusions (“Funds Q-1”) to the average number of pension funds owning shares in Quarters -4 to Quarter
4 relative to the exclusion quarter (“Funds Q#”). The first columns shows which is the comparison quarter
in the given row. “Firms sample” displays the sample of excluded firms with available data in each event
time quarter, constructed as described in Table 9. The final column displays how many pension funds in
total owned shares in any of the excluded firms.The table is constructed using ownership data from Capital
IQ. A paired t-test is used to determine if the before and after ownership levels are statistically significantly
different.
Panel A: All Pension Funds, All excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by all pension funds for all excluded firms
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 10.14 9.99 -0.15 144 134
-3 10.14 10.15 0.01 144 130
-2 10.14 9.94 -0.20* 144 124
-1 10.14 10.14 0.00 144 119
0 10.14 9.97 -0.17* 144 121
1 10.14 9.99 -0.15 144 123
2 10.15 10.10 -0.06 143 126
3 10.15 10.36 0.21 143 129
4 9.96 10.23 0.27 140 131
Panel B: All Pension Funds, Product-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by all pension funds for firms excluded under the product criteria
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 10.77 10.60 -0.17 108 118
-3 10.77 10.86 0.09 108 120
-2 10.77 10.50 -0.27* 108 114
-1 10.77 10.77 0.00 108 110
0 10.77 10.48 -0.29*** 108 111
1 10.77 10.55 -0.22 108 114
2 10.79 10.64 -0.15 107 119
3 10.79 10.98 0.19 107 121
4 10.79 11.07 0.27 107 122
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Panel C: All Pension Funds, Conduct-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by all pension funds for firms excluded under the conduct criteria
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 8.25 8.14 -0.11 36 89
-3 8.25 8.00 -0.25 36 83
-2 8.25 8.25 0.00 36 82
-1 8.25 8.25 0.00 36 79
0 8.25 8.44 0.19 36 81
1 8.25 8.31 0.06 36 80
2 8.25 8.47 0.22 36 81
3 8.25 8.53 0.28 36 81
4 7.24 7.52 0.27 33 81
Panel D: All Pension Funds, Coal-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by all pension funds for firms excluded under the coal criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 8.12 8.41 0.29 68 78
-3 8.12 8.41 0.29 68 76
-2 8.12 8.03 -0.09 68 76
-1 8.12 8.12 0.00 68 73
0 8.12 7.75 -0.37** 68 73
1 8.12 7.75 -0.37* 68 77
2 8.12 7.69 -0.43** 67 77
3 8.12 7.79 -0.33* 67 78
4 8.12 7.94 -0.18 67 78
Panel E: All Pension Funds, All exc. Coal-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by all pension funds for all excluded firms except for those excluded under the coal
criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 11.95 11.39 -0.55** 76 107
-3 11.95 11.70 -0.25 76 105
-2 11.95 11.64 -0.30** 76 99
-1 11.95 11.95 0.00 76 97
0 11.95 11.96 0.01 76 99
1 11.95 11.99 0.04 76 99
2 11.95 12.22 0.28* 76 103
3 11.95 12.63 0.68** 76 105
4 11.64 12.33 0.68** 73 107
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Panel F: All Pension Funds, Tobacco-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by all pension funds for firms excluded under the tobacco criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 12.70 11.30 -1.40** 20 73
-3 12.70 11.75 -0.95** 20 74
-2 12.70 11.75 -0.95*** 20 71
-1 12.70 12.70 0.00 20 70
0 12.70 12.65 -0.05 20 71
1 12.70 12.95 0.25 20 72
2 12.70 13.00 0.30 20 75
3 12.70 13.30 0.60 20 76
4 12.70 12.85 0.15 20 77
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
Table 11: Average number of European Pension Funds owning shares in Excluded companies,
Quarter -1 vs Quarters -4 to 4, data up to end March 2018
This table shows the average number of European pension funds owning shares in excluded firms around
the exclusion announcements. In each row we compare the mean ownership number in the quarter prior to
the exclusions (“Funds Q-1”) to the average number of pension funds owning shares in Quarters -4 to
Quarter 4 relative to the exclusion quarter (“Funds Q#”). The first columns shows which is the comparison
quarter in the given row. “Firms sample” displays the sample of excluded firms with available data in each
event time quarter, constructed as described in Table 9. The final column displays how many pension funds
in total owned shares in any of the excluded firms. The table is constructed using ownership data from
Capital IQ. A paired t-test is used to determine if the before and after ownership levels are statistically
significantly different.
Panel A: European Pension Funds, All Excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by European pension funds for all excluded firms
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 3.00 3.00 0.00 144 40
-3 3.00 3.08 0.08 144 41
-2 3.00 2.90 -0.10* 144 40
-1 3.00 3.00 0.00 144 39
0 3.00 2.88 -0.12** 144 39
1 3.00 2.90 -0.10 144 40
2 3.02 2.87 -0.15* 143 41
3 3.02 3.00 -0.02 143 41
4 2.97 2.96 -0.01 140 42
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Panel B: European Pension Funds, Product-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by European pension funds for firms excluded under the product criteria
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 2.96 3.03 0.06 108 39
-3 2.96 3.12 0.16 108 40
-2 2.96 2.82 -0.14* 108 39
-1 2.96 2.96 0.00 108 38
0 2.96 2.77 -0.19*** 108 38
1 2.96 2.81 -0.15 108 39
2 2.99 2.81 -0.18* 107 40
3 2.99 2.98 -0.01 107 40
4 2.99 2.99 0.00 107 41
Panel C: European Pension Funds, Conduct-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by European pension funds for firms excluded under the conduct criteria
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 3.11 2.92 -0.19 36 28
-3 3.11 2.97 -0.14 36 28
-2 3.11 3.11 0.00 36 28
-1 3.11 3.11 0.00 36 28
0 3.11 3.22 0.11 36 28
1 3.11 3.17 0.06 36 28
2 3.11 3.06 -0.06 36 28
3 3.11 3.06 -0.06 36 28
4 2.91 2.88 -0.03 33 27
Panel D: European Pension Funds exc. Norges, Coal-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by European pension funds for firms excluded under the coal criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 1.60 1.91 0.31** 68 20
-3 1.60 1.99 0.38*** 68 20
-2 1.60 1.59 -0.01 68 20
-1 1.60 1.60 0.00 68 19
0 1.60 1.46 -0.15* 68 19
1 1.60 1.51 -0.09 68 21
2 1.63 1.49 -0.13 67 21
3 1.63 1.48 -0.15 67 21
4 1.63 1.48 -0.15 67 21
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Panel E: European Pension Funds, All exc. Coal-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by European pension funds for all excluded firms except for those excluded under
the coal criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 4.25 3.97 -0.28** 76 37
-3 4.25 4.07 -0.18* 76 38
-2 4.25 4.07 -0.18** 76 37
-1 4.25 4.25 0.00 76 37
0 4.25 4.16 -0.09 76 37
1 4.25 4.14 -0.11 76 38
2 4.25 4.09 -0.16 76 39
3 4.25 4.34 0.09 76 39
4 4.21 4.33 0.12 73 40
Panel F: European Pension Funds, Tobacco-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by European pension funds for firms excluded under the tobacco criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 5.05 4.75 -0.30 20 29
-3 5.05 4.70 -0.35 20 29
-2 5.05 4.80 -0.25 20 29
-1 5.05 5.05 0.00 20 29
0 5.05 4.75 -0.30** 20 29
1 5.05 4.75 -0.30 20 29
2 5.05 4.70 -0.35 20 29
3 5.05 5.00 -0.05 20 29
4 5.05 5.00 -0.05 20 30
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 12: Average number of United States Pension Funds owning shares in Excluded companies,
Quarter -1 vs Quarters -4 to 4, data up to end March 2018
This table shows the average number of United Sates pension funds owning shares in excluded firms
around the exclusion announcements. In each row we compare the mean ownership number in the quarter
prior to the exclusions (“Funds Q-1”) to the average number of pension funds owning shares in Quarters -4
to Quarter 4 relative to the exclusion quarter (“Funds Q#”). The first columns shows which is the
comparison quarter in the given row. “Firms sample” displays the sample of excluded firms with available
data in each event time quarter, constructed as described in Table 9. The final column displays how many
pension funds in total owned shares in any of the excluded firms. The table is constructed using ownership
data from Capital IQ. A paired t-test is used to determine if the before and after ownership levels are
statistically significantly different.
Panel A: United States Pension Funds, All Firms
Changes to ownership by United States pension funds for all excluded firms
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 5.90 5.84 -0.06 144 51
-3 5.90 5.88 -0.03 144 46
-2 5.90 5.82 -0.08 144 43
-1 5.90 5.90 0.00 144 42
0 5.90 5.82 -0.08 144 43
1 5.90 5.76 -0.14* 144 42
2 5.90 5.83 -0.07 143 43
3 5.90 5.87 -0.03 143 46
4 5.76 5.74 -0.01 140 45
Panel B: United States Pension Funds, Product Firms
Changes to ownership by United States pension funds for firms excluded under the product criteria
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 6.54 6.43 -0.11 108 42
-3 6.54 6.56 0.03 108 44
-2 6.54 6.44 -0.10 108 40
-1 6.54 6.54 0.00 108 40
0 6.54 6.43 -0.11* 108 41
1 6.54 6.37 -0.17 108 41
2 6.53 6.42 -0.11 107 43
3 6.53 6.49 -0.05 107 44
4 6.53 6.51 -0.02 107 43
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Panel C: No Filter, United States Pension Funds, Conduct Firms
Changes to ownership by United States pension funds for firms excluded under the conduct criteria
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 4.00 4.08 0.08 36 46
-3 4.00 3.81 -0.19 36 39
-2 4.00 3.97 -0.03 36 39
-1 4.00 4.00 0.00 36 38
0 4.00 4.00 0.00 36 39
1 4.00 3.94 -0.06 36 38
2 4.00 4.06 0.06 36 38
3 4.00 4.03 0.03 36 38
4 3.24 3.24 0.00 33 38
Panel D: United States Pension Funds, Coal-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by United States pension funds for firms excluded under the coal criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 5.19 5.24 0.04 68 27
-3 5.19 5.19 0.00 68 27
-2 5.19 5.15 -0.04 68 27
-1 5.19 5.19 0.00 68 27
0 5.19 5.00 -0.19** 68 27
1 5.19 4.90 -0.29** 68 27
2 5.16 4.84 -0.33*** 67 27
3 5.16 4.93 -0.24** 67 28
4 5.16 5.06 -0.10 67 27
Panel E: United States Pension Funds, All exc. Coal-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by United States pension funds for all excluded firms except for those excluded
under the coal criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 6.54 6.38 -0.16 76 51
-3 6.54 6.49 -0.05 76 46
-2 6.54 6.42 -0.12 76 43
-1 6.54 6.54 0.00 76 42
0 6.54 6.55 0.01 76 43
1 6.54 6.54 0.00 76 42
2 6.54 6.70 0.16* 76 43
3 6.54 6.70 0.16 76 45
4 6.30 6.37 0.07 73 45
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Panel F: United States Pension Funds, Tobacco-excluded Firms
Changes to ownership by United States pension funds for firms excluded under the tobacco criterion
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 6.15 5.55 -0.60** 20 33
-3 6.15 5.75 -0.40** 20 33
-2 6.15 5.60 -0.55** 20 31
-1 6.15 6.15 0.00 20 31
0 6.15 6.10 -0.05 20 31
1 6.15 6.25 0.10 20 32
2 6.15 6.35 0.20 20 34
3 6.15 6.25 0.10 20 34
4 6.15 5.95 -0.20 20 34
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
Table 13: Responsible Funds Sample and firms matched to CRSP data
This Table shows how I created the sample for ethical mutual funds and matched excluded firms.
Panel A: Responsible Funds matched to CRSP Data
The panel displays the construction of the mutual funds sample. The first raw “Total from TR (Eikon)” lists
the number of mutual funds with an Ethical (first column) or Social (second column) screens as part of
their mandate in the Thomson Reuters’ Fund Screener database in Eikon. The next row, “Funds with listed
CUSIP” lists how many of those funds have a listed CUSIP number. Then the next row “Matched to
CRSP” details how many of those funds are matched to the WRDS (Wharton Research Data Services)
CRSP database (Center for Research in Security Prices) which contains information on mutual fund
holdings. The next row shows now many funds are removed as they are duplicates of other funds in the list.
(“Duplicate Portfolios due to Fund Class”). I subtract that row from the previous row (“Matched to CRSP
”) to calculate the numbers in the next row “Final Matched to CRSP” . The row below , “CRSP Holdings
Data Available”, shows how many of these funds have holdings data in the CRSP database. The final row,
“Overlap Ethical & Social” lists the number of funds which have both an ethical and a social screen. For
the analysis of holdings we use the number of funds with either a social or ethical screen holdings data
available (177). Of these, only one fund has a social but not an ethical screen.
Number of Responsible Funds
by Criteria Ethical Social
Total from TR (Eikon) 2151 226
Funds with listed CUSIP 221 211
Matched to CRSP 187 188
Duplicate Portfolios due to Fund Class 2 2
Final Matched to CRSP 185 186
CRSP Holdings Data Available 176 177
Overlap Ethical & Social 176 176
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Panel B: Excluded Firms matched to CRSP Data
This panel describes the construction of the matched excluded firms sample for the ethical mutual funds
holdings analysis. The first row “Total” shows the total number of exclusions (first column) and how they
split across conduct and product-based exclusions (next two columns). The next row “Excluded Matched
to CRSP” lists how many of these can be matched to the firms in the CRSP database. These are firms
which are listed in the USA. The sample in this row is the one used in the analysis. The next row
“Excluded owned by the Analysed Funds (at some point)” shows how many of the firms have been owned
by one of the ethical or social mutual funds. Next, the table displays the overlap with reincluded firms, The
“reincluded” row displays the total number of excluded firms which were later reincluded in the GPFG
portfolio. The next row “Reincluded Matched to CRSP” lists how many of the reincluded firms have a
matched in the CRSP database. Again, these are USA-listed excluded firms. Finally, the last row “
Reincluded owned by the Analysed Funds (at some point)” displays how many of the reincluded firms
which are matched in the CRSP database were at some point owned by one of the mutual funds in our
database.
Excluded Firms Total Conduct Product
Total 144 36 108
Excluded Matched to CRSP 60 13 47
Excluded owned by the Analysed
Funds (at some point) 57 13 44
Reincluded 13 6 7
Reincluded Matched to CRSP 6 3 3
Reincluded owned by the
Analysed Funds (at some point) 6 3 3
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Table 13: Average number of Funds owning shares in Excluded companies, Quarter -1 vs
Quarters -4 to 4, Non-Index Funds, All Firms, data to end November 2017
This table shows panels of the number US non-index mutual funds with an ethical or social
component in their mandates which own shares in an excluded US-listed firm in the quarters
around the exclusion announcements.
This table shows the average number of US non-index mutual funds with an ethical or social
component in their mandates owning shares in excluded firms around the exclusion
announcements. In each row we compare the mean ownership number in the quarter prior to the
exclusions (“Funds Q-1”) to the average number of mutual funds owning shares in Quarters -4 to
Quarter 4 relative to the exclusion quarter (“Funds Q#”). The first columns shows which is the
comparison quarter in the given row. “Firms sample” displays the sample of excluded firms with
available data in each event time quarter, constructed as described in Table 13 Panel B. The final
column displays how many mutual funds in total owned shares in any of the excluded firms.The
table is constructed using ownership data from CRSP. A paired t-test is used to determine if the
before and after ownership levels are statistically significantly different. Not all funds report
ownership levels in each quarter so the fund sample size changes over time. Therefore, the Funds
Q-1 number also changes in each quarter, as it is calculated based on the ownership levels of the
funds which have reported their ownership levels in both Q-1 and the relevant comparison quarter.
Panel A: All Firms
Changes to ownership by all non-index ethical mutual funds for all excluded firms
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 0.88 0.95 0.07 60 109
-3 0.98 1.00 0.02 60 116
-2 1.02 0.98 -0.03 60 116
-1 1.32 1.32 0.00 60 127
0 1.15 0.98 -0.17** 60 120
1 1.02 0.92 -0.10 60 119
2 1.10 0.95 -0.15 60 114
3 1.16 1.03 -0.12 58 112
4 1.13 1.02 -0.11 53 106
Panel B: Product Firms
Changes to ownership by all non-index ethical mutual funds for product-excluded firms
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 0.73 0.82 0.09 44 104
-3 0.77 0.77 0.00 44 111
-2 0.82 0.82 0.00 44 112
-1 1.18 1.18 0.00 44 123
0 1.07 0.82 -0.25** 44 116
1 0.89 0.77 -0.11 44 118
2 1.00 0.77 -0.23* 44 114
3 1.17 0.93 -0.24* 42 107
4 0.97 0.86 -0.11 37 101
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Panel C: Conduct Firms
Changes to ownership by all non-index ethical mutual funds for conduct-excluded firm
Quarter #
Before or After Funds Q-1 Funds Q# Difference Firms Sample Funds Sample
-4 1.62 1.62 0.00 13 103
-3 1.92 2.00 0.08 13 104
-2 1.92 1.77 -0.15 13 107
-1 2.08 2.08 0.00 13 118
0 1.69 1.77 0.08 13 114
1 1.69 1.62 -0.08 13 111
2 1.69 1.77 0.08 13 109
3 1.38 1.62 0.23 13 107
4 1.85 1.69 -0.15 13 103
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 14: Changes to Firm Performance metrics, Year -1 vs Years 0 to 2, data to 8th May
2018
This table shows how firm performance metric evolve around the exclusion
announcements. The first column in each panel describes the sample for the row, all
exclusions or either conduct or product-based exclusions. Since the analysed metrics
change annually, the next column “Year #” shows the comparison year in each row. The
following column “Mean in Year-1” displays the value for each metric in the year prior to
exclusions, Then the next column “Mean in Year #” shows the metric’s value in the
relevant Year in event time, listed in the “Year #” column. Year 0 is the year of the
exclusion announcement, Year 1 is the year following the exclusion announcements, and
Year 2 is two years following the announcements. The “Difference” column is the
difference between the value of each metric in the previous two columns, the year prior to
the exclusion and the relevant comparison year. The last column “# Firms” show the
number of excluded firms examined in each row. This can be below the total sample size
due to data availability and as recent exclusions drop out in event time, as data runs to 8th
May 2018. A paired t-test is used to determine if the before and after ownership levels are
statistically significantly different.
Panel A: Receivables/5 Year Average Assets
Changes in receivables scaled by firm 5 year average assets for excluded firms around the
exclusion announcements.
Exclusions Year # Mean inYear-1
Mean in
Year # Difference # Firms
All 0 34.49 34.67 0.18 138
All 1 33.66 34.06 0.39 126
All 2 29.47 29.92 0.45 61
Conduct 0 31.49 32.10 0.61 32
Conduct 1 29.28 30.27 0.99 29
Conduct 2 27.49 28.58 1.10 21
Product 0 35.40 35.45 0.05 106
Product 1 34.97 35.19 0.22 97
Product 2 30.51 30.63 0.11 40
Panel B: Net Sales/L1 Assets
Changes in net sales scaled by firm lagged firm assets for excluded firms around the exclusion
announcements.
Exclusions Year # Mean inYear-1
Mean in
Year # Difference # Firms
All 0 0.63 0.64 0.01 140
All 1 0.66 0.67 0.01 129
All 2 0.88 0.98 0.10** 64
Conduct 0 0.76 0.78 0.02 35
Conduct 1 0.82 0.83 0.00 32
Conduct 2 0.80 0.93 0.13*** 24
Product 0 0.58 0.59 0.01 105
Product 1 0.60 0.62 0.01 97
Product 2 0.93 1.02 0.09 40
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 15: Excluded Firms change in Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Metrics, MSCI
data
This table shows how ESG metrics change for the excluded firms around the month of the exclusion announcements. The first column in each
panel lists the metric which is being examined. Since the analysed metrics are provided monthly, the next column “Month #” shows the
comparison month in each row. The following column “Mean Month-1” displays the value for each metric in the month prior to exclusions, Then
the next column “Mean Month #” shows the metric’s value in the relevant month in event time, listed in the “Month #” column. Monty 0 is the
month of the exclusion announcement, Month 3 is three months following the announcements, and so on. The “Difference” column is the
difference between the value of each metric in the previous two columns, the month prior to the exclusion and the relevant comparison month. The
last column “# Firms” show the number of excluded firms examined in each row. This can be below the total sample size due to data availability
and as recent exclusions drop out in event time, as data runs to October 2018. A paired t-test is used to determine if the before and after ownership
levels are statistically significantly different. The metrics analysed in the table are the firms separate Environmental, Social, and Governance
scores. A “Weighted-Average Key Issue Score” is then created combining all firm scores. This is industry-adjusted to generate a score comparable
across companies with different lines of business in the “Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score”. Scores range from 0 (worst) t 10 (best)
Panel A: All Exclusions
Changes to ESG ratings for all excluded firms around the time of the exclusion announcements
MSCI ESG Metric Month # MeanMonth -1
Mean
Month # Difference # Firms
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 0 3.43 3.45 0.03 85
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 3 3.44 3.65 0.21** 82
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 6 3.44 3.63 0.19* 82
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 12 3.37 3.95 0.57*** 78
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 18 3.45 4.04 0.59*** 76
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 0 4.05 4.04 -0.00 65
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 3 4.06 4.11 0.06 62
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 6 4.06 4.12 0.07 62
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 12 4.08 4.34 0.26*** 61
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 18 4.08 4.37 0.29*** 60
Environmental Pillar Score 0 4.18 4.18 0.00 85
Environmental Pillar Score 3 4.21 4.29 0.07 82
Environmental Pillar Score 6 4.21 4.30 0.09 82
Environmental Pillar Score 12 4.16 4.47 0.32*** 78
Environmental Pillar Score 18 4.16 4.50 0.34*** 76
Social Pillar Score 0 3.90 3.89 -0.02 85
Social Pillar Score 3 3.91 3.94 0.03 82
Social Pillar Score 6 3.91 4.07 0.16 82
Social Pillar Score 12 3.91 4.01 0.11 78
Social Pillar Score 18 3.90 3.97 0.07 76
Governance Pillar Score 0 5.21 5.21 -0.00 85
Governance Pillar Score 3 5.21 5.20 -0.01 82
Governance Pillar Score 6 5.21 5.05 -0.16 82
Governance Pillar Score 12 5.19 4.94 -0.25 78
Governance Pillar Score 18 5.21 4.85 -0.35 76
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Panel B: Product Exclusions
Changes to ESG ratings for product-excluded firms around the time of the exclusion announcements
MSCI ESG Metric Month # MeanMonth -1
Mean
Month # Difference # Firms
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 0 3.34 3.35 0.00 69
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 3 3.36 3.54 0.19* 66
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 6 3.36 3.53 0.17 66
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 12 3.27 3.94 0.68*** 62
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 18 3.27 3.99 0.72*** 62
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 0 4.08 4.07 -0.01 55
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 3 4.09 4.17 0.08 52
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 6 4.09 4.15 0.06 52
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 12 4.12 4.40 0.28*** 51
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 18 4.12 4.42 0.30*** 51
Environmental Pillar Score 0 4.18 4.17 -0.01 69
Environmental Pillar Score 3 4.21 4.29 0.08 66
Environmental Pillar Score 6 4.21 4.30 0.08 66
Environmental Pillar Score 12 4.15 4.50 0.36*** 62
Environmental Pillar Score 18 4.15 4.55 0.40*** 62
Social Pillar Score 0 3.75 3.74 -0.01 69
Social Pillar Score 3 3.75 3.85 0.09 66
Social Pillar Score 6 3.75 4.03 0.28* 66
Social Pillar Score 12 3.74 4.01 0.27 62
Social Pillar Score 18 3.74 3.89 0.15 62
Governance Pillar Score 0 5.33 5.33 0.00 69
Governance Pillar Score 3 5.33 5.29 -0.05 66
Governance Pillar Score 6 5.33 5.10 -0.23* 66
Governance Pillar Score 12 5.32 4.99 -0.33 62
Governance Pillar Score 18 5.32 4.81 -0.51** 62
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Panel C: Conduct Exclusions
Changes to ESG ratings for conduct-excluded firms around the time of the exclusion announcements
MSCI ESG Metric Month # MeanMonth -1
Mean
Month # Difference # Firms
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 0 3.78 3.91 0.12 16
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 3 3.78 4.09 0.31* 16
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 6 3.78 4.05 0.26 16
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 12 3.78 3.97 0.18 16
Final Industry-Adjusted Company Score 18 4.26 4.28 0.02 14
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 0 3.88 3.90 0.02 10
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 3 3.88 3.84 -0.04 10
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 6 3.88 3.97 0.09 10
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 12 3.88 4.03 0.15 10
Weighted-Average Key Issue Score 18 3.84 4.08 0.23 9
Environmental Pillar Score 0 4.20 4.24 0.04 16
Environmental Pillar Score 3 4.20 4.26 0.07 16
Environmental Pillar Score 6 4.20 4.31 0.12 16
Environmental Pillar Score 12 4.20 4.37 0.17 16
Environmental Pillar Score 18 4.22 4.28 0.06 14
Social Pillar Score 0 4.56 4.50 -0.06 16
Social Pillar Score 3 4.56 4.33 -0.23 16
Social Pillar Score 6 4.56 4.25 -0.31 16
Social Pillar Score 12 4.56 4.04 -0.52 16
Social Pillar Score 18 4.64 4.35 -0.29 14
Governance Pillar Score 0 4.68 4.67 -0.01 16
Governance Pillar Score 3 4.68 4.82 0.14 16
Governance Pillar Score 6 4.68 4.83 0.15 16
Governance Pillar Score 12 4.68 4.74 0.06 16
Governance Pillar Score 18 4.72 5.06 0.34 14
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 16: Excluded Firms change in Environmental ESG Metrics, MSCI data
This table shows how the metrics comprising the environmental ESG score change for the excluded firms
around the month of the exclusion announcements. The first column in each panel lists the metric which is
being examined. Since the analysed metrics are provided monthly, the next column “Month #” shows the
comparison month in each row. The following column “Mean Month-1” displays the value for each metric
in the month prior to exclusions, Then the next column “Mean Month #” shows the metric’s value in the
relevant month in event time, listed in the “Month #” column. Monty 0 is the month of the exclusion
announcement, Month 3 is three months following the announcements, and so on. The “Difference”
column is the difference between the value of each metric in the previous two columns, the month prior to
the exclusion and the relevant comparison month. The last column “# Firms” show the number of excluded
firms examined in each row. This can be below the total sample size due to data availability and as recent
exclusions drop out in event time, as data runs to October 2018. A paired t-test is used to determine if the
before and after ownership levels are statistically significantly different. Scores range from 0 (worst) t 10
(best)
Panel A: All Exclusions
Changes to Environmental ratings for all excluded firms around the time of the exclusion announcements
MSCI ESG Metric Month # MeanMonth -1
Mean
Month # Difference # Firms
Climate Change Theme Score 0 4.60 4.63 0.03 62
Climate Change Theme Score 3 4.71 4.87 0.17 58
Climate Change Theme Score 6 4.71 4.99 0.28 58
Climate Change Theme Score 12 4.69 5.45 0.76*** 57
Climate Change Theme Score 18 4.64 5.38 0.74*** 57
Natural Capital Theme Score 0 3.35 3.35 -0.00 61
Natural Capital Theme Score 3 3.35 3.38 0.03 57
Natural Capital Theme Score 6 3.35 3.25 -0.10 57
Natural Capital Theme Score 12 3.39 3.65 0.26 56
Natural Capital Theme Score 18 3.39 3.88 0.49*** 56
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 0 3.75 3.73 -0.02 62
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 3 3.74 3.76 0.02 58
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 6 3.74 3.75 0.00 58
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 12 3.77 3.97 0.20* 57
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 18 3.74 4.08 0.34*** 56
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 0 4.33 4.32 -0.01 51
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 3 4.29 4.46 0.17 49
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 6 4.29 4.52 0.23 49
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 12 4.31 4.53 0.22 48
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 18 4.28 4.37 0.09 47
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Panel B: Product Exclusions
Changes to Environmental ratings for product-excluded firms around the time of the exclusion
announcements
MSCI ESG Metric Month # MeanMonth -1
Mean
Month # Difference # Firms
Climate Change Theme Score 0 4.45 4.46 0.01 55
Climate Change Theme Score 3 4.58 4.75 0.17 52
Climate Change Theme Score 6 4.58 4.84 0.26 52
Climate Change Theme Score 12 4.55 5.34 0.78*** 51
Climate Change Theme Score 18 4.55 5.42 0.86*** 51
Natural Capital Theme Score 0 3.28 3.28 0.00 54
Natural Capital Theme Score 3 3.29 3.33 0.05 51
Natural Capital Theme Score 6 3.29 3.15 -0.13 51
Natural Capital Theme Score 12 3.33 3.60 0.27 50
Natural Capital Theme Score 18 3.33 3.84 0.51*** 50
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 0 3.78 3.77 -0.01 54
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 3 3.80 3.84 0.04 51
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 6 3.80 3.82 0.01 51
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 12 3.83 4.07 0.23* 50
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 18 3.83 4.23 0.40*** 50
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 0 4.28 4.24 -0.04* 46
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 3 4.23 4.39 0.16 44
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 6 4.23 4.48 0.25 44
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 12 4.26 4.48 0.22 43
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 18 4.26 4.34 0.09 43
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Panel C: Conduct Exclusions
Changes to Environmental ratings for conduct-excluded firms around the time of the exclusion
announcements
MSCI ESG Metric Month # MeanMonth -1
Mean
Month # Difference # Firms
Climate Change Theme Score 0 5.81 5.97 0.16 7
Climate Change Theme Score 3 5.80 5.92 0.12 6
Climate Change Theme Score 6 5.80 6.28 0.48 6
Climate Change Theme Score 12 5.80 6.43 0.63 6
Climate Change Theme Score 18 5.37 5.07 -0.30 6
Natural Capital Theme Score 0 3.93 3.89 -0.04 7
Natural Capital Theme Score 3 3.88 3.73 -0.15 6
Natural Capital Theme Score 6 3.88 4.05 0.17 6
Natural Capital Theme Score 12 3.88 4.07 0.18 6
Natural Capital Theme Score 18 3.88 4.20 0.32 6
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 0 3.55 3.47 -0.08 8
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 3 3.30 3.21 -0.09 7
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 6 3.30 3.24 -0.06 7
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 12 3.30 3.26 -0.04 7
Pollution & Waste Theme Score 18 2.92 2.82 -0.10 6
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 0 4.82 5.02 0.20 5
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 3 4.82 5.02 0.20 5
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 6 4.82 4.86 0.04 5
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 12 4.82 5.00 0.18 5
Environmental Opportunities Theme Score 18 4.55 4.70 0.15 4
Significance: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Using industry indices spanning 1900–2018 we investigate the impact of sector screening 
for a well-diversified long-term investor and identify a number of risks associated with the 
strategy. Specifically, we examine the impact on the portion of the portfolio which is being 
replaced by other assets. Market returns are not a substitute for industry returns due to changes 
in sector composition over time and the large cross-sectional dispersion of sector returns. The 
net impact of sector exclusion can be proxied by allocating a portion of the portfolio to a 
strategy that is long the market and short a sector. This strategy would introduce unwanted 
geographic tilts into the portfolio and could suffer substantial and lengthy drawdowns. 
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1. Introduction 
Many investors incorporate screening within their investment process. Negative screening 
involves excluding companies based on criteria that may be specific to individual issuers. For 
instance, potential investments may be regarded as unsuitable based on environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) criteria. Frequently, screening is based on a set of common attributes. 
There are many examples. Health-oriented investors prohibit exposure to tobacco companies; 
strict Sharia funds avoid bank stocks; Dharmic investors may exclude animal-testing pharma 
companies; social campaigners avoid firms with poor ESG scores; politically sensitive 
investors avoid rogue-state markets; institutions constrained to spending income underweight 
low-yield stocks; and climate-change activists pursue divestment from fossil-fuel businesses. 
In some cases, the decision to disinvest is commercial, such as the argument that certain 
assets are likely to become stranded because of anticipated impairment of their economic value. 
As an illustration, transport has a long history of investments becoming of little value after a 
change in technology. As we discuss later, canals drastically cut the cost of long-distance 
transport and largely obsoleted horse-drawn carts; railways then hugely undercut the cost of 
water-based transport and drove canals into disuse; and for long-distance travel, buses and 
aircraft then propelled many rail services into financial distress. Looking forward, autonomous 
vehicles and transport-as-a-service may force automobile plants into closure. At each 
disruptive event, older assets that have not reached the end of their technical life are no longer 
able to earn the return anticipated at an earlier date. Recently, the transition to a low-carbon 
economy has led to predictions that fossil-fuel industries will become stranded assets, and that 
it could be financially attractive to sell out of coal, oil and gas stocks. 
The Cambridge Zero Carbon Society, a fossil fuel divestment pressure group at the 
University of Cambridge, argues that “[w]ithout an ethical policy … [university] money is 
invested in companies without consideration for their catastrophic environmental impact. At a 
global and local level, the impacts of these investments contradict the University’s positive 
contributions to society, through research and education. Over the past two years the global 
divestment movement has shown the very real path to a sustainable, fossil-free future. 
Regarding fossil fuels, the divestment campaign is the fastest growing climate justice campaign 
in history.” ((CZCS(2018)). Other institutional investors, such as Norges Bank Investment 
Management, which runs the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), have 
financial motives to consider fossil fuel divestment. They are concerned that the Fund is 
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overexposed to the oil and gas sector once government revenue exposures to the sector are 
taken into account (NBIM (2017)).  
Whether divesting for financial or moral reasons, investors can benefit from being aware 
of the potential costs of such exclusion strategies.  The paper makes use of a unique long-term 
sector returns dataset covering 1900-2018 for the United Kingdom and the United States in 
order to examine the effect of excluding sectors from the financial portfolio of a well-
diversified long-term investor. Conventionally, research has focused on comparing the returns 
of an unscreened portfolio to those of negatively screened portfolios and showed that 
differences tend to be minimal (Humphrey and Tan (2014), Sauer (1997)). Our research focuses 
on the net impact on the part of the portfolio which is being excluded and replaced with other 
investments. Using this method, we identify several potential financial costs of such sector 
exclusion strategies. 
First, given that sector divestment is equivalent to allocating a portion of the portfolio to a 
strategy that is long the market and short a sector, we investigate whether the market seems a 
suitable substitute for sector returns. We conclude that this does not seem to be the case as there 
is a large cross-sectional dispersion in sector returns as well as substantial changes in sector 
composition over time.  Second, we document substantial historic maximum drawdowns of 
strategies which are long the market and short sectors. Therefore, investment managers 
engaging in sector exclusion can experience prolonged periods of high losses on the portion of 
their portfolio which would have otherwise been invested in the particular sector. This can 
make it difficult to sustain such strategies over the long term, particularly if the managers are 
accountable to stakeholders which can put pressure on their investment decisions. Third, we 
show that sectors often have large country concentrations. As a result, sector exclusion would 
likely introduce unwanted geographic tilts into the portfolio. Finally, historically the inflation-
adjusted capital returns of a number of mineral resources which we analyse have been lower 
than the inflation-adjusted returns observed in the equity markets. Therefore, even if investors 
are trying to hedge existing mineral resource holdings, as can be the case for fossil fuel-funded 
sovereign wealth funds, we argue that sector exclusion may not achieve this goal.  
In brief, we find that the downside risk from sector exclusions is higher than many writers 
have suggested. For long-term investors, the consequences of sector exclusion are likely to be 
economically significant.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, while Section 3 
briefly showcases the conventional method to examine the impact of sector exclusions. In 
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Section 4 we describe the data we use for our long terms return analysis. In Section 5 we 
describe how long term returns can differ from market return and examine how a strategy 
emulating the net impact of sector exclusions can suffer substantial drawdowns. Next, in 
Section 6 we investigate the relationship between resource company share prices and the price 
of the underlying resources which they acquire. Furthermore, we also demonstrate the 
geographic tilts which sector exclusions can introduce into portfolios. Finally, Section 7 
summarises and concludes our findings.   
2. Related Literature 
Forming optimal portfolios using mean variance analysis is a cornerstone of modern 
portfolio theory (Markowitz (1956), Markovitz (1959), Sharpe (1970)). In that context, 
excluding sectors from a portfolio reduces the potential portfolio allocations over which 
optimisation can be performed and could lead to optimal portfolios with lower returns or higher 
risk than those on an unconstrained efficiency frontier. Lack of diversification in portfolios has 
traditionally been discussed in a geographic context, where it has been documented that 
investors tend to tilt portfolios towards domestic (“home bias”, e.g. Kang and Stulz (1997)) or 
local firms (Coval and Moskowitz  (1999)).  With respect to sector exclusions, data from the 
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2018) and US SIF (2018) indicates that 17% of 
professionally managed assets in the US and 37.6% of those in Europe are managed in 
portfolios using negative/exclusionary screening.  
However, evidence that exclusions affect portfolio returns has been slim. Most studies 
examine the returns of constrained relative to non-constrained portfolios. On one hand, 
Humphrey and Tan (2014) do not find evidence that excluding sin stocks from portfolios 
(“negative screening”) has an impact on risk or returns.2  In the same vein, Sauer (1997) 
examines the performance of the Domini 400 Social index (DSI) relative to comparable non-
constrained portfolios and finds similar results. In order to estimate the potential costs of 
boycotting South African stocks during the Apartheid Grossman and Sharpe (1986) construct 
a South Africa Free (SAF) portfolio of NYSE stocks and also find minimal financial 
implications of using the portfolio to engage in a simple divestment strategy. The evidence on 
Shariah-compliant screenings is mixed. Hoepner, Rammal and Rezec (2011) find that Islamic 
funds from countries with developed Islamic financial markets perform in line with non-
 
2 They also find no impact due to positive screening.  
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screened benchmarks, while those from developed countries with lower Islamic services 
expertise underperform their comparable benchmarks.  
On the other hand, in the endowment universe Cornell (2015) estimates that the costs to 
five prominent US endowments from divesting the fossil fuel sector would be non-
insignificant.3 Examining portfolios comprised of mutual funds, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin 
(2005) argue that the cost of being constrained due to Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) is 
minor for investors who follow CAPM4 and higher for an investor investing in line with the 
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). Furthermore, Belghitar, Clark and Deshmukh 
(2014) argue that while in a mean variance framework portfolios are minimally affected by 
exclusions, ethical investors pay a price in terms of the higher distributional moments such as 
skewness and kurtosis. 
At the same time, sector returns can vary significantly from those in the market, as we also 
demonstrate later in the paper. Academic research has primarily focused on the performance 
of controversial, so called “sin” stocks, versus the market or comparable “non-sin” stocks. 
Notably, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that sin stocks have superior returns to matched 
“non-sin” stocks. In the same vein, Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant (2008) show that “sin” stock 
portfolios have positive marked-adjusted returns. However, Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) document 
no “sin” stock outperformance after adjusting for the five factors of Fama French (Fama and 
French (2015)).  
One reason why controversial “sin” sectors could outperform the market is investor 
disagreement on future returns. Fama and French (1997), note that these could result in 
violations to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Such disagreements could in turn 
manifest as higher returns for controversial stocks if they face short-selling constraints.  In this 
scenario positively inclined investors buy stocks and push prices up while negatively inclined 
investors are restricted in their ability to reflect their beliefs into stock prices (Miller (1977)). 
Such a theory is consistent with empirical findings by Carlin, Longstaff and Matoba (2014). 
There is also some evidence that changes to demographic compositions can be used to 
predict industry returns (DellaVigna and Pollet, (2007)). Furthermore, industry concentration 
has been shown to affect stock returns so that stocks in industries with higher concentration 
tend to achieve lower returns (Hou and Robinson (2006)). Finally, Choi and Sias (2009) 
document institutional investor herding in and out of industries. 
 
3 Estimating a mean risk-adjusted shortfall of 0.23 percent per year, examining Columbia, Harvard, MIT, NYU and Yale. 
4 Capital Asset Pricing Model, see Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) 
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An alternative method to exclude sectors, which is beyond the scope of this paper, could be 
to substitute a sector with a “mimicking portfolio”. In that setting, a sector’s factor exposures 
would be replicated by a portfolio of other assets which replicate its factor exposures (see 
Huberman, Kandel and Stambaughm(1987), Roll and Srivastava (2018), and Pukthuanthong, 
Roll, Wang and Zhang (2019)). The investor would then hold the mimicking portfolio instead 
of the given sector. 
3. Returns of Negatively Screened Portfolios 
As mentioned in the literature review, research has generally found that portfolios 
excluding sectors may achieve similar returns to non-screened portfolios. We briefly 
demonstrate this argument by examining the returns of portfolios in the UK and USA which 
we negatively screened via sector exclusion. For the UK, we use 35 FTSE Russell (2019) 
sectors and for the USA we use 49 sectors from the Ken French (2019) database.5 In Table 1 
we show the results for a market cap weighted strategy of holding the whole market for the UK 
(Panel A) or USA (Panel B) compared to excluding a given sector and holding a market cap 
weighted portfolio of the remaining sectors. We choose to display scenarios excluding the 
sectors which correspond the closest to those for which we have long term returns and analyse 
in the next part of the paper.6 Cumulative returns are also charted in Figure 1.  
In the UK, over 32 years (data from 1986 to 2017), excluding our selected sectors could 
have led to a maximum loss of 16% of cumulative returns by excluding the Mining sector or a 
maximum gain of 9% higher cumulative returns if the Retail sector was excluded. Looking at 
annualised returns, excluding our selected sectors would achieve between 97 to 102 percent of 
 
5 For the UK, we use sector data from the FTSE Russell (2019) All Shares index, downloaded from Thomson Reuters 
(2019). There are 41 sectors in the index. One of them is not available for the UK (Nonequity Investment Instruments).  We 
combine two sectors into a Real Estate sector in order to have data going back to the start of the rest of the series. We also take 
three super-sectors (Oil & Gas, Retail, Insurance) instead of their comprising sectors in order to have comparable sectors to 
those in the long term sector returns database. Since Retail and Insurance sector data is not available directly in Thomson 
Reuters (2019) we manually reconstruct them based on their comprising sectors. This leaves us with 35 sectors for the UK. 
For the US, we use the 49 sectors from the Ken French (2019) database.  
 
6 For the UK, the mapping of each long term returns sector to a FTSE Russell sector is as follows: Alcohol: Beverages; Banks: 
Banks; Chemicals: Chemicals; Engineering: Inds Eng; Food: Fd Producers; Insurance: Life Insurance + Nonlife insurance; 
Leisure: Travel & Leis; Mining: Mining; Motors: Auto & Parts; Oil: Oil & Gas; Retail: Fd & Drug Rt + Gen Retailers; 
Shipping: Inds Transpt; Textiles: Personal Goods; Tobacco: Tobacco. For the USA, the mapping of each long term returns 
sector to a Ken French sector where the names differ are Rail: Trans; and Tobac: Smoke.  
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mean returns. The results are similar for the USA, where we have 91 years of returns (1927 to 
2017). Excluding the Oil sector would have led to a maximum loss of 9% of cumulative returns 
while excluding Transportation would have resulted in 13% higher cumulative returns over the 
analysis period. At an annualised return basis, returns for the negatively screened portfolios 
range from 99 to 101 percent of the market portfolio.  
In unreported work (available on request from the authors) we perform a similar analysis 
using an annual rebalancing equal weighting strategy and a buy and hold equal weighting. We 
obtain results that are the essentially same as those using the market cap sector weighting 
method.  Therefore, if we examine total portfolio returns when excluding a sector compared to 
market returns, the consequences of sector exclusions seem minimal.  
However, this type of analysis masks the changes which occur at the level of the excluded 
part of the portfolio, which is being replaced by other assets. In this paper we aim to show how 
losses to the portion of the portfolio which is being excluded can be substantial due to the 
different distribution of market and sector returns. Therefore, the opportunity costs of 
excluding a sector can be high if we focus on the net impact on the changed part of the portfolio. 
We employ long term sector returns dataset from 1900, which we describe below, to showcase 
this argument. 
4. Long Term Returns Data Sources7 
Our study primarily examines the United Kingdom and the United States, with occasional 
references to other international evidence. We use the dataset compiled by Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton (2018), hereafter referred to as the DMS database, the London Share Price Database 
(2018), and various public-domain and proprietary industry indices. The series begin at start-
1900 or, occasionally, at later dates such as 1911. 
Our long sample period witnessed many changes. As Table 2 shows, the UK railway sector 
was extremely large at the start of 1900 but by 2018 it had shrunk almost to zero, whereas 
banking and insurance, beverages, tobacco and utilities survived. Moreover, some sectors 
changed radically: compare telegraphy in 1900 with telecoms in 2018. When analysing sector 
returns, we should therefore bear in mind that industries experienced great transformations. In 
1900, telephones, cars, electric lighting, movies and recorded music were new technologies. 
Some industries were destined to grow, including electricity and power generation, 
 
7 This section extends and updates DMS (2018). 
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automobiles, airlines, oil and gas, information services, and entertainment; others such as 
horse-drawn carriages, canal boats and candles were destined to disappear. 
For the UK market, industry indices are constructed based on the top 100 UK companies 
for the 1900-1955 period, and based on the London Share Price Database for 1956 to 1961. 
Following that period, we use FTSE International industry indices and predecessor indices 
assembled by the Institute of Actuaries and Financial Times. In 1900, over 65% by value of 
the total UK equity market was in industries that, today, no longer exist. In 2018, 47% by value 
of the total UK equity market was in industries that, in 1900, had not yet come into existence. 
The evolution of the equity market in the United States resembles the United Kingdom. 
Table 3 reports the breakdowns of market capitalisations in the USA. In 1900, over 80% by 
value of the US equity market was in industries that, today, no longer exist. In 2018, 62% by 
value of the US equity market was in industries that, in 1900, had not yet come into existence. 
For the US equity market, the data sources employed are as follows. For 1900 to 1925, the 
57 industry indices in Cowles (1938) are used. Of these, 20 industries start in 1900. For the 
later period of 1926 to the end of 2017, we use industry data reported by French (2018). His 
website contains 49 industries, of which 40 begin in 1926.  
While our analysis is agnostic as to whether portfolios exclude controversial or non-
controversial sectors, it is worth noting that the level of stigma which certain activities attract 
changes over time. Therefore, looking at long term returns can be affected by anachronism, 
where sectors which were not deemed controversial in the past carry stigma in the present and 
vice versa. For example, tobacco has converted into a controversial sector as evidence on the 
impact of smoking on health has increased and become generally accepted. Similarly, fossil 
fuel stocks have attracted attention by exclusion campaigners as the effects of climate change 
have gained the attention of the general public and governments around the world. 
5. Main Analysis 
1.1 Long-term Returns 
We use the UK and US industry return series described above to examine our first question: 
In the long run, do sectors provide returns close to the market? Table 4 Panels A and B display 
annualized returns for the total analysis period and for 25 year subperiods8 for the UK and USA 
respectively. Then in Table 5 we show the same results in Callan Periodic Tables, ranking each 
sector from the top to bottom performance for each time period. There is a wide variation of 
 
8 except the last subperiod which 18 years, from 2000 to 2017 
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sector and market returns, which, unsurprisingly, is more pronounced in the subperiods that the 
full historic sample. Notably, a few of the series start post 1900 – US oil starts in 1911 and UK 
Tobacco, Motors and Leisure start in 1920. 
Figure 2 shows the 11 industries for which continuous data is available for the UK. Market 
returns are plotted in red, showing that £1 invested in the market in 1900 would have grown to 
£40,838 by the end of 2017, assuming dividends were reinvested. Over the 118 years since the 
start of the last century, the worst industry performer, engineering, would have increased to 
£3,388, providing an annualised return of 7.1%. The best-performing industry (alcoholic 
beverages) had a cumulative value in Figure 2 of £403,234 that was 119 times as large as 
engineering. The annualised return from alcoholic beverages was 11.6%. The total return data 
is presented in Table 6 Panel A shows the total return by sectors and for the Market for the full 
analysis period and by subperiods and Panel B displays sector total returns as multiples of the 
market total return over the same period. The results in the table demonstrate that even 
seemingly small changes in annualised mean returns can lead to large dispersions in total 
returns as they accumulate over time. 
Due to post-war nationalisation, which was reversed in the Thatcher-era privatisations, 
there is a gap in the returns history for UK railways, utilities, telecoms, steel, coal and 
shipbuilding. As a thought experiment, we might imagine that these return gaps could be 
bridged. This would likely reveal still greater extremes of performance. 
It should also be noted that Figure 2 is subject to survivorship bias. In order to display a 
continuous 118-year return history for the displayed industries, the sample needs to be 
restricted to industries that existed in some form during 1900 and 2018, and every year in 
between. If we were able to access indices for industries that disappeared, the downside in 
Figure 2 would be more dramatic. Similarly, if we were to incorporate business activities that 
were not initiated until after 1900, some of those would have recorded outstanding results. This 
further understates the extremes of performance experienced by sector indices. 
Figure 3 displays the investment performance of the 15 US industries for which data is 
available from 1900. Market returns are plotted in red, showing that $1 invested in the market 
in 1900 would have grown to $47,661 by the end of 2017, assuming dividends were reinvested. 
In contrast, the worst industry performer, coal, would have increased to $1,612, providing an 
annualised return of 6.5%. The tobacco industry, which performed best, delivered an 
annualised return of 14.6%, and reached over $9.4m, almost 6,000 times higher than coal. 
Similarly to the UK results, US total returns are shown in Table 7. Differences in annualised 
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means again lead to large total return dispersions over the full 1900-2017 period and in the 
various subperiods. 
The index series for the USA—like the UK data—also contains some industries with a gap. 
The industries for which we do not have a full 118-year record are banks, insurance and 
alcoholic beverages. Financial services were excluded from the Cowles indices. Notably, 
Alcohol was illegal during the prohibition era which lasted from 1922 to 1930. The vast 
majority of US alcohol firms did not survive prohibition period. Those which did so by 
diversifying their operations into “near-beer” non-alcohol beverages and other products, as 
well as offloading some of their real estate holdings.9 The alcohol prohibition period represents 
an extreme case where the US alcohol sector was effectively screened out of investor portfolios 
as the industry moved underground.  
Furthermore, the US equity market has witnessed many corporate failures, offset by a 
vibrant IPO market. So, like the UK, the range of long-term sector returns is again 
underestimated because of our focus in Figure 3 on sectors with a 118-year history. 
Using log returns, we also compute Pearson correlations, standard deviations, and betas for 
the sectors. Log returns are computed as: 
 
Returnt = ln (TRt / TRt-1) 
 
where we take the log of the ratio of total return index in one period and the preceding 
period. 
Correlation are displayed in Table 8. The bottom row of the tables shows the mean 
correlation for each analysis period. Correlations for each sector are then tested for statistical 
significance relative to the mean. For 1900-2017 the mean excludes series which do not begin 
in 1900. These are Motors, Leisure, and Tobacco (1920) for the UK and Oil (1911) for the 
USA. Correlations for UK Motors, Leisure, and Tobacco are tested for significance compared 
to the mean correlation for all sectors using data from 1920 to 2017 in the 1900-2017 column. 
Similarly, for US Oil, in the 1900-2017 column, the mean the sector correlation is tested against 
is calculated using sector data for 1911-2017.  This is also the case for all similar tables which 
have significance tests compared to the sector mean. 
 
9  Summarised in https://www.history.com/news/brewers-under-prohibition-miller-coors-busch-yuengling-pabst . And 
described in more detail in Ogle (2007) 
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Sectors tend to be highly correlated with the market over the long term and in the analysed 
subperiods. Recent returns for UK tobacco are an outlier, having only 15% correlation with the 
market for 2000-2017. US tobacco also shows low correlations with the market in the last two 
subperiods. Sector correlations also differ among one another, with a significant number of 
sectors having correlations which are significantly above or below the sector mean for each 
market and analysis period.  
At the same time, a number of sectors have significantly different variances than the market. 
This is displayed in Table 9 where we can see the standard deviations for sectors, again using 
log returns. A Levene test is applied to test for statistical significance in the difference of the 
sector variances vs the market. For the full period, at least half the sectors have significantly 
higher variances than the market. Across the subperiods, all sectors with statistically 
significantly different variances also exhibit higher volatility than that of the market, with the 
exception of US Telecoms which is in fact less volatile than the US market for 1900-1949. 
Nevertheless, this result could me mechanical due to differences in the level of diversification 
of the market versus individual sectors. 
Still using log-returns, in Table 10 we show sector betas relative to their respective markets. 
The dispersion in betas stems from the variability of sector standard deviations and sector 
correlations with the market.10 For the full analysis period, around half the series in each market 
have betas statistically significantly different from the mean sector beta. This also broadly 
holds across the different subperiods, with the exception of the UK for 1900-1924. 
The above-described differences result in substantial tracking errors between sector and 
market returns, which we have calculated using annual (non-log) returns. We measure tracking 
errors in two ways. The first is as a mean absolute deviation between sector and market returns, 
which is the absolute value of the difference in returns between a sector and the market in each 
year, averaged over the analysed periods. This is displayed in Panel A of the UK and US 
Tracking error tables (Table 11 and Table 12). The second measure, presented in Panel B of 
the two tables, is the standard deviation of the variance of the difference of sector and market 
returns. This is the tracking error metric for fund vs benchmark return used in the asset 
management industry.  For both Tracking error metrics, we also calculate the mean tracking 
error in each analysis period. In the UK, across the two metrics, Motors, Mining, Oil, and 
 
10 As well as being equal to the covariance of a sector with the market divided by the market variance, betas can also be defined 
as the correlation between a sector and the market times the standard deviation of the sector and divided by the market 
standard deviation.  
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Textiles have significantly higher tracking errors than the mean for their full analysis periods.11 
For the USA, Coal, Tobacco, and Paper have significantly higher tracking errors for the full 
analysis period. 
To demonstrate how tracking errors can impact long-term returns, we calculate rolling 
annualized (i.e. geometric mean) returns for each sector and the market over 10, 20 and 30-
year periods, with a one year rolling window. We then test if the rolling annualized returns for 
each sector are significantly different from those of the markets the sectors are in. The results 
are presented in Table 13. Naturally, the larger the holding period, the larger the probability 
the annualised rolling means will be more different. Around half of UK sectors and almost two 
thirds of US sectors have statistically significantly different 30-year annualized rolling returns 
relative to their respective markets. For both markets, the Tobacco sector outperforms the 
market over the three different rolling mean horizons. In the UK, this is also the case for 
Alcohol.12 In both markets, Oil outperforms the market for the 20 and 30-year horizons. It also 
has a stronger performance over a 10-year horizon, but this is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, excluding “sin sectors” can be particularly costly for investors. 
This large long-term variation in industry returns mirrors the dispersion of national equity 
market returns; see DMS (2018). We already know that past country returns provide little 
indication of future country returns (see Lally and Marsden (2004a, 2004b)). Predicting the 
fortunes of specific industries based on their past returns is similarly unlikely to be a successful.  
Indeed, Ilmanen (2011) argues that country and industry exposures are good examples of non-
priced investment risks. A factor being priced would imply that it is expected to generate a 
long-run premium. Following Ilmanen, the prediction for an industry is that it would have an 
expected return that is close to other industries. Returns would be boosted or impeded only by 
industry exposure to priced factors such as a deviant market-to-book ratio or as a result of 
ostracism by a large cohort of investors. 
For simplicity, we assume that industry exposure is not in itself a priced factor. However, 
sectors are not diversified portfolios, and they experience substantial tracking error over the 
long term as well as over the short term. Our analysis reveals striking return variation across 
sectors.  Divesting from an industry, especially if it has a high market capitalisation and/or 
large idiosyncratic volatility, raises the likelihood of generating deviant portfolio performance. 
 
11 1900-2017 for Mining and Oil, and 1920-2017 for Motors and Tobacco. 
12 we do not have a continuous US return series for alcohol due to the US prohibition. 
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Conclusion: Over the long run we find that sectors do not provide returns close to the 
market. 
1.2 Drawdowns with Sector Exclusion 
While we have documented the variability of realised returns, we have cautioned against 
extrapolating industry performance into the future. Pástor & Stambaugh (2012) point out that 
from an investor perspective, expected returns are more volatile over long horizons than shorter 
ones.  Crucially, they examine the predictive return variance, rather than the realised variance, 
as they argue it is more representative of the investor experience. Observers can estimate the 
parameters of the historical return process, but this may not reflect the true population 
parameters. The true data generating process is unknown, and this contributes to the predictive 
variance being larger than the realised variance of returns. While mean reversion may reduce 
long-term return variances relative to their short-term counterparts, the other components have 
a stronger impact, resulting in greater uncertainty about return variability in the long term. 
To provide more insight into the impact of sector exclusion strategies, we therefore 
investigate a strategy of holding a portfolio long the market and short various sectors. This 
provides an indication of some of the uncertainties investors face in practice. While in hindsight 
drawdowns can prove to be transient, investors have no way of knowing how long they may 
last. Furthermore, during particularly low return periods they may also face pressure from 
stakeholders to abandon the particular strategy, which would result in locking into 
unsatisfactory returns at a potentially disadvantageous time.  
To illustrate the investment performance of the long-short strategy, we select oil as the 
sector to be shorted. The cumulative investment performance, plotted in Figure 4, is calculated 
in each period as: 
 
(1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry) 
 
The value of the portfolio for a period is multiplied by the value for the next period in order 
to generate a cumulative time series of total returns. 
The same exercise is repeated for all sectors. In Table 14 we show the annualised returns 
for such a strategy for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods and in Table 16 we 
display the total returns at the end of each period.13 If a strategy has lost money over the periods 
 
13 See Table 15 for Callan Periodic Tables of the annualized returns. 
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the annualised returns will be less than zero and the total returns less than one. There is a wide 
variation in the realised annualised returns which propagates into even larger total return 
dispersions. In the UK, for the full analysis period, shorting Engineering and Motors would 
have been particularly profitable, while shorting Chemicals, Alcohol, and Tobacco would have 
been costly. In the US, shorting Coal and Ships would have been advantageous, while shorting 
Food, Electrical Equipment. Chemicals, and Tobacco would have been particularly detrimental 
to returns. The subperiod results, which often switch between positive and negative annualised 
returns, demonstrate that the shorting strategies do not consistently over or underperform. 
Therefore, past good performance cannot be extrapolated to predict good performance into the 
future and vice versa. 
We now describe how we examine the downside risk from sector exclusion. Our focus is 
concern about switching from an unwanted exposure (for example, oil stocks) to a preferred 
alternative (for example, the equity market as a whole). The risk is the possibility of 
experiencing a dramatic fall in the value of the long-short portfolio (in our example, a long 
exposure to equities accompanied by a short position in oil stocks). Note that the long-short 
portfolio is automatically hedged against currency depreciation: losses will be attributable 
solely to the gap between the cumulative returns of the long and short positions. 
Portfolio drawdowns are defined as the difference between the portfolio’s value on a 
particular date and its high-water mark (the highest historic value up to that date). The interval 
from the date of the high-water mark to breaching the high-water mark again is the recovery 
period. The investment is said to be underwater from the date of the high-water mark to the 
end of the recovery period. 
Cumulative drawdowns for oil are portrayed in Figure 5 as percentages of the high-water 
mark. In the left-hand panel we consider the downside of a holding that is long the UK market 
and short the UK oil sector. This is a position that might sit alongside a fully diversified equity 
portfolio for the rest of the fund. We measure the drawdown in value relative to the portfolio’s 
high-water mark. 
With extended intervals of good and poor investment performance, a crucial question is 
how deep portfolio drawdowns can be, and how long the recovery period can be. To provide 
an answer, we compute the cumulative percentage decline in value from a high to successive 
subsequent dates. This indicates just how bad an investor’s experience might have been if they 
had the misfortune to buy at the wrong time. The red area displays the results for the full 
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analysis period, and the blue area calculates the drawdown percentage when starting the 
strategy from 1950. 
Using annual data for the UK from 1900 to 2018, we look in the left-hand panel of Figure 
5 at drawdowns for an oil-based long-short portfolio. The maximal drawdown is 96% (76%, 
from 1950). The downside risk for the US is similar. The right-hand panel of Figure 5 shows 
that, over the longest period for which we have a US oil index (1911 to 2018), the maximal 
drawdown is 83% (73%, from 1950). 
Is the oil sector in some way unusual? Figure 6 presents histograms for the maximal 
drawdown for long-short portfolios constructed for each of the sectors plotted in Figure 4  and 
Figure 5. The series all start in 1900 except the US oil sector which, as noted earlier, begins in 
1911. At its most extreme, the deviation between the market and the excluded sector is between 
approximately 60% and—in the USA—approximately 99.5% (for the long-short portfolio 
based on tobacco).  
In general, this long-term perspective of analysing data from 1900 is limited by the fact that 
we examine only one interval of 118 years. Furthermore, it may not be feasible to maintain 
absence to a sector for such a long interval.  We show the maximum drawdowns by sector in 
Table 17. This also includes the Tobacco, Motors and Leisure sectors for the UK which are 
not included in Figure 6 as they only have returns from 1920. The table provides evidence that 
even at 25-year periods the long short strategies can produce substantial drawdowns, so the 
strategy risks are not driven by any particular time period. 
For the full period, in the UK, Tobacco, Oil, Alcohol, Mining, and Textiles have particularly 
high maximum drawdowns. In the US, this is the case for Tobacco, Chemicals, Coal, Food, 
Electrical Equipment, and Rail. Notably, while we saw in the earlier tables that shorting US 
Coal has been a profitable strategy over the full analysis period, the strategy is subject to large 
drawdowns over time, which may in practice make it hard for investors to continue following 
the strategy over a period long enough to reap any long term benefits. 
Drawdowns are also substantial over different holding periods. In particular, in Table 18 
we calculate the maximum drawdowns for rolling window periods of 10, 20, and 30 years, 
which we shift by one year. There are 109 overlapping one-decade intervals, running from 
1900-09 up to the most recent decade, 2008-17. We then take the median maximum drawdown 
investors would have experiences with such a holding strategy. Naturally, longer holding 
periods are likely to result in larger maximum drawdowns and in consequence larger historic 
median maximum drawdowns.  In the UK, Oil, Shipping, and Mining have significantly higher 
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drawdowns than the mean for all rolling window periods. In the USA, this is the case for 
Tobacco, Textiles, and Coal. Even for sectors with lower drawdowns, these are still non-trivial 
and could pose difficulty for investors which are likely to face pressure from stakeholders over 
the exclusion strategies. 
At the same time, it is important to note that these drawdowns relate to the portion of an 
otherwise well-diversified fund that is subject to exclusion of a sector. The impact on the total 
fund would involve scaling the drawdown by the proportion of the overall portfolio that is 
subject to sector exclusion. For example, a drawdown of –50% as a consequence of divesting 
a sector position that comprises 2% of the total portfolio would give rise to a shortfall in 
portfolio value of 1%. 
We also interrogate the historical record for the returns of the long short strategies over 
one-decade intervals. Furthermore, similarly to the drawdown analysis, we replicate our 
analysis based on two-decade and three-decade intervals. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the dispersion of annualised industry returns in 
the UK (left-hand panel) and in the USA (right-hand panel). For each country, keeping the 
same sample of industries as before,14 we calculate annualised (i.e., geometric mean) returns 
for one, two, and three decades of running the long-short strategy for each sector using one-
year rolling windows. We then average the rolling windows of annualised returns for each 
sector and decade interval. Finally, we calculate the dispersion of average annualised returns 
per sector for each decade interval and plot relevant percentiles of the distributions.  
The clusters of bars display the variation of geometric mean returns estimated over rolling 
windows of 10 years (in the left of each panel), 20 years (in the middle), and 30 years (in the 
right of each panel). Within each cluster we report the 5th and 95th percentiles, and the quartile 
boundaries. The numbers are displayed in Table 19. 
Over all horizons and all sectors, and generalising across countries, the worst five percent 
of long-short positions had annualised returns of –1½% or less while the best five percent had 
annualised returns of +2% or more. The median return is close to or slightly above zero. The 
interquartile range is distributed around the median within an approximate range of plus or 
minus 1%. The range is slightly wider in the United States than in the United Kingdom, which 
is consistent with the larger number of industries identified in Figure 3 for the US market, as 
compared to the UK which has fewer industry categories (see Figure 2). It can be seen that the 
distribution of annualised returns from the long-short portfolio is approximately symmetric. As 
 
14 Which excludes Tobacco, Motors and Leisure for the UK, as they only have returns from 1920 
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one would expect, there is no indication of a risk premium, whether positive or negative, arising 
from industry exclusion. 
Mean annualised returns for the rolling shorting strategies are displayed by sector in Table 
20. For the majority of sectors, the returns of the shorting strategy are statistically significantly 
different from zero, especially over the longer rolling windows.  In particular, for the UK, 
Chemicals, Alcohol, and Tobacco have significantly negative annualised returns over all 
horizons. Oil has significantly negative returns for the 20 and 30-year holding periods. In the 
USA, Oil, Electrical Equipment, Food, Chemicals, and Tobacco have significantly negative 
returns over all horizons.  
Based on our historical evidence, shorting sectors in favour of the overall market would 
have been a risky strategy in the sense of introducing potentially substantial tracking error 
relative to the overall market or relative to standard benchmarks for performance. Conclusion: 
Over a 10–30 year horizon, sector exclusion exacerbates the risk of underperformance. 
6. Further Analysis 
1.3 Do Resource-company Share Prices Mimic Resource Prices? 
Some investors may contemplate the exclusion of a mineral resource sector from their 
portfolio as a risk management measure if they are already exposed to mineral resource prices 
directly. This can be the case for sovereign wealth funds which are also funded by sales of 
fossil fuel resources. For example, the managers of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global (NBIM (2017)) have considered excluding the oil and gas sector from the benchmark 
of their portfolio for those reasons. However, resource company shares differ from direct 
resource ownership. Companies can manage production levels in light of output prices, 
extraction costs, and other factors. Even when a mine or well is undeveloped, there is a 
possibility that prices will become favourable in the future, and this optionality is valuable. 
Consequently, resource companies’ shares generally sell for more than the value of the mineral 
minus the present value of extraction costs. 
Figure 8 shows the inflation-adjusted price index for valuable mineral resources from 1900 
to 2017. Only platinum outperformed cash (treasure bill returns) over the whole period, and 
that was due to particularly strong performance in the early 1900s. Over the period since 1900, 
the annualised capital appreciation for the five minerals was diamonds -0.5%, silver 0.002%, 
oil 0.3%, gold 0.7%, and platinum 1.4%. Over the same interval, cash (Treasury bills) provided 
an annualised real rate of return of 0.8%.  
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Historically, equities have provided a risk premium to investors. In all of the 21 markets 
with an unbroken history over the period 1900–2017, DMS (2018) find the long-term return 
on equities exceeded inflation, and also exceeded the return on long-term government bonds 
and the return on Treasury bills. In contrast to equities, the mineral resources plotted in Figure 
8 have almost all failed to provide a risk premium, even compared to cash, for a variety of 
reasons that are discussed by DMS (2018). 
The low mineral resource performance is further highlighted in Table 21. Panel A shows 
the annualised real returns over the full analysis period and selected subperiods and Panel B 
displays the total returns for each period. The series displayed are the five mineral resources 
from the chart, t-bills, World equities, US Equities, US oil sector, and US mines sector. For the 
most recent subperiod of 2000 to 2017, all mineral resources beat cash returns. Gold, silver and 
oil also outperform the world equity market. In all other subperiods, however, except 1900-
1924 for platinum, none of the mineral resources perform better than World or US equities.  
The long-term price appreciation for minerals falls far short of the level of equity returns. 
It follows that investors would likely have achieved superior returns from buying into shares 
in resource extraction companies rather than holding the underling minerals. At the same time, 
however, mineral resource returns could still be related to equity returns. To investigate this, 
we run several regressions of the change in (the log of) mineral prices on the change in (the log 
of) market returns from 1911 (the base date for the US oil index) to 2017.  
Our regression results are reported in Table 22. Panel A displays the full sample results, 
and the other Panels have results for the different subsamples. World and US equity market 
returns come from DMS (2018) and US oil and mines Sector returns come from Cowles (1938) 
and French (2018). Oil prices are from the BP (2018) Crude Oil Price Index. Using the inflation 
data in DMS (2018) we convert the total returns and price series to inflation-adjusted returns 
and prices. We then calculate log returns for the series in the same way we calculated log 
returns in the long-term returns section. The regressions are then run for these log returns series. 
We choose prices to be the dependent variables in the regressions since stock market prices 
impound beliefs about current and future resource prices. Spot resource prices, on the other 
hand, are unlikely to incorporate information about future stock price fluctuations. However, 
the interpretation of our results does not rely on the direction of causality. 
In the full sample, there is a low correlation between (logarithmic) changes in oil prices and 
the corresponding (logarithmic) stock market returns from investing in the US oil sector, with 
the regression having a negative adjusted R-squared. For the subsamples where the relationship 
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is statistically significant, it is in fact negative, which is the opposite direction than the expected 
one. The association only becomes significant after accounting for US and world market 
returns. However, based on the adjusted R-squared of the full model compared to the adjusted 
R-squared of the simple model which only includes oil sector returns, most of the explanatory 
power in the full model comes from including the other factors and not from oil sector returns. 
This suggests that oil sector stock market returns are not a suitable hedge for oil price returns.  
Diamond prices are not affected by World, US, or US mines sector stock market returns. 
Of the other minerals, platinum is the most positively associated with world equity returns, 
followed by gold. All other minerals are insensitive to the world equity market returns, having 
no statistically significant relationships with it. Platinum, gold, and silver are positively 
associated with US mines sector returns. This association also holds in a simple regression 
which excludes World and US equity returns, suggesting the mines sector can be a partial hedge 
for their prices. On the other hand, the three mineral resources are negatively associated with 
US equity returns, similarly to oil prices. These results vary significantly in the selected 
subsamples (Panels B to F). In the most recent period, 2000 to 2017, silver prices are not 
associated with mines sector returns, while platinum and gold maintain the positive 
relationship. Conclusion: World, US, and Oil market returns do not seem to provide an 
adequate hedge to mineral resource returns. On the other hand, mines sector returns 
seem to provide a partial hedge. 
1.4 Global Impact of Sector Exclusion15 
In this section, we examine the interactions between geographic and sector allocation and 
the implications of sector exclusion for portfolio allocations. We use country and sector 
weightings data from the constituents in the FTSE All World Index in June 2018 and December 
2010 (earliest available FTSE report). Table 23 displays sector proportions in the world 
market, as well as for the USA, UK, Japan, Germany, and Emerging Markets. We use the ten 
sectors from the ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) standard. The world index used is 
the FTSE Russell All World Index and is plotted as a basis for comparison with the overweight 
and underweight positions in the other series. Panel A displays the weights for June 2018, and 
Panel B, the weights in December 2010. 
There are large disparities in sector weighting across regional markets. In June 2016, the 
USA has a particularly large allocation to technology (22%), as well as consumer services and 
 
15 This section is a fully-updated version of material from DMS (2015) 
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healthcare, all of which have higher allocations than they did in December 2010. In contrast, 
the UK has minimal weight in technology (1%), but is heavily tilted towards resources, with 
oil & gas at 16% and basic materials at 9%, which includes mining. Consumer goods are also 
overweight versus the world market (at 16%), and financials are high in absolute terms (21%). 
Technology had the same allocation in December 2010 as it did in June 2018, while oil & gas 
and basic materials have declined from 2010, when they made up 19% and 15% respectively. 
Consumer goods used to take up 12% of the UK market, which was in line with the World 
market. Financials, at 20% were only one percentage point (pp) lower in December 2010 
relative to June 2018. 
The Japanese and German markets share some similarities. Both in June 2018 and 
December 2010, they had substantial allocations to manufacturing industries (industrials), but 
very low exposures to oil & gas resources. Germany has a larger weighting to basic materials 
(14% in June 2018 and 19% in December 2010), which is due to the chemicals sector. 
Furthermore, both countries are over-exposed to consumer goods, where automobiles are the 
largest contributor. Japan has a low relative exposure to healthcare, and Germany to consumer 
services. 
Emerging markets generally have a high allocation to financials at 28% in June 2018, over 
60% of which is in banks. Banks made up 70% of Financials in December 2010 so they weight 
is decreasing. In June 2018, emerging markets are also slightly overweight in oil & gas, basic 
materials, and technology. They were also overweight oil & gas and basic materials in 
December 2010, but notably, were underweight technology. On the other hand, they are 
particularly under-exposed to healthcare, both in 2010 and June 2018. Furthermore, they are 
underweighted in consumer goods but overweighed in consumer services in June 2018, while 
they were underweighted in both sector in December 2010. 
We proceed to compare industry concentration within individual countries. The same ICB 
classification used in the preceding analysis separates the ten sectors used earlier into 41 
industries (for 39 of which we have country weightings). Table 24 reports the national and 
sector weightings at June 2018 (Panel A) and December 2010 (Panel B). 
It shows the country with the largest weight and the second-largest country, as well as their 
respective weights in the industry. In June 2018, the USA comprises just over half (53%) of 
total world market capitalisation and has the largest industry weight in 30 industries. The nine 
cases where the USA is not the biggest industry contributor are the following. Japan is the top 
player in automobiles and parts, electronic & electrical equipment, mobile telecommunications, 
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and construction & materials.  Hong Kong leads in real estate investment & services; UK in 
mining; China in alternative energy; South Korea in leisure goods; and Finland in forestry and 
paper. In contrast, in December 2010 the USA comprised 41% of total world market 
capitalisation and had the largest weight in 31 industries. Japan leads in automobiles & parts 
and leisure goods; Hong Kong is the main contributor in real estate investment & services; UK 
in mining and mobile telecommunications; Finland in forestry and paper; Germany has a 
narrow lead over the USA in gas water & multiutilities; and France is the top country in 
construction & materials.  
Examining industries where the weight of the second largest country is over 20%, and is 
not the USA, reveals other important industry players. For June 2018, Canada is an important 
contributor to oil equipment services & distribution; UK to tobacco; Denmark to alternative 
energy; Japan to leisure goods, industrial engineering, and real estate investment & services; 
Australia to mining; Switzerland to food producers. In December 2010, important players were 
UK for tobacco; Japan for support services, electronic & electrical equipment, industrial 
engineering; Switzerland for food producers; France for personal goods; Australia for mining; 
Denmark for alternative energy; Germany for chemicals.  
While there are similarities between industry weights in June 2018 and December 2010, 
some notable trends also emerge. In 2010 the USA was the main contributor to alternative 
energy. In contrast, in 2018 the industry is dominated by China and Denmark. Similarly, in 
2010 Japan was the leader in two industries, while in 2018 it leads in four.  
To summarise, industries display pronounced country concentrations. In June 2018 
(December 2010), for 31 (31) out of 39 industries, the two countries with largest weights make 
up over 50% of the world industry market capitalisation; for 28 (20) industries they make up 
more that 60%, for 18 (12) industries they make up more than 70%, and for nine (four) 
industries more than 80%. Furthermore, overall, industry concentration is higher in June 2018 
than it was in December 2010. 
In the same manner that industries appear prone to country concentration, countries can 
also be over-exposed to particular industries. Table 25 displays the weight of the three largest 
industries in each country in June 2018 (Panel A) and December 2010 (Panel B). We have 
selected all countries in the FTSE All World Index in each period. In both cases we have 47 
countries, 46 of which are the same. In December 2010 Qatar was in the index, while in June 
2018 Morocco is included instead. 
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In June 2018, in four countries, three or fewer industries account for the entire country’s 
market capitalisation, while this is the case only for two countries in December 2010. On the 
other hand, the five least concentrated countries in June 2018 are Japan, France, the USA, 
Germany and the UK, where the three largest industries make up between 25% (Japan) and 
37% (UK) of total market capitalisation. In December 2010, the five least concentrated 
countries were South Korea, India, France, Japan, and the USA, with the three largest industries 
comprising between 26% and 42%. In June 2018 (December 2010), in 42 (44) out of 47 the 
top three industries make up more than 40% of total country market capitalisation; in 34 (35) 
countries, they make up at least 50%, in 23 (26) countries they make up a least 60%; and in 13 
(13) at least 70%. 
Therefore, there are more countries with 100% concentration made up by their top three 
industries in 2018 relative to 2010. However, overall, the concentration of industries among 
countries, while still relatively high, is slightly lower in 2018 than it was in 2010. 
Our discussion highlights changes to the proportion of a county’s market to which an 
investor is exposed. For example, if 40% of a country’s stock market is taken up by a specific 
sector, then by excluding that sector from an investment portfolio, the portfolio’s exposure to 
the country’s market is almost halved. Another way to look at changes to country exposure 
would be to discuss the change of a country’s weight in the total index following sector 
exclusion. For example, if the country made up 2% of the world market, after the sector 
exclusions it would comprise 1.2% of the world market (40% lower), making the exposure 
change roughly 0.8% (this is an approximation as the precise exposure change would depend 
on the new, ex-sector benchmark following exclusion). Discussed in that framework, the 
change to the country exposure would seem much smaller. While both approaches have merit, 
we stress the proportional change in country weightings to draw attention to the impact of 
sector divestment on exposure to emerging markets and smaller economies. 
Investors who focus on specific countries will usually have poorly diversified portfolios, 
especially if they favour stocks located primarily in their home market. A sector-screened 
portfolio may be regarded as an active-passive blend of a diversified long-only portfolio plus 
a long-short overlay. That overlay is likely to incorporate unwanted geographic tilts alongside 
the sector (or other) attributes that underpin the screen. Conclusion: sector or industry 
exclusion is likely to generate collateral tilts away from particular countries. 
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7. Conclusion 
There are a variety of motivations which can drive investors to engage in sector exclusion. 
These can range from beliefs about the future return prospects for particular sectors, to attempts 
to hedge the risks of existing holdings, or a desire to invest in line with particular ethical 
considerations. Over a brief horizon, exclusions are unlikely to have a large influence on prices. 
Atta-Darkua (2020) for example, documents that while GPFG divestment recommendations 
have a negative impact on the price of excluded firms, the impact is modest in magnitude. Over 
the long term, however, divestments are likely to have a more pronounced impact on 
investment returns. 
In this paper we examine exclusions from the point of view of a well-diversified long-term 
investor. We employ a dataset of UK and USA market and sector returns starting in 1900 in 
order to have a long term perspective, and make periodic comparisons with global evidence. 
Instead of examining the performance of screened relative to non-screened portfolios, we focus 
our analysis on the portion of the portfolio which is being excluded and the assets which replace 
it. Therefore, we compare market and sector returns. 
We document that over the long run sectors do not provide returns close to the market, 
making the overall equity market an imperfect substitute for any given sector’s returns. 
Furthermore, sector exclusion exposes investors to substantial drawdowns in the component of 
the portfolio that is exposed to this strategy. The risks of screened strategies underperforming 
a diversified portfolio are non-trivial. Even if drawdowns are eventually reversed, investors 
may face pressure to abandon the sector exclusion strategies at a time when they are performing 
particularly poorly, thus locking in the bad performance. 
We find that the equity market is a poor hedge for investors seeking to offset the price 
volatility of a mineral resource. Over the long term, real cash returns from equities have been 
higher than those from any of the high-value mineral resources which we analyse. Furthermore, 
from a long-term perspective, real oil prices in particular were found to be uncorrelated with 
real US oil sector market returns. Mines sector returns, on the other hand, seem to provide a 
partial hedge for platinum, gold, and silver prices, but not for the prices of diamonds.  
Finally, global investors need to be mindful that sectors can be concentrated in specific 
geographic locations. Sector exclusions may introduce active country exposures into portfolios. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that in the long run the consequences of sector exclusions can 
be substantial rather than minor. While exclusions may generate financial rewards for an 
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investor, sector exclusions can also introduce unrewarded downside risks into the investor’s 
portfolio. 
e(Dimson, Ilmanen, Liljeblom and Stephansen, 2010)(Skancke, Dimson, Hoel, Kettis, et al., 2014)(Dimson, Kreutzer, Lake, Sjo, et al., 2013)  
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8. Figures 
Figure 1 Cumulative Market returns and Market excluding a sector returns 
This Figure displays the cumulative returns of the total market in each geography relative to strategies 
which exclude a given sector and hold a market cap weighted portfolio of the remaining sectors. We 
plot the cumulative returns for the market and the top and bottom performing strategy in each market. 
Panel A shows the results in the UK market, and Panel B displays the USA market results 
Panel A: UK 
 
Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
 
Panel B: USA 
 
Source: French (2019) 
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Figure 3: Cumulative value of $1 invested in US industries 1900–2017 
This Figure displays the cumulative returns of the USA sectors in our long term returns dataset together 
with the USA market return. 
 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019) 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative value of £1 invested in UK industries 1900–2017 
This Figure displays the cumulative returns of the UK sectors in our long term returns dataset together 
with the UK market return.  
 
Source: DMS (2015), Thomson Reuters (2019) 
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Figure 5: Drawdown charts for a fund long the market, short the oil sector 
This figure shows the drawdowns of a strategy short the oil sector and long the market in the UK and USA, starting 
at either the beginning of the data period (1900 for the UK and 1911 for the USA) or in 1950. Drawdowns are 
defined as the difference between the portfolio’s value on a particular date and its high-water mark (the highest 
historic value up to that date), divided by the high-water mark. They are expressed as percentages. 
United Kingdom 1900–2017 United States 1911–2017 
  
 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), FTSE Russell (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019) 
  
Figure 4: Cumulative total return for a fund long the market, short the oil sector 
This figure shows the cumulative total returns of a strategy which is short the oil sector and long the market 
in the UK and USA, starting at either the beginning of the data period (1900 for the UK and 1911 for the 
USA) or in 1950. 
United Kingdom 1900–2017  United States 1911–2017 
  
 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), FTSE Russell (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019) 
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Figure 7: Annualised return of a fund long the market, short an industry 
This figure shows the percentile distribution of strategies which are short a sector and long the 
market in the UK and USA. We use data from 1900 to 2017, and for each sector calculate the mean 
strategy results over one year rolling windows of 10, 20, and 30 years. The percentile distribution is 
then calculated based on those mean sector returns. 
Distribution for the UK 1900–2017 Distribution for the US 1900–2017 
  
Source: DMS (2018),  French (2019), FTSE Russell (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019). 
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Figure 6: Maximum drawdown for a fund long the market, short an industry 
This figure shows histograms for the maximal drawdowns of portfolios short a sector and long the market in 
the UK and USA.  Drawdowns are defined as the difference between the portfolio’s value on a particular date 
and its high-water mark (the highest historic value up to that date), divided by the high-water mark. They are 
expressed as percentages. The series all start in 1900 except the US oil sector which, as noted earlier, begins 
in 1911. 
Distribution for the UK 1900–2017 Distribution for the US 1900–2017 
  
Source: DMS (2018),  French (2019), FTSE Russell (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019).  Note: US oil index starts in 1911; 
all others in 1900. 
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Figure 8: Price indices for minerals in inflation-adjusted US dollars, 1900-
2017 
This figure shows the total real (inflation-adjusted) returns for selected minerals in US dollars.  
 
Sources: onlygold.com (2018), Officer and Williamson (2018), US Geological Survey (2018), Stooq (2018), 
Katzav/IDEX (2018), Spaenjers (2016), BP (2018), DMS (2018). 
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9. Tables 
Table 1 Return statistics for Market series and series of the Market excluding 
a given sector 
This table displays the cumulative returns (“Total Returns”, TR) of the total market in each geography 
relative to strategies which exclude a given sector and hold a market cap weighted portfolio of the 
remaining sectors. The first column “TR” shows the total returns of the strategies over the analyses 
period in each panel. The next column “% of Market TR” display what percentage of market total return 
is achieved by each strategy. The next column, “Mean” shows the mean annualised return of the 
strategies. In the following column. “% of Market Mean” we display the percentage of market mean 
annualised return achieved by each strategy. The final column, “std” shows the standard deviation of 
returns in each strategy. Panel A shows the results in the UK market, and Panel B displays the USA 
market results. 
 
TR is Total Returns; Mean is geometric sector returns. Std is standard deviation 
Panel A: UK, 1986-2017, Market value weighting, annual rebalancing 
 TR % of  Market TR Mean % of Market Mean Std 
Retail 64 109 13.87 102 17.36 
Banks 63 108 13.84 102 16.91 
Insurance 60 102 13.65 101 16.97 
Inds Transpt 60 102 13.63 100 16.95 
Chemicals 59 101 13.60 100 16.90 
Fd Producers 59 101 13.60 100 17.14 
Inds Eng 59 101 13.60 100 16.89 
Auto & Parts 59 100 13.57 100 16.85 
Travel & Leis 59 100 13.56 100 16.95 
Personal Goods 58 99 13.53 100 16.90 
Oil & Gas 58 99 13.52 100 17.53 
Beverages 57 98 13.49 99 17.14 
Tobacco 55 94 13.34 98 17.06 
Mining 52 88 13.13 97 16.22 
Market 59 100 13.57 100 16.86 
Source: Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
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Panel B: USA, 1927-2017, Market value weighting, annual rebalancing 
 TR % of Market TR Mean % of Market Mean Std 
Trans 36,347 113 12.23 101 20.60 
Util  34,033 106 12.15 101 21.14 
Telcm 33,975 105 12.15 101 21.13 
Hshld 33,068 103 12.12 100 20.64 
Steel 33,024 102 12.11 100 20.20 
Chems 33,013 102 12.11 100 20.52 
Mach  32,664 101 12.10 100 20.50 
Paper 32,478 101 12.09 100 20.59 
Ships 32,360 100 12.09 100 20.53 
Food  32,304 100 12.09 100 20.86 
Txtls 32,280 100 12.09 100 20.56 
Coal  32,270 100 12.08 100 20.58 
Mines 32,155 100 12.08 100 20.56 
ElcEq 31,876 99 12.07 100 20.49 
Smoke 30,997 96 12.04 100 20.80 
Oil   29,340 91 11.97 99 20.99 
Market 32,249 100 12.08 100 20.57 
French (2019) 
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Table 2: Sector market capitalisations in the United Kingdom 
This table shows the composition of the UK Market in the beginning of our long term returns sample 
(1900) and its composition at the end of our sample (2018) 
 
Panel A: 1st January 1900   Panel B: 1st January 2018 
 
Sector % 
Other industrial 16.4 
Oil & gas 15.0 
Banks 13.1 
Health 8.8 
Mines 7.4 
Tobacco 7.0 
Insurance 5.7 
Telecoms 4.2 
Travel & leisure 3.8 
Other financial 3.6 
Media 3.5 
Drink 3.5 
Utilities 3.1 
Retail 2.8 
Technology 0.9 
Food 0.6 
Textiles 0.4 
Other transport 0.2 
Source: DMS (2002, 2018), FTSE Russell (2019) 
 
Table 3: Sector market capitalisations in the United States 
This table shows the composition of the USA Market in the beginning of our long term returns sample 
(1900) and its composition at the end of our sample (2018) 
Panel A: 1st January 1900   Panel B: 1st January 2018 
 
Sector % 
Technology 20.2 
Other industrial 16.7 
Health 12.7 
Banks 7.9 
Retail 7.3 
Other financial 7.2 
Oil & gas 5.9 
Insurance 4.4 
Media 3.0 
Utilities 2.9 
Travel & leisure 2.6 
Telecoms 2.1 
Drinks 2.0 
Food 1.6 
Tobacco 1.3 
Rail 0.9 
Other transport 0.8 
Textiles 0.3 
Others 0.3 
Source: DMS (2002, 2018), FTSE Russell (2019)  
Sector %  
Rail 49.2 
Banks 15.4 
Mines 6.7 
Textiles 4.8 
Iron & coal 4.5 
Drink 4.5 
Other industrial 3.6 
Utilities 3.1 
Telegraph 2.5 
Insurance 1.9 
Other transport 1.4 
Retail 0.7 
Food 0.6 
Media 0.3 
Oil & gas 0.2 
Sector %  
Rail 62.8 
Banks 6.7 
Other Industrial 5.3 
Iron & coal 5.2 
Utilities 4.8 
Tobacco 4.0 
Telegraph 3.9 
Other transport 3.7 
Food 2.5 
Textiles 0.7 
Drink 0.3 
Retail 0.1 
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Table 4 Geometric Mean Returns for Sectors and the Market 
This table shows the geometric mean annualised returns for the sectors and the market in the UK (Panel 
A) and USA (Panel B). The annualised returns are shown for the full analysis period and for selected 
subperiods of 25 years each, except for the last period which is 18 years. 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
*Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobacco* 13.46   4.81 8.44 22.66 19.89 
Alcohol 11.56 7.85 7.03 8.57 21.09 14.78 
Chemicals 11.06 6.68 7.42 9.57 19.10 13.72 
Insurance 10.20 9.58 4.92 7.09 23.51 5.63 
Shipping 9.86 9.00 1.27 13.42 18.74 6.79 
Leisure* 9.74  -0.61 7.83 21.98 8.87 
Mining 9.48 1.44 4.07 12.65 20.93 9.33 
Retail 9.36 4.08 7.62 10.31 19.60 4.48 
Oil 9.16 -1.47 6.78 10.82 24.02 6.45 
Textiles 8.86 8.35 2.54 8.05 10.76 17.48 
Banks 8.65 5.35 4.15 6.94 25.67 0.46 
Food 8.32 3.06 1.78 9.21 19.21 9.58 
Motors* 7.94  5.28 6.12 22.98 5.72 
Engineering 7.13 0.87 -0.72 6.87 18.48 12.94 
Market 9.41 5.30 4.82 9.20 22.5 4.99 
 
Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
*Oil starts in 1911 
 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobac 14.58 20.64 8.00 10.89 15.52 19.81 
Chems 11.97 14.29 12.46 8.51 14.19 9.96 
ElcEq 11.74 12.51 7.41 10.45 21.60 5.64 
Food 11.73 14.06 7.54 8.50 18.44 9.99 
Oil* 10.40   6.52 11.9 15.19 8.22 
Rail 10.07 7.16 2.42 8.84 17.24 17.46 
Hshld 9.25 8.78 4.22 11.34 15.25 6.08 
Mach 9.01 4.21 8.04 10.2 12.64 10.58 
Mines 8.85 5.88 7.92 10.54 10.03 10.35 
Telcm 8.81 6.24 7.47 7.93 19.63 1.49 
Paper 8.54 2.86 6.66 9.25 15.97 8.29 
Util 8.46 5.39 5.97 7.78 14.10 9.60 
Steel 8.13 11.05 6.21 9.34 10.96 1.45 
Txtls 7.87 5.60 3.94 5.91 14.61 10.30 
Ships 6.50 -1.51 3.36 8.97 7.95 17.61 
Coal 6.46 6.45 0.11 15.65 7.52 1.95 
Market 9.56 7.83 6.97 9.43 17.11 5.73 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
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Table 5 Callan Periodic Tables for Geometric Mean Returns for Sectors and 
the Market 
This table shows Callan tables for the geometric mean annualised returns for the sectors and the market 
in the UK (Panel A) and USA (Panel B). The annualised returns are shown for the full analysis period 
and for selected subperiods of 25 years each, except for the last period which is 18 years. Callan tables 
rank each sector and the market from the highest to lowest return in each period. 
 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
*Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 
1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobacco* 
13.46 
Insurance 
9.58 
Retail 
7.62 
Shipping 
13.42 
Banks 
25.67 
Tobacco 
19.89 
Alcohol 
11.56 
Shipping 
9.00 
Chemicals 
7.42 
Mining 
12.65 
Oil 
24.02 
Textiles 
17.48 
Chemicals 
11.06 
Textiles 
8.35 
Alcohol 
7.03 
Oil 
10.82 
Insurance 
23.51 
Alcohol 
14.78 
Insurance 
10.20 
Alcohol 
7.85 
Oil 
6.78 
Retail 
10.31 
Motors 
22.98 
Chemicals 
13.72 
Shipping 
9.86 
Chemicals 
6.68 
Motors 
5.28 
Chemicals 
9.57 
Tobacco 
22.66 
Engineering 
12.94 
Leisure* 
9.74 
Banks 
5.35 
Insurance 
4.92 
Food 
9.21 
Market 
22.50 
Food 
9.58 
Mining 
9.48 
Market 
5.30 
Market 
4.82 
Market 
9.20 
Leisure 
21.98 
Mining 
9.33 
Market 
9.41 
Retail 
4.08 
Tobacco 
4.81 
Alcohol 
8.57 
Alcohol 
21.09 
Leisure 
8.87 
Retail 
9.36 
Food 
3.06 
Banks 
4.15 
Tobacco 
8.44 
Mining 
20.93 
Shipping 
6.79 
Oil 
9.16 
Mining 
1.44 
Mining 
4.07 
Textiles 
8.05 
Retail 
19.60 
Oil 
6.45 
Textiles 
8.86 
Engineering 
0.87 
Textiles 
2.54 
Leisure 
7.83 
Food 
19.21 
Motors 
5.72 
Banks 
8.65 
Oil 
-1.47 
Food 
1.78 
Insurance 
7.09 
Chemicals 
19.10 
Insurance 
5.63 
Food 
8.32 
 Shipping 
1.27 
Banks 
6.94 
Shipping 
18.74 
Market 
4.99 
Motors* 
7.94 
 Leisure 
-0.61 
Engineering 
6.87 
Engineering 
18.48 
Retail 
4.48 
Engineering 
7.13 
 Engineering 
-0.72 
Motors 
6.12 
Textiles 
10.76 
Banks 
0.46 
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Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
*Oil starts in 1911 
 
1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobac 
14.58 
Tobac 
20.64 
Chems 
12.46 
Coal 
15.65 
ElcEq 
21.60 
Tobac 
19.81 
Chems 
11.97 
Chems 
14.29 
Mach 
8.04 
Oil 
11.90 
Telcm 
19.63 
Ships 
17.61 
ElcEq 
11.74 
Food 
14.06 
Tobac 
8.00 
Hshld 
11.34 
Food 
18.44 
Rail 
17.46 
Food 
11.73 
ElcEq 
12.51 
Mines 
7.92 
Tobac 
10.89 
Rail 
17.24 
Mach 
10.58 
Oil* 
10.40 
Steel 
11.05 
Food 
7.54 
Mines 
10.54 
Market 
17.11 
Mines 
10.35 
Rail 
10.07 
Hshld 
8.78 
Telcm 
7.47 
ElcEq 
10.45 
Paper 
15.97 
Txtls 
10.30 
Market 
9.56 
Market 
7.83 
ElcEq 
7.41 
Mach 
10.20 
Tobac 
15.52 
Food 
9.99 
Hshld 
9.25 
Rail 
7.16 
Market 
6.97 
Market 
9.43 
Hshld 
15.25 
Chems 
9.96 
Mach 
9.01 
Coal 
6.45 
Paper 
6.66 
Steel 
9.34 
Oil 
15.19 
Util 
9.60 
Mines 
8.85 
Telcm 
6.24 
Oil 
6.52 
Paper 
9.25 
Txtls 
14.61 
Paper 
8.29 
Telcm 
8.81 
Mines 
5.88 
Steel 
6.21 
Ships 
8.97 
Chems 
14.19 
Oil 
8.22 
Paper 
8.54 
Txtls 
5.60 
Util 
5.97 
Rail 
8.84 
Util 
14.10 
Hshld 
6.08 
Util 
8.46 
Util 
5.39 
Hshld 
4.22 
Chems 
8.51 
Mach 
12.64 
Market 
5.73 
Steel 
8.13 
Mach 
4.21 
Txtls 
3.94 
Food 
8.50 
Steel 
10.96 
ElcEq 
5.64 
Txtls 
7.87 
Paper 
2.86 
Ships 
3.36 
Telcm 
7.93 
Mines 
10.03 
Coal 
1.95 
Ships 
6.50 
Ships 
-1.51 
Rail 
2.42 
Util 
7.78 
Ships 
7.95 
Telcm 
1.49 
Coal 
6.46 
 Coal 
0.11 
Txtls 
5.91 
Coal 
7.52 
Steel 
1.45 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
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Table 6: Cumulative value of £1 invested in UK industries 1900–2017 
This table shows the cumulative returns for the sectors and the market in the UK (Panel A) and the 
relative size of those cumulative returns to the UK market return (sector total return divided by market 
total return, Panel B). These are shown for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 
years each, except for the last period which is 18 years. 
Panel A: Total Returns for Sectors and the Market 
*Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Alcohol 403,234 6.61 5.47 7.81 119.62 11.95 
Chemicals 237,221 5.04 5.99 9.82 79.08 10.12 
Tobacco* 237,087   3.24 7.59 165.03 26.19 
Insurance 95,066 9.84 3.32 5.54 195.95 2.68 
Shipping 65,786 8.62 1.37 23.31 73.21 3.26 
Mining 43,938 1.43 2.71 19.65 115.62 4.98 
Retail 38,333 2.72 6.28 11.63 87.79 2.2 
Oil 31,078 0.69 5.15 13.05 217.22 3.08 
Textiles 22,510 7.42 1.87 6.93 12.86 18.17 
Banks 17,866 3.68 2.76 5.35 302.54 1.09 
Food 12,520 2.13 1.55 9.04 80.82 5.19 
Leisure* 9,067   0.86 6.59 143.6 4.61 
Engineering 3,388 1.24 0.84 5.26 69.33 8.94 
Motors* 1,789   3.62 4.41 176.1 2.72 
Market 40,838 3.64 3.24 9.02 159.75 2.4 
 
Panel B: Relative Returns for Sectors vs the Market 
*Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobacco* 15.85   1.00 0.84 1.03 10.91 
Alcohol 9.87 1.81 1.69 0.87 0.75 4.98 
Chemicals 5.81 1.38 1.85 1.09 0.5 4.21 
Insurance 2.33 2.7 1.03 0.61 1.23 1.12 
Shipping 1.61 2.37 0.42 2.58 0.46 1.36 
Mining 1.08 0.39 0.84 2.18 0.72 2.07 
Retail 0.94 0.75 1.94 1.29 0.55 0.92 
Oil 0.76 0.19 1.59 1.45 1.36 1.28 
Leisure* 0.61   0.26 0.73 0.9 1.92 
Textiles 0.55 2.04 0.58 0.77 0.08 7.56 
Banks 0.44 1.01 0.85 0.59 1.89 0.45 
Food 0.31 0.58 0.48 1.00 0.51 2.16 
Motors* 0.12   1.12 0.49 1.10 1.13 
Engineering 0.08 0.34 0.26 0.58 0.43 3.72 
Source: DMS (2015), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
  
  
115 
 
Table 7: Cumulative value of $1 invested in US industries 1900–2017 
This table shows the cumulative returns for the sectors and the market in the USA (Panel A) and the 
relative size of those cumulative returns to the USA market return (sector total return divided by market 
total return, Panel B). These are shown for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 
years each, except for the last period which is 18 years. 
Panel A: Total Returns for Sectors and the Market 
*Oil starts in 1911 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobac 9,437,340 108.88 6.86 13.25 36.85 25.89 
Chems 623,092 28.18 18.83 7.70 27.60 5.53 
ElcEq 488,153 19.06 5.98 12.01 132.98 2.68 
Food 484,231 26.79 6.16 7.69 68.77 5.55 
Rail 82,254 5.63 1.82 8.31 53.3 18.12 
Oil* 39,523   4.85 16.61 34.3 4.14 
Hshld 34,000 8.21 2.81 14.66 34.78 2.89 
Mach 26,350 2.80 6.91 11.34 19.59 6.12 
Mines 22,092 4.17 6.72 12.26 10.92 5.89 
Telcm 21,342 4.54 6.05 6.74 88.34 1.31 
Paper 15,769 2.02 5.01 9.13 40.57 4.19 
Util 14,538 3.71 4.27 6.51 27.07 5.21 
Steel 10,087 13.75 4.51 9.31 13.47 1.30 
Txtls 7,593 3.90 2.63 4.20 30.22 5.84 
Ships 1,679 0.68 2.28 8.57 6.77 18.55 
Coal 1,612 4.77 1.03 37.89 6.13 1.42 
Market 47,661 6.58 5.39 9.51 51.85 2.73 
 
Panel B: Relative Returns for Sectors vs the Market 
*Oil starts in 1911 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobac 198.01 16.55 1.27 1.39 0.71 9.50 
Chems 13.07 4.28 3.49 0.81 0.53 2.03 
ElcEq 10.24 2.9 1.11 1.26 2.56 0.98 
Food 10.16 4.07 1.14 0.81 1.33 2.04 
Oil* 2.04   0.9 1.75 0.66 1.52 
Rail 1.73 0.86 0.34 0.87 1.03 6.65 
Hshld 0.71 1.25 0.52 1.54 0.67 1.06 
Mach 0.55 0.43 1.28 1.19 0.38 2.24 
Mines 0.46 0.63 1.25 1.29 0.21 2.16 
Telcm 0.45 0.69 1.12 0.71 1.70 0.48 
Paper 0.33 0.31 0.93 0.96 0.78 1.54 
Util 0.31 0.56 0.79 0.68 0.52 1.91 
Steel 0.21 2.09 0.84 0.98 0.26 0.48 
Txtls 0.16 0.59 0.49 0.44 0.58 2.14 
Ships 0.04 0.10 0.42 0.90 0.13 6.80 
Coal 0.03 0.72 0.19 3.98 0.12 0.52 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)  
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Table 8: Sector Correlations with the Market 
This table shows the correlations with the overall market for the sectors in the UK (Panel A) and in the USA 
(Panel B). Correlations are calculated using log returns. The metrics are tested for significance relative to the mean 
in each period. These are shown for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 years each, except 
for the last period which is 18 years. The mean reported for 1900-2017 excludes sectors starting after 1900. For 
series starting after 1900, significance for 1900-2017 is tested relative to the mean calculated using only data from 
when the series starts. Log returns for year are calculated as: Returnt = ln (TRt / TRt-1), where TRt is the value of 
a cumulative return series at year t. 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
*Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920. 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Insurance 0.87*** 0.79*** 0.83** 0.88 0.89*** 0.87** 
Banks 0.85*** 0.70 0.90*** 0.86** 0.86** 0.81 
Chemicals 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.81** 0.93*** 0.83 0.84* 
Leisure^ 0.84***  0.67 0.90 0.92*** 0.84* 
Retail 0.82** 0.80*** 0.63 0.88 0.80 0.81 
Motors^ 0.79  0.66 0.91 0.82 0.86** 
Alcohol 0.77 0.43*** 0.72 0.90 0.74 0.73 
Food 0.76 0.52*** 0.39*** 0.94*** 0.83* 0.55*** 
Shipping 0.75 0.62 0.63 0.84*** 0.72* 0.94*** 
Engineering 0.75 0.63 0.38*** 0.98*** 0.86*** 0.88** 
Mining 0.74* 0.64 0.88*** 0.86** 0.59*** 0.69 
Textiles 0.70*** 0.76** 0.66 0.91 0.69*** 0.69 
Oil 0.69*** 0.50*** 0.82** 0.84*** 0.76 0.62* 
Tobacco^ 0.67***  0.87*** 0.85*** 0.58*** 0.15*** 
Mean 0.78 0.65 0.70 0.89 0.78 0.74 
Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
ElcEq 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.92** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.92*** 
Chems 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.92** 0.84** 0.74*** 0.92*** 
Steel 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.95*** 0.79 0.51* 0.90*** 
Rail 0.79* 0.90*** 0.93** 0.80 0.56 0.67* 
Oil^ 0.78  0.89 0.80 0.63 0.68 
Mach 0.77 0.78 0.97*** 0.94*** 0.65 0.90*** 
Paper 0.77 0.66*** 0.87 0.79 0.74*** 0.92*** 
Food 0.77 0.85*** 0.95*** 0.76 0.50** 0.60*** 
Txtls 0.77 0.78 0.82** 0.84** 0.54 0.80 
Mines 0.75 0.77 0.93*** 0.70 0.52 0.77 
Telcm 0.74 0.81* 0.82** 0.67** 0.51* 0.86** 
Ships 0.72 0.74 0.89 0.69* 0.53 0.76 
Util 0.71 0.76 0.72*** 0.77 0.64 0.64** 
Hshld 0.67** 0.60*** 0.89 0.85*** 0.77*** 0.84* 
Coal 0.55*** 0.73 0.75*** 0.45*** 0.61 0.42*** 
Tobac 0.48*** 0.59*** 0.78*** 0.50*** 0.10*** 0.43*** 
Mean 0.74 0.77 0.88 0.75 0.59 0.75 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01 Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)  
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Table 9: Sector and Market Standard Deviations  
This table shows the standard deviations of the overall market and sectors in the UK (Panel A) and in 
the USA (Panel B).  Standard Deviations are calculated for log returns. Standard deviations are shown 
for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 years each, except for the last period which 
is 18 years. Log returns for year t are calculated as: Returnt = ln (TRt / TRt-1), Where TRt is the value of 
a cumulative return series at year t. 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Motors^ 36***  32** 34 29* 39* 
Leisure^ 29***  28** 35 25 24 
Mining 29*** 19** 23 33 25 41*** 
Oil 29*** 38*** 26** 29 24 17 
Engineering 26** 17 30 24 24 29** 
Textiles 26*** 17** 19* 26 34** 29 
Shipping 23*** 21** 21* 24 18 30 
Banks 22 8 11 30 23 26 
Tobacco^ 22  15 23 28** 12 
Chemicals 21 13 20 25 24 23 
Insurance 21 15 14 25 22 22 
Retail 21 14 15 27 24* 17 
Food 20 19** 11 26 22 11 
Alcohol 19 13 17 26 19 12 
Market 18 10 13 24 18 17 
Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Coal 37*** 34** 34 26* 26*** 65*** 
Mach 36*** 62*** 35 22 16 27 
Paper 33*** 43*** 46** 26* 14 21 
Txtls 32*** 40*** 36 30*** 25*** 27 
Steel 32*** 39** 37 25 18 38** 
Ships 31*** 39*** 39 25 23** 21 
Hshld 29* 52** 27 22 13 12 
Mines 28*** 30* 28 23 22** 39** 
ElcEq 24** 21 32 24 15 24 
Tobac 24 32** 19 20 24 19 
Rail 24* 17 32 23 22*** 19 
Chems 23 28 29 19 15 24 
Oil^ 21  26 19 17 20 
Util 21 23 30 14 13 19 
Food 18 21 20 15 18* 11 
Telcm 17 12* 18* 12 15 25 
Market 19 18 26 18 12 20 
Levene Test for differences in variances of sectors vs the market, at median, * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01; 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
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Table 10: Sector Betas vs the Market  
This table shows the betas for each sector and mean sector beta in the UK (Panel A) and in the USA 
(Panel B).  Betas are created using log returns. The metrics are tested for significance relative to the 
mean in each period. The mean reported for 1900-2017 excludes sectors starting after 1900. For series 
starting after 1900, significance for 1900-2017 is tested relative to the mean calculated using only data 
from when the series starts. Betas are shown for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 
25 years each, except for the last period which is 18 years. Log returns for year t are calculated as: 
Returnt = ln (TRt / TRt-1), Where TRt is the value of a cumulative return series at year t. 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Motors^ 1.48***  1.59*** 1.28*** 1.29*** 1.97*** 
Leisure^ 1.25***  1.38*** 1.31*** 1.26*** 1.20 
Mining 1.17*** 1.15 1.54*** 1.16*** 0.83*** 1.69*** 
Oil 1.09*** 1.81*** 1.57*** 1.01 0.99 0.63*** 
Engineering 1.06* 1.02 0.88 0.98 1.13* 1.49** 
Banks 1.04 0.52*** 0.76** 1.07 1.08 1.23 
Chemicals 1.00 1.00 1.24* 0.94* 1.09 1.16 
Textiles 0.99 1.22 0.93 0.99 1.30*** 1.18 
Insurance 0.99 1.17 0.86* 0.90*** 1.09 1.16 
Shipping 0.96 1.22 0.97 0.85*** 0.72*** 1.68*** 
Retail 0.93 1.11 0.70*** 0.98 1.04 0.82* 
Food 0.83*** 0.97 0.32*** 1.01 1.01 0.36*** 
Alcohol 0.80*** 0.55*** 0.92 0.96 0.78*** 0.50*** 
Tobacco^ 0.75***  1.00 0.82*** 0.87*** 0.11*** 
Mean 0.99 1.07 1.05 1.02 1.03 1.08 
Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Mach 1.46*** 2.65*** 1.32*** 1.18*** 0.88 1.25** 
Steel 1.38*** 1.81*** 1.36*** 1.12*** 0.78 1.74*** 
Paper 1.32*** 1.56 1.57*** 1.14*** 0.86 0.98 
Txtls 1.28*** 1.75** 1.15 1.40*** 1.13*** 1.11 
Ships 1.17* 1.60* 1.35*** 0.96 1.02** 0.81 
ElcEq 1.12 0.99** 1.15 1.18*** 1.09*** 1.12 
Mines 1.09 1.27 1.03 0.90 0.96 1.51*** 
Coal 1.08 1.37 0.99 0.66*** 1.33*** 1.41*** 
Chems 1.04 1.33 1.03 0.89 0.94 1.13 
Hshld 1.03 1.71** 0.94 1.05* 0.83 0.51*** 
Rail 0.97 0.82*** 1.15 1.03 1.06** 0.64*** 
Oil^ 0.88*  0.89** 0.85 0.91 0.68** 
Util 0.77*** 0.94*** 0.85** 0.59*** 0.73** 0.61*** 
Food 0.71*** 0.98** 0.74*** 0.65*** 0.75** 0.35*** 
Telcm 0.66*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.47*** 0.66*** 1.09 
Tobac 0.59*** 1.05** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.21*** 0.42*** 
Mean 1.05 1.36 1.04 0.92 0.88 0.96 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)  
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Table 11: Tracking Errors for Sectors vs Market, UK ,1900-2017  
This table shows two different metrics of UK sector tracking errors relative to the UK market. Panel A 
calculates tracking errors as the mean absolute deviations from market returns and Panel B uses the 
standard deviation of the variance of the difference of sector and market (formula shown below). The 
metrics are tested for significance relative to the mean in each period. The mean reported for 1900-2017 
excludes sectors starting after 1900. For series starting after 1900, significance for 1900-2017 is tested 
relative to the mean calculated using only data from when the series starts. Tracking errors are shown 
for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 years each, except for the last period which 
is 18 years. 
Panel A: Mean Absolute Deviation 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Motors^ 0.18***  0.19*** 0.14** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
Oil 0.17*** 0.25*** 0.14** 0.16*** 0.16 0.13 
Mining 0.17*** 0.11 0.11 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.30*** 
Tobacco^ 0.15**  0.06*** 0.12 0.23*** 0.20** 
Leisure^ 0.14  0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12** 0.13 
Textiles 0.14** 0.09 0.12 0.10* 0.19*** 0.21*** 
Shipping 0.13 0.12 0.14** 0.12 0.14 0.12* 
Alcohol 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.11** 
Food 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.12* 
Engineering 0.10* 0.10 0.11 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.16 
Retail 0.10* 0.07** 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.08*** 
Chemicals 0.10** 0.06** 0.10 0.08*** 0.13 0.13 
Banks 0.09** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.14* 0.12** 0.11** 
Insurance 0.09** 0.09 0.07*** 0.11 0.10*** 0.10*** 
Mean 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 
 
Panel B: Standard-Deviation based 
TE = Sqrt (Sum( (R_Sector – R_market) ^2)/ (n-1) ) 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Motors^ 0.27***  0.33*** 0.18 0.26*** 0.29*** 
Mining 0.24*** 0.15 0.13 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.39*** 
Oil 0.24*** 0.36*** 0.18 0.21*** 0.21 0.16* 
Leisure^ 0.21**  0.24*** 0.23*** 0.20 0.16* 
Tobacco^ 0.21*  0.08*** 0.16 0.30*** 0.26** 
Textiles 0.20** 0.13 0.15 0.13* 0.25*** 0.33*** 
Shipping 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.16* 
Engineering 0.16 0.14 0.20** 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.25* 
Alcohol 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.15** 
Food 0.15 0.20* 0.15 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.15** 
Chemicals 0.14* 0.09** 0.16 0.10*** 0.17** 0.19 
Retail 0.14** 0.10** 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.11*** 
Banks 0.14** 0.08** 0.06*** 0.19** 0.16** 0.14** 
Insurance 0.12*** 0.12 0.08*** 0.15 0.13*** 0.11*** 
Mean 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.20 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01; Source: DMS (2015), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE 
Russell (2019)  
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Table 12: Tracking Errors for Sectors vs Market, US ,1900-2017  
This table shows two different metrics of US sector tracking errors relative to the US market. Panel A 
calculates tracking errors as the mean absolute deviations from market returns and Panel B uses the 
standard deviation of the variance of the difference of sector and market (formula shown below). The 
metrics are tested for significance relative to the mean in each period. The mean reported for 1900-2017 
excludes sectors starting after 1900. For series starting after 1900, significance for 1900-2017 is tested 
relative to the mean calculated using only data from when the series starts. Tracking errors are shown 
for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 years each, except for the last period which 
is 18 years. 
Panel A: Mean Absolute Deviation 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Coal 0.25*** 0.21 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.48*** 
Txtls 0.19*** 0.26** 0.15* 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.14 
Ships 0.18*** 0.25 0.18*** 0.13 0.19*** 0.15 
Paper 0.18** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.15** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
Tobac 0.17* 0.24 0.12 0.15*** 0.17** 0.18 
Mach 0.17 0.43*** 0.10** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.12 
Mines 0.16 0.17 0.09*** 0.14** 0.16* 0.26*** 
Steel 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.14* 0.15 0.17 
Hshld 0.14 0.33*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.07*** 0.08** 
Rail 0.12** 0.05*** 0.10** 0.13 0.18*** 0.17 
Oil^ 0.12**  0.11** 0.10*** 0.12 0.14 
Util 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.15* 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.13 
Telcm 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.13 0.11* 0.13 0.10** 
Food 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.14 0.12 
Chems 0.11*** 0.14** 0.11 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09** 
ElcEq 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11 0.12 0.08*** 0.08*** 
Mean 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.16 
Panel B: Standard-Deviation based 
TE = Sqrt ( Sum( (R_Sector – R_market) ^2)/ (n-1) ) 
*Oil starts in 1911 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Mach 0.38*** 0.80*** 0.14** 0.09*** 0.14** 0.15* 
Coal 0.33*** 0.29 0.24** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.59*** 
Paper 0.31*** 0.52*** 0.39*** 0.18** 0.11*** 0.09*** 
Tobac 0.30*** 0.50*** 0.17 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 
Hshld 0.29** 0.59*** 0.14** 0.13** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
Ships 0.26 0.33 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.21 
Txtls 0.25 0.39 0.21 0.19** 0.24*** 0.20 
Steel 0.23 0.34 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 
Mines 0.22 0.24 0.13** 0.18** 0.21** 0.34*** 
Chems 0.17*** 0.26 0.19 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.12** 
Util 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.23** 0.13** 0.12*** 0.19 
Rail 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.15 0.22*** 0.19 
Oil^ 0.16***  0.14** 0.13*** 0.16 0.17 
Food 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.13** 0.18 0.16 
Telcm 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.12** 
ElcEq 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16 0.15 0.10*** 0.10*** 
Mean 0.23 0.33 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.21 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)  
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Table 13: Rolling Mean Annualised Returns for Sectors and the Market 
,1900-2017  
This table rolling annualized (i.e. geometric mean) returns for each sector and the market over 10, 20 
and 30-year periods, with a one year rolling window. The results in Panel A are for the UK, and in Panel 
B for the USA. The metrics are tested for significance relative to the market rolling annualised mean in 
each geography.  
Panel A: UK 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 
Industry\Period 10 20 30 
Tobacco^ 13.68*** 13.47** 13.60* 
Alcohol 11.93** 12.11*** 12.23*** 
Chemicals 11.20* 11.09 11.40 
Oil 11.07 12.08** 12.30*** 
Insurance 10.42 10.76 10.80 
Shipping 10.22 10.19 10.34 
Retail 10.20 10.74 11.19 
Mining 10.19 10.45 10.87 
Motors^ 9.68 10.37 10.81** 
Leisure^ 9.35 9.92* 10.62* 
Banks 9.30 10.13 10.26 
Food 9.18 9.47 9.56 
Textiles 8.95 8.40*** 8.55*** 
Engineering 7.49** 7.05*** 7.40*** 
Market 9.87 10.36 10.63 
Test for Significance of Sector vs Market returns * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01 
 
Panel B: USA 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 Industry\Period 10 20 30 
Tobac 13.47*** 12.93*** 12.81*** 
Chems 12.01*** 11.92*** 11.75*** 
Food 11.96*** 12.07*** 11.97*** 
ElcEq 11.56*** 11.89*** 11.71*** 
Oil 10.98 11.06* 11.47*** 
Rail 9.81 9.56 9.48 
Hshld 9.69 10.21 9.98 
Paper 9.28 9.78 9.82 
Telcm 9.05 9.42 9.63 
Mines 8.82 8.84* 8.97** 
Util 8.74 8.95 9.03** 
Steel 8.60 8.54** 8.39*** 
Coal 8.54 8.54 8.08** 
Mach 8.52 9.03 9.26 
Txtls 7.85 7.85*** 8.06*** 
Ships 6.54*** 6.28*** 6.20*** 
Market 9.46 9.77 9.85 
Test for Significance of Sector vs Market returns * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
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Table 14: Annualised Returns for a Strategy Long the Market and Short Sectors 
This table shows the annualised returns of a strategy short a sector and long the market in the UK (Panel 
A) and USA (Panel B). The annualised returns are tested for significance relative to the mean in each 
period. The mean reported for 1900-2017 excludes sectors starting after 1900. For series starting after 
1900, significance for 1900-2017 is tested relative to the mean calculated using only data from when 
the series starts. Returns are shown for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 years 
each, except for the last period which is 18 years. The formula used to calculate the returns of the 
strategy in each period is: (1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry) 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Motors^ 2.19***  -0.44 2.90*** -0.39** -0.69** 
Engineering 2.13*** 4.39*** 5.57*** 2.18*** 3.40* -7.04** 
Food 1.01** 2.18 2.98** -0.01 2.76 -4.19 
Banks 0.70* -0.04 0.64 2.11*** -2.52*** 4.51*** 
Leisure^ 0.51  5.46*** 1.26* 0.43 -3.56 
Textiles 0.51 -2.81** 2.22* 1.06 10.60*** -10.63*** 
Oil 0.23 6.87*** -1.84*** -1.47*** -1.22*** -1.37** 
Retail 0.05 1.17 -2.61*** -1.01** 2.42 0.49*** 
Mining -0.06 3.81** 0.71 -3.07*** 1.30 -3.97 
Shipping -0.40 -3.39*** 3.50*** -3.73*** 3.17* -1.68* 
Insurance -0.71* -3.90*** -0.10 1.97*** -0.81** -0.61** 
Chemicals -1.48*** -1.29 -2.43*** -0.34 2.85 -7.68** 
Alcohol -1.92*** -2.36** -2.07*** 0.58 1.16 -8.53*** 
Tobacco^ -2.78***  0.00 0.69 -0.13* -12.43*** 
Mean 0.00 0.42 0.83 0.22 1.64 -4.10 
 
Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Coal 2.91*** 1.30 6.85*** -5.38*** 8.91*** 3.71*** 
Ships 2.88*** 9.48*** 3.49*** 0.42 8.49*** -10.11*** 
Txtls 1.57** 2.11* 2.92*** 3.32*** 2.18 -4.14 
Steel 1.32** -2.91** 0.71 0.08 5.54*** 4.22*** 
Util 1.01 2.32* 0.94 1.53*** 2.63 -3.54 
Paper 0.94 4.83*** 0.29 0.16 0.99 -2.36 
Telcm 0.68 1.50 -0.47* 1.39*** -2.11*** 4.18*** 
Mines 0.65 1.84 -0.88** -1.01 6.43*** -4.19 
Mach 0.50 3.47** -0.99** -0.70 3.97 -4.39 
Hshld 0.29 -0.88 2.64** -1.71*** 1.61 -0.33** 
Rail -0.46 0.63 4.44*** 0.54 -0.11** -9.99*** 
Oil^ -0.67  0.42 -2.20*** 1.67 -2.30 
Food -1.95*** -5.46*** -0.53* 0.85** -1.12*** -3.87 
ElcEq -1.95*** -4.17*** -0.41* -0.93 -3.70*** 0.09** 
Chems -2.15*** -5.65*** -4.88*** 0.85** 2.55 -3.85 
Tobac -4.38*** -10.62*** -0.96** -1.32** 1.38 -11.76*** 
Mean 0.12 -0.15 0.85 -0.26 2.46 -3.04 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)  
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Table 15 Callan Periodic Tables for Annualised Returns for a Strategy Long the 
Market and Short Sectors 
This table shows the Callan periodic tables for annualised returns of a strategy short a sector and long 
the market in the UK (Panel A) and USA (Panel B). Returns are shown for the full analysis period and 
for selected subperiods of 25 years each, except for the last period which is 18 years. The formula used 
to calculate the returns of the strategy in each period is: (1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry). Callan tables rank 
each sector from the highest to lowest return in each period. 
 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 
1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Motors^ 
2.19 
Oil 
6.87 
Engineering 
5.57 
Motors 
2.90 
Textiles 
10.60 
Banks 
4.51 
Engineering 
2.13 
Engineering 
4.39 
Leisure 
5.46 
Engineering 
2.18 
Engineering 
3.40 
Retail 
0.49 
Food 
1.01 
Mining 
3.81 
Shipping 
3.50 
Banks 
2.11 
Shipping 
3.17 
Insurance 
-0.61 
Banks 
0.70 
Food 
2.18 
Food 
2.98 
Insurance 
1.97 
Chemicals 
2.85 
Motors 
-0.69 
Leisure^ 
0.51 
Retail 
1.17 
Textiles 
2.22 
Leisure 
1.26 
Food 
2.76 
Oil 
-1.37 
Textiles 
0.51 
Banks 
-0.04 
Mining 
0.71 
Textiles 
1.06 
Retail 
2.42 
Shipping 
-1.68 
Oil 
0.23 
Chemicals 
-1.29 
Banks 
0.64 
Tobacco 
0.69 
Mining 
1.30 
Leisure 
-3.56 
Retail 
0.05 
Alcohol 
-2.36 
Tobacco 
0.00 
Alcohol 
0.58 
Alcohol 
1.16 
Mining 
-3.97 
Mining 
-0.06 
Textiles 
-2.81 
Insurance 
-0.10 
Food 
-0.01 
Leisure 
0.43 
Food 
-4.19 
Shipping 
-0.40 
Shipping 
-3.39 
Motors 
-0.44 
Chemicals 
-0.34 
Tobacco 
-0.13 
Engineering 
-7.04 
Insurance 
-0.71 
Insurance 
-3.90 
Oil 
-1.84 
Retail 
-1.01 
Motors 
-0.39 
Chemicals 
-7.68 
Chemicals 
-1.48 
 Alcohol 
-2.07 
Oil 
-1.47 
Insurance 
-0.81 
Alcohol 
-8.53 
Alcohol 
-1.92 
 Chemicals 
-2.43 
Mining 
-3.07 
Oil 
-1.22 
Textiles 
-10.63 
Tobacco^ 
-2.78 
 Retail 
-2.61 
Shipping 
-3.73 
Banks 
-2.52 
Tobacco 
-12.43 
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Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 
1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Coal 
2.91 
Ships 
9.48 
Coal 
6.85 
Txtls 
3.32 
Coal 
8.91 
Ships 
2.88 
Paper 
4.83 
Rail 
4.44 
Util 
1.53 
Ships 
8.49 
Txtls 
1.57 
Mach 
3.47 
Ships 
3.49 
Telcm 
1.39 
Mines 
6.43 
Steel 
1.32 
Util 
2.32 
Txtls 
2.92 
Food 
0.85 
Steel 
5.54 
Util 
1.01 
Txtls 
2.11 
Hshld 
2.64 
Chems 
0.85 
Mach 
3.97 
Paper 
0.94 
Mines 
1.84 
Util 
0.94 
Rail 
0.54 
Util 
2.63 
Telcm 
0.68 
Telcm 
1.50 
Steel 
0.71 
Ships 
0.42 
Chems 
2.55 
Mines 
0.65 
Coal 
1.30 
Oil 
0.42 
Paper 
0.16 
Txtls 
2.18 
Mach 
0.50 
Rail 
0.63 
Paper 
0.29 
Steel 
0.08 
Oil 
1.67 
Hshld 
0.29 
Hshld 
-0.88 
ElcEq 
-0.41 
Mach 
-0.70 
Hshld 
1.61 
Rail 
-0.46 
Steel 
-2.91 
Telcm 
-0.47 
ElcEq 
-0.93 
Tobac 
1.38 
Oil^ 
-0.67 
ElcEq 
-4.17 
Food 
-0.53 
Mines 
-1.01 
Paper 
0.99 
Food 
-1.95 
Food 
-5.46 
Mines 
-0.88 
Tobac 
-1.32 
Rail 
-0.11 
ElcEq 
-1.95 
Chems 
-5.65 
Tobac 
-0.96 
Hshld 
-1.71 
Food 
-1.12 
Chems 
-2.15 
Tobac 
-10.62 
Mach 
-0.99 
Oil 
-2.20 
Telcm 
-2.11 
Tobac 
-4.38 
 Chems 
-4.88 
Coal 
-5.38 
ElcEq 
-3.70 
Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)  
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Table 16: Cumulative Value of Long Short Strategies 
This table shows the cumulative returns of a strategy short a sector and long the market in the UK (Panel 
A) and USA (Panel B). The cumulative returns are tested for significance relative to the mean in each 
period. The mean reported for 1900-2017 excludes sectors starting after 1900. For series starting after 
1900, significance for 1900-2017 is tested relative to the mean calculated using only data from when 
the series starts. Returns are shown for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 25 years 
each, except for the last period which is 18 years. The formula used to calculate the returns of the 
strategy in each period is: (1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry) 
Panel A: UK, 1900-2017 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Engineering 12.05*** 2.93** 3.88*** 1.71*** 2.30 0.27** 
Motors^ 8.36***  0.89* 2.04*** 0.91 0.88 
Food 3.26 1.71 2.09* 1.00 1.98 0.46 
Banks 2.29 0.99 1.17 1.69*** 0.53* 2.21*** 
Textiles 1.81 0.49** 1.73 1.30 12.43*** 0.13*** 
Leisure^ 1.65  3.78*** 1.37 1.11 0.52 
Oil 1.31 5.27*** 0.63** 0.69*** 0.74* 0.78 
Retail 1.07 1.34 0.52*** 0.78** 1.82 1.09*** 
Mining 0.93 2.55* 1.19 0.46*** 1.38 0.48 
Shipping 0.62 0.42** 2.36** 0.39*** 2.18 0.74 
Insurance 0.43 0.37** 0.98* 1.63*** 0.82 0.90 
Chemicals 0.17* 0.72* 0.54*** 0.92* 2.02 0.24** 
Alcohol 0.10* 0.55** 0.59*** 1.16 1.34 0.20** 
Tobacco^ 0.06***  1.00 1.19 0.97 0.09*** 
Mean 2.19 1.58 1.53 1.17 2.18 0.64 
 
Panel B: US, 1900-2017 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 
 1900-2017^ 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Coal 29.56*** 1.38 5.24*** 0.25*** 8.46*** 1.93*** 
Ships 28.39*** 9.62*** 2.36** 1.11 7.66*** 0.15*** 
Txtls 6.28 1.69 2.05 2.26*** 1.72 0.47* 
Steel 4.73 0.48* 1.19 1.02 3.85* 2.10*** 
Util 3.28 1.77 1.26 1.46*** 1.92 0.52 
Paper 3.02 3.25** 1.07 1.04 1.28** 0.65 
Telcm 2.23 1.45 0.89* 1.41*** 0.59*** 2.09*** 
Mines 2.16 1.58 0.80** 0.78** 4.75*** 0.46* 
Mach 1.81 2.35 0.78** 0.84 2.65 0.45* 
Hshld 1.40 0.80 1.92 0.65*** 1.49* 0.94 
Rail 0.58* 1.17 2.96*** 1.14 0.97** 0.15*** 
Oil^ 0.49**  1.11 0.57*** 1.51* 0.66 
Food 0.10** 0.25** 0.88** 1.24* 0.75*** 0.49* 
ElcEq 0.10** 0.35** 0.90* 0.79* 0.39*** 1.02 
Chems 0.08** 0.23** 0.29*** 1.24* 1.88 0.49* 
Tobac 0.01** 0.06** 0.79** 0.72** 1.41* 0.11*** 
Mean 5.58 1.76 1.53 1.03 2.58 0.79 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01; Source: DMS (2015), French (2019), Thomson Reuters 
(2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
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Table 17: Maximum Drawdowns for Long Short Strategies, 1900-2017 
This table shows the maximum drawdown of a strategy short a sector and long the market in the UK 
(Panel A) and USA (Panel B). Maximum drawdowns are tested for significance relative to the mean in 
each period. The mean reported for 1900-2017 excludes sectors starting after 1900. For series starting 
after 1900, significance for 1900-2017 is tested relative to the mean calculated using only data from 
when the series starts. Drawdowns are shown for the full analysis period and for selected subperiods of 
25 years each, except for the last period which is 18 years. The formula used to calculate the returns of 
the long short strategy in each period is: (1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry). Drawdowns are defined as the 
difference between the portfolio’s value on a particular date and its high-water mark (the highest historic 
value up to that date), divided by the high-water mark, and are expressed as percentages. A maximum 
drawdown of 96 implies that at some point the strategy’s total return was 96% lower than its highest 
previous value. 
Panel A: UK 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 1900-2017^ 1950-2017 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobacco^ 96*** 96  37 43 78*** 91*** 
Oil 96*** 76 87*** 59*** 58*** 40 45*** 
Alcohol 91*** 83 52 50** 42 46 80*** 
Mining 90*** 88 23*** 35** 78*** 46 79*** 
Textiles 87* 87 61 30*** 42 38 87*** 
Chemicals 83 79 48 52** 34** 29*** 76** 
Shipping 78 61 78*** 48 61*** 41 41*** 
Retail 77 50 19*** 56*** 43 38 39*** 
Engineering 76 76 39 50* 10*** 17*** 76** 
Banks 75* 75 26*** 18*** 44 65*** 34*** 
Insurance 71*** 48 63* 28*** 42 48 41*** 
Leisure^ 69** 63  44 58** 39 59 
Motors^ 68** 68  60*** 43 42 68 
Food 66*** 66 61 31*** 34** 32** 66 
Mean 81 73 51 43 45 43 63 
Panel B: US 
^Oil starts in 1911 
 1900-2017^ 1950-2017 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
Tobac 100*** 96 94*** 62** 68*** 78*** 90*** 
Chems 96*** 51 83** 77*** 37** 28*** 51* 
Coal 94*** 94 66 67*** 80*** 29*** 91*** 
Food 93*** 82 80** 35*** 42 76*** 59 
ElcEq 93** 77 65 49 45 61*** 36*** 
Rail 90* 90 21*** 30*** 31*** 61*** 85*** 
Steel 90 58 88*** 43** 43 26*** 58 
Ships 86 86 73 49 45 45 86*** 
Mach 85 57 76 52 27*** 17*** 55 
Hshld 84 67 84*** 23*** 67*** 26*** 38*** 
Oil^ 83 73  40** 43 45 69 
Mines 83 83 66 43** 64*** 36 83*** 
Paper 79** 54 77 79*** 34*** 35* 36*** 
Txtls 73*** 73 68 65*** 59*** 65*** 60 
Util 69*** 61 34*** 53 30*** 28*** 61 
Telcm 61*** 61 32*** 60* 36** 60*** 29*** 
Mean 85 73 67 52 47 45 62 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01; Source: DMS (2018),  French (2019), Thomson Reuters 
(2019), FTSE Russell (2019) 
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Table 18 Rolling Median Maximum Drawdowns for Long Short Strategies 
This table shows the median maximum drawdowns of a strategy short a sector and long the market in 
the UK (Panel A) and USA (Panel B) using data from 1900 to 2017. We calculate the maximum 
drawdowns using one year rolling windows of 10, 20, and 30-years over the analysis period and then take 
the median of the maximum drawdowns for each sector and aggregation period (10, 20 or 30 years).  The 
maximum drawdowns are tested for significance relative to the mean median drawdown in each period. 
Returns of the long short strategy in each period are calculates as: (1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry). 
Drawdowns are defined as the difference between the portfolio’s value on a particular date and its high-
water mark (the highest historic value up to that date), divided by the high-water mark, and are 
expressed as percentages. A median maximum drawdown of 39 implies that the median among all the 
maximum drawdowns of a strategy over a given period (e. g. 10-year rolling window) is a 39% 
maximum drawdown. 
Panel A: UK 
*Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 10 20 30 
Oil 39*** 57*** 62*** 
Motors^ 39*** 43 48 
Shipping 35*** 48** 59*** 
Mining 35** 58*** 64*** 
Tobacco^ 34** 46 60*** 
Alcohol 33** 46 51 
Textiles 30 41 42 
Retail 28 41 50 
Leisure^ 28 44 53 
Chemicals 27 34* 43 
Insurance 25 37 42 
Food 25* 32** 34*** 
Banks 20*** 33** 44 
Engineering 17*** 21*** 35*** 
Mean 28 41 48 
Panel B: USA 
*Oil starts in 1911 
 10 20 30 
Tobac 52*** 67*** 78*** 
Txtls 44*** 59*** 64** 
Coal 43*** 67*** 75*** 
Ships 39** 49 53 
Food 35 53** 66*** 
Paper 33 45 49* 
Steel 33 44 52 
Mines 32 44 58 
ElcEq 32 44 54 
Telcm 32 36*** 57 
Oil^ 31 46 56 
Chems 29** 43 43*** 
Mach 28*** 38** 51 
Util 26*** 30*** 42*** 
Hshld 24*** 38** 53 
Rail 23*** 30*** 30*** 
Mean 34 46 55 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01; ;Source: DMS (2018),  French (2019), Thomson Reuters 
(2019), FTSE Russell (2019)  
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Table 19: Rolling Mean Annualised Returns Long Short Strategies ,1900-2017  
This table shows the percentile distribution of annualised returns of a strategy short a sector and long 
the market in the UK (Panel A) and USA (Panel B). We use data from 1900 to 2017, and for each sector 
calculate the mean strategy results over one year rolling windows of 10, 20, and 30 years.  The formula 
used to calculate the returns of the strategy in each period is: (1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry) 
 
Panel A: UK 
Excludes Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure which start in 1920 
 
 Percentile\Period 10 20 30 
0.05 -1.46 -1.52 -1.43 
0.25 -0.45 -0.50 -0.60 
0.50 -0.07 0.09 -0.09 
0.75 0.76 0.59 0.71 
0.95 1.95 2.58 2.55 
 
 
Panel B: USA 
Includes Oil which starts in 1911 
Percentile\Period 10 20 30 
0.05 -2.43 -2.16 -2.03 
0.25 -1.14 -1.12 -1.15 
0.50 0.48 0.34 0.33 
0.75 1.04 0.98 0.96 
0.95 2.36 2.33 2.28 
Source: DMS (2018),  French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)   
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Table 20: Rolling Mean Annualised Returns Long Short Strategies ,1900-
2017  
This table shows the rolling mean annualised returns of a strategy short a sector and long the market in 
the UK (Panel A) and USA (Panel B) using data from 1900 to 2017, over one year rolling windows of 
10, 20, and 30 years. For each sector, we calculate the annualised returns using one year rolling windows 
of 10, 20, and 30-years over the analysis period and then take the mean of the returns for each aggregation 
period (10,20 or 30 years).  The formula used to calculate the returns of the long short strategy in each 
period is: (1 + Rmarket) / (1 + Rindustry). 
Panel A: UK 
^Tobacco, Motors, and Leisure start in 1920 
 
 Industry\Period 10 20 30 
Engineering 2.76*** 3.34*** 3.17*** 
Leisure^ 1.50*** 1.44*** 1.31*** 
Motors^ 1.18** 0.97*** 1.07*** 
Textiles 1.14* 1.83*** 1.93*** 
Food 0.77** 0.87*** 1.02*** 
Banks 0.75* 0.3 0.40** 
Mining 0.03 0.09 -0.09 
Shipping -0.07 0.26 0.32 
Retail -0.22 -0.33* -0.51*** 
Insurance -0.43 -0.34 -0.15 
Oil -0.47 -1.48*** -1.44*** 
Chemicals -1.13*** -0.67*** -0.70*** 
Alcohol -1.79*** -1.56*** -1.42*** 
Tobacco^ -2.25*** -1.63*** -1.23** 
Test for Significance of Returns different from 0,  * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01 
 
 
Panel B: USA 
^Oil starts in 1911 
Industry\Period 10 20 30 
Ships 3.19*** 3.46*** 3.52*** 
Coal 2.08* 1.55** 1.86*** 
Txtls 1.99*** 1.95*** 1.76*** 
Mach 1.20** 0.74** 0.58*** 
Steel 0.99** 1.22*** 1.37*** 
Util 0.80** 0.78*** 0.76*** 
Mines 0.75 0.90*** 0.82*** 
Telcm 0.48 0.35 0.21 
Paper 0.48 0.03 0.06 
Hshld 0.11 -0.35 -0.09 
Rail -0.09 0.33 0.46 
Oil^ -0.92** -0.88*** -0.99*** 
ElcEq -1.78*** -1.86*** -1.66*** 
Food -2.09*** -1.99*** -1.86*** 
Chems -2.15*** -1.84*** -1.63*** 
Tobac -3.26*** -2.69*** -2.54*** 
Test for Significance of Returns different from 0, * p<0.1, ** p<0,05, ***p <0.01 
Source: DMS (2018),  French (2019), Thomson Reuters (2019), FTSE Russell (2019)   
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Table 21: Annualised Real USD Returns and Total Returns for Minerals and 
selected Equities 
This table shows inflation-adjusted USD returns for selected minerals and natural resources as well as 
for US treasury bills and equity returns. Annualised real returns (Panel A) and total real returns (Panel 
B) are shown over the full analysis period and for selected subperiods. We adjust raw returns into real 
returns using inflation data in DMS (2018) 
Panel A: Annualised Real Returns, 1900-2017 
*Oil equity returns start in 1911 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
platinum 1.43 9.56 -3.04 0.00 -0.73 1.98 
gold 0.66 -2.78 1.46 2.94 -2.84 6.39 
oil 0.32 -2.38 -0.37 4.43 -2.90 4.09 
silver 0.00 -2.02 -3.43 6.81 -4.19 4.58 
diamonds -0.55 0.08 -1.28 -1.93 -0.49 1.47 
tbills 0.81 2.15 -0.13 0.26 1.94 -0.54 
US oil Sector* 7.07  5.21 8.42 9.89 5.95 
US mines Sector 5.79 2.94 6.59 7.11 4.97 8.04 
US Equities 6.48 4.83 5.65 6.03 11.73 3.51 
World Equities 5.18 1.72 3.66 6.90 10.32 2.88 
 
Panel B: Total Real Returns, 1900-2017 
*Oil equity returns start in 1911 
 1900-2017* 1900-1924 1925-1949 1950-1974 1975-1999 2000-2017 
platinum 5.36 9.81 0.46 1.00 0.83 1.42 
gold 2.18 0.49 1.44 2.06 0.49 3.05 
oil 1.46 0.55 0.91 2.96 0.48 2.06 
silver 1.00 0.60 0.42 5.19 0.34 2.24 
diamonds 0.52 1.02 0.72 0.61 0.89 1.30 
tbills 2.58 1.70 0.97 1.07 1.62 0.91 
US oil Sector* 1,488.15  3.56 7.55 10.58 2.83 
US mines Sector 766.57 2.06 4.93 5.57 3.37 4.02 
US Equities 1,653.83 3.25 3.95 4.33 15.99 1.86 
World Equities 386.58 1.53 2.45 5.30 11.65 1.67 
Sources: onlygold.com (2018), Officer and Williamson (2018), US Geological Survey (2018), Stooq (2018), 
Katzav/IDEX (2018), Spaenjers (2016), BP (2018), DMS (2018). 
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Table 22: Regressions of change in mineral price on market returns  
This table shows regressions of log mineral prices on log real returns of the market series. Panel 
A displays the full sample results, and the other Panels (B to F) have results for the different subsamples. 
We use inflation data in DMS (2018) we convert the total returns and price series to inflation-adjusted 
returns and prices. Then log returns for year t are calculated as: Returnt = ln (TRt / TRt-1), Where TRt is 
the value of a cumulative return series at year t. 
 
Panel A: 1911-2017 
Dependent variable→ Oil price Oil price Oil price Platinum price 
Gold 
price 
Silver 
price 
Diamond 
index 
Constant 0.017 0.026 0.026 -0.001 0.014 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) 
US oil-sector market return –0.079 0.435** 0.432**     
 (0.112) (0.166) (0.166)     
US mines-sector market 
return    0.323
*** 0.368*** 0.367*** 0.051 
    (0.099) (0.079) (0.118) (0.069) 
US equity market return  –0.719*** –0.500* -0.814*** -0.664*** -0.556** -0.042 
  (0.181) (0.301) (0.213) (0.169) (0.254) (0.148) 
World equity market return   –0.263 0.689*** 0.309* 0.307 -0.030 
   (0.289) (0.228) (0.181) (0.272) (0.159) 
Number of observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 
Adjusted R2 –0.005 0.120 0.118 0.179 0.201 0.091 -0.023 
F Statistic 0.507 8.198*** 5.732*** 8.728*** 9.892*** 4.541*** 0.197 
Note: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Panel B: 1911–1924 
Dependent variable→ Oil price Oil price Oil price Platinum price 
Gold  
price 
Silver  
price 
Diamond 
index 
Constant 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.042 -0.040* -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.064) (0.054) (0.019) (0.040) (0.036) 
US oil-sector market return -0.464** -0.146 -0.165     
 (0.210) (0.338) (0.384)     
US mines-sector market 
return    -0.671 0.047 -0.149 0.247 
    (0.464) (0.167) (0.342) (0.311) 
US equity market return  -0.601 -0.520 0.268 -0.032 -0.221 -0.222 
  (0.505) (0.821) (0.613) (0.221) (0.451) (0.410) 
World equity market return   -0.084 0.771 0.296 0.382 -0.326 
   (0.653) (0.521) (0.188) (0.384) (0.349) 
Number of observations 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Adjusted R2 0.231 0.257 0.184 0.015 0.318 -0.131 -0.097 
F Statistic 4.901**  3.245*  1.975  1.066 3.017* 0.500 0.616 
Note: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01 
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Panel C: 1925–1949 
Dependent variable→ Oil price Oil price Oil price Platinum  price 
Gold  
price 
Silver  
price 
Diamond  
index 
Constant -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 -0.032 0.010 -0.054 -0.013 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.037) (0.019) (0.039) (0.037) 
US oil-sector market return 0.124 0.729* 0.746*     
 (0.180) (0.360) (0.397)     
US mines-sector market return    0.317 0.147 0.185 -0.916* 
    (0.468) (0.244) (0.491) (0.466) 
US equity market return  -0.661* -0.630 -0.339 -0.403* -0.532 0.490 
  (0.347) (0.451) (0.410) (0.214) (0.430) (0.408) 
World equity market return   -0.064 -0.022 0.489 1.017 0.884 
   (0.558) (0.585) (0.305) (0.615) (0.583) 
Number of observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adjusted R2 -0.022 0.083 0.039 -0.102 0.207 0.300 0.093 
F Statistic 0.476  2.079  1.328  0.258 3.082** 4.430** 1.822 
Note: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Panel D 1950–1974 
Dependent variable→ Oil price Oil price Oil price Platinum  price 
Gold  
price 
Silver  
price 
Diamond  
index 
Constant 0.092* 0.089* 0.099* -0.029 0.015 0.062 -0.028** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.052) (0.025) (0.028) (0.040) (0.011) 
US oil-sector market return -0.601** -0.214 -0.243     
 (0.216) (0.382) (0.396)     
US mines-sector market 
return    0.271
* 0.433*** 0.475** 0.298*** 
    (0.138) (0.151) (0.218) (0.060) 
US equity market return  -0.480 0.096 -1.674** -2.361*** -1.114 -0.971*** 
  (0.393) (1.479) (0.730) (0.798) (1.155) (0.317) 
World equity market return   -0.617 1.625** 1.836** 0.548 0.674* 
   (1.525) (0.765) (0.837) (1.211) (0.333) 
Number of observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.235 0.205 0.138 0.392 0.115 0.532 
F Statistic 7.714** 4.685** 3.059* 2.278 6.151***  2.035 10.108*** 
Note: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01 
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Panel E: 1975–1999 
Dependent variable→ Oil price Oil price Oil price Platinum  price 
Gold  
price 
Silver  
price 
Diamond  
index 
Constant -0.076 -0.010 0.007 -0.018 -0.015 -0.048 0.032 
 (0.057) (0.062) (0.055) (0.061) (0.061) (0.070) (0.031) 
US oil-sector market return 0.496 0.935** 0.987***     
 (0.304) (0.354) (0.315)     
US mines-sector market 
return    0.309 0.353 0.751
** 0.065 
    (0.242) (0.243) (0.280) (0.125) 
US equity market return  -0.969* -0.075 -1.094* -0.796 -0.660 -0.501* 
  (0.468) (0.536) (0.561) (0.563) (0.649) (0.289) 
World equity market return   -1.239** 1.188** 0.587 0.422 0.156 
   (0.469) (0.508) (0.511) (0.588) (0.262) 
Number of observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.182 0.356 0.148 0.020 0.177 0.032 
F Statistic 2.672 3.667** 5.429*** 2.391* 1.167 2.724* 1.263 
Note: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Panel F: 2000-2017 
Dependent variable→ Oil price Oil price Oil price Platinum  price 
Gold 
 price 
Silver  
price 
 Diamond  
index 
Constant 0.017 0.012 0.005 -0.006 0.056* 0.056 0.014 
 (0.070) (0.060) (0.064) (0.039) (0.029) (0.061) (0.022) 
US oil-sector market return 0.393 1.108** 1.165**     
 (0.364) (0.419) (0.452)     
US mines-sector market 
return    0.553
*** 0.365** 0.024 0.004 
    (0.175) (0.129) (0.272) (0.099) 
US equity market return  -1.047** -0.355 -1.722 -1.165 -1.368 0.148 
  (0.407) (1.725) (1.122) (0.824) (1.741) (0.636) 
World equity market return   -0.690 1.473 0.624 1.189 -0.186 
   (1.669) (1.155) (0.848) (1.791) (0.654) 
Number of observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.267 0.224 0.639 0.410 -0.151 -0.194 
F Statistic 1.167 4.098** 2.638* 11.049*** 4.939** 0.255 0.079 
Note: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01 
 
Sources: onlygold.com (2018), Officer and Williamson (2018), US Geological Survey (2018), Stooq (2018), 
Katzav/IDEX (2018), Spaenjers (2016), BP (2018), DMS (2018). Also see text. 
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Table 23: Sector weights for the world and for major markets 
This table shows sector weights for the World, United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and 
Emerging markets geographies, in June 2018 (Panel A) and December 2010 (Panel B). We use the 
ten sectors from the ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) standard. The weightings are based on 
FTSE Russell data. 
 
Panel A: June 2018 
 World United States United Kingdom Japan Germany Emerging markets 
Financials 22 19 21 14 17 28 
Technology 15 22 1 5 11 17 
Industrials 13 12 10 23 16 8 
Consumer Goods 12 8 16 25 19 8 
Consumer Services 11 13 11 11 3 13 
Healthcare 10 13 10 7 14 3 
Oil & Gas 7 6 16 1 0 8 
Basic materials 5 2 9 6 14 7 
Utilities 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Telecoms 3 2 3 5 4 5 
 
Source: FTSE Russell (2018) 
 
Panel B: December 2010 
 World United States  United Kingdom 
 
Japan 
 
Germany  Emerging markets 
 Financials 21 17 20 18 16 26 
 Industrials 12 12 4 21 20 10 
 Consumer Goods 12 10 12 23 19 7 
 Oil & Gas 11 11 19 2 0 16 
 Technology 10 17 1 7 6 7 
 Basic materials 9 3 15 8 19 16 
 Consumer Services 9 12 9 8 2 5 
 Healthcare 7 10 8 5 3 1 
 Telecoms 5 3 7 4 4 8 
 Utilities 4 3 4 5 9 4 
 
Source: FTSE Russell (2010) 
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Table 24: Country concentration of FTSE All World Index sectors, June 2018 
This table displays the top country weights in industries at June 2018 (Panel A) and December 2010 
(Panel B). It shows the respective weights in the industry for the largest country in each industry, the 
second largest country, and the combined weighting of the top two country weights. It then lists the 
country with the largest weight in each industry and the second-largest country. We use the 39 ICB 
(Industry Classification Benchmark) industries for which we have data (out of 41 industries). The 
weightings are based on FTSE Russell data. 
Panel A: June 2018 
Industry\ 
% Weights & Countries % Largest country 
% Second 
largest 
country 
% Two 
largest 
countries 
Largest 
country 
Second 
Largest 
country 
Aerospace & Defense 73 15 88 USA France  
Software & Computer Serv. 77 11 88 USA China  
Oil Equip. Services & Distrib. 62 25 87 USA Canada  
Technology Hard. & Equip. 77 8 86 USA Taiwan 
Tobacco 51 33 84 USA UK 
Alternative Energy 42 41 83 China  Denmark  
Health Care Equip. & Serv. 79 4 83 USA Germany  
RE Investment Trusts 76 7 83 USA Australia  
General Retailers 71 11 81 USA China  
Hous. Goods & Home Constr. 61 15 76 USA UK 
Support Services 61 15 76 USA Japan  
Financial Services 71 4 75 USA Japan  
Electronic & Electrical Equip. 37 35 72 Japan  USA 
Leisure Goods 41 31 72 South Korea Japan  
General Industrials 59 13 72 USA Germany  
Travel & Leisure 53 18 71 USA Japan  
Nonlife Insurance 61 10 71 USA Germany  
Mining 42 28 70 UK Australia  
Media 59 11 70 USA South Africa  
Fixed Line Telecom. 64 5 69 USA Spain  
Pharma. & Biotechnology 56 11 67 USA Switzerland 
Electricity 58 7 65 USA Spain  
Oil & Gas Producers 48 17 65 USA UK 
Food Producers 34 30 64 USA Switzerland 
Beverages 53 11 64 USA UK 
Industrial Transportation 52 11 63 USA Canada  
Industrial Engineering 35 28 62 USA Japan  
Automobiles & Parts 38 23 61 Japan  USA 
Food & Drug Retailers 45 9 54 USA UK 
Chemicals 37 16 53 USA Germany  
Forestry & Paper 30 21 51 Finland  USA 
Gas Water & Multiutilities 33 14 47 USA UK 
Personal Goods 31 15 47 USA France  
Real Estate Inv. & Services 24 21 45 Hong Kong  Japan  
Banks 32 9 41 USA Canada  
Mobile Telecommunications 27 13 40 Japan  UK 
Life Insurance 22 16 38 USA UK 
Construction & Materials 17 17 34 Japan  USA 
Industrial Metals & Mining 17 15 31 USA Brazil  
 
Source: FTSE Russell (2018)   
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Panel B: December 2010 
Industry\ 
% Weights & Countries 
% Largest 
country 
% Second 
largest 
country 
% Two 
largest 
countries 
Largest 
country 
Second 
Largest 
country 
Aerospace & Defense 77 11 88 USA UK 
Software & Computer Serv. 82 5 87 USA India  
Health Care Equip.& Services 81 4 85 USA Germany  
Tobacco 52 31 83 USA UK 
Hous. Goods & Home Constr. 68 11 80 USA UK 
Leisure Goods 62 16 78 Japan  USA 
RE Investment Trusts 58 18 76 USA Australia  
General Retailers 68 8 76 USA Japan  
Oil Equip. Serv. & Distrib. 65 10 75 USA Canada  
Technology Hard. & Equip. 63 11 75 USA Taiwan 
Support Services 44 28 72 USA Japan  
Media 60 10 70 USA UK 
General Industrials 51 18 69 USA Germany  
Electronic & Electrical Equip. 35 31 66 USA Japan  
Pharma. & Biotechnology 50 15 65 USA Switzerland 
Financial Services 58 6 64 USA Japan  
Beverages 49 15 64 USA UK 
Travel & Leisure 49 15 63 USA Japan  
Nonlife Insurance 51 11 63 USA Germany  
Fixed Line Telecom. 46 14 60 USA Spain  
RE Investment & Services 41 18 59 Hong Kong  Japan  
Food Producers 32 27 58 USA Switzerland 
Food & Drug Retailers 41 17 58 USA UK 
Automobiles & Parts 38 19 57 Japan  USA 
Oil & Gas Producers 40 16 56 USA UK 
Industrial Engineering 34 21 55 USA Japan  
Electricity 41 13 54 USA Japan  
Industrial Transportation 45 9 54 USA Canada  
Personal Goods 30 23 54 USA France  
Mining 33 21 53 UK Australia  
Alternative Energy 30 23 53 USA Denmark  
Forestry & Paper 28 21 49 Finland  USA 
Chemicals 26 21 47 USA Germany  
Gas Water & Multiutilities 21 20 41 Germany  USA 
Life Insurance 25 15 40 USA UK 
Mobile Telecommunications 21 12 33 UK Japan  
Banks 23 10 33 USA UK 
Construction & Materials 17 14 31 France  USA 
Industrial Metals & Mining 19 12 31 USA Japan  
Source: FTSE Russell (2010)  
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Table 25: Sector concentration of FTSE All World Index countries, June 2018 
This table shows the weight of the three largest industries in each country in June 2018 (Panel A) and 
December 2010 (Panel B). We use all countries in the FTSE All World Index in each period. In each 
time period we have 47 countries, however in December 2010 Qatar is in the index, while in June 2018 
Morocco is included instead. The other 46 countries overlap. The weightings are based on FTSE Russell 
data. 
Panel A: June 2018 
Country\% weight largest industry next two largest industries three largest industries 
Peru  81 19 100 
Ireland  50 50 100 
Portugal  44 56 100 
Pakistan  50 50 100 
Czech Republic  52 45 97 
Hungary  53 43 96 
Colombia  37 48 85 
Qatar  65 19 84 
Austria  45 38 83 
Russian Federation  54 29 83 
UAE 36 44 79 
Egypt  54 22 76 
Belgium  47 26 73 
Denmark  48 22 70 
Greece  41 29 70 
Indonesia  42 24 66 
Israel  28 38 66 
Singapore  48 17 65 
Norway  29 35 64 
Taiwan 44 20 64 
Switzerland  31 32 63 
Poland  34 28 62 
New Zealand  27 34 61 
Spain  37 22 60 
Finland  20 38 58 
Sweden  27 31 57 
Malaysia  33 23 56 
Philippines  24 32 56 
China  25 31 56 
Italy  26 27 53 
Chile  22 30 52 
Canada  31 21 51 
South Africa  30 21 51 
Turkey  29 22 51 
Brazil  22 26 48 
South Korea 33 15 47 
Hong Kong  19 28 47 
Australia  28 19 47 
Thailand  20 26 47 
Mexico  15 30 45 
Netherlands  16 28 44 
India  16 27 43 
UK 16 21 37 
Germany  14 21 35 
USA 12 17 29 
France  11 18 29 
Japan  11 14 25 
 
Source: FTSE Russell (2018)  
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Panel B: December 2010 
Country\% weight largest industry next two largest industries three largest industries 
Morocco  67 33 100 
Peru  54 46 100 
Pakistan  49 47 96 
Czech Republic  56 39 95 
Hungary  42 52 94 
UAE 33 49 83 
Ireland  53 29 82 
Russian Federation  59 22 81 
Greece  48 31 78 
Israel  50 26 76 
Denmark  46 28 74 
Spain  36 37 73 
Poland  42 29 71 
Austria  36 31 68 
Colombia  28 40 68 
Turkey  48 19 67 
Portugal  28 39 66 
Taiwan 40 25 66 
Belgium  45 21 66 
Thailand  30 35 65 
Finland  31 33 64 
Switzerland  27 36 64 
Sweden  29 34 63 
Indonesia  24 37 61 
Mexico  30 31 60 
Egypt  24 37 60 
Philippines  24 33 58 
Malaysia  35 22 57 
Brazil  23 33 57 
Australia  28 29 57 
Canada  22 34 56 
Italy  25 31 56 
New Zealand  23 32 55 
Norway  27 28 55 
China  29 26 55 
Chile  21 27 48 
Singapore  25 23 48 
UK 18 29 48 
Hong Kong  25 22 47 
Germany  19 28 47 
South Africa  20 26 46 
Netherlands  15 29 43 
South Korea 22 20 42 
India  14 26 41 
France  10 20 30 
Japan  12 17 28 
USA 9 16 26 
 
Source: FTSE Russell (2010) 
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Abstract 
We survey industry professionals’ views on sector exclusions. Respondents consider 
negative portfolio screenings most useful for attracting funds from ethically concerned 
investors and least useful for risk management purposes. Professionals do not anticipate 
controversial sector outperformance. However, they disagree the least about the expected 
returns of non-controversial sectors relative to controversial sectors. Investor disagreement has 
been linked to higher realised returns, suggesting one reason why ex-ante expectations can 
differ from ex-post realisations.  Exclusion scepticism does not seem to stem from an 
expectation of controversial stocks superior performance, indicating that favourable risk and 
return expectations are not its driving force.  
 
JEL Classification: G11; G15; G23; G41; Q51 
 
Keywords: Divestment; negative screening; activism; fossil fuel; corporate social 
responsibility (CSR); environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
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1 Introduction 
Fears about the consequences of global warming are increasingly giving rise to grassroots 
campaigns to address the issue. The University of Cambridge, an academic institution dating 
back to 1209, has recently been in the forefront of this discussion. Chambers, Dimson and 
Quigley (2019) detail the experiences of the endowment office in the last few years. In 2018, 
in the midst of a fossil fuel divestment campaign spearheaded by university stakeholders, which 
included both students and academic staff, the university lost its Chief Investment Officer (CIO) 
and the majority of his team. Having faced persistent student protests and demonstrations as 
well as several university working groups on the topic of divestment, they elected to instead 
run the sizable endowment of a wealthy British family.  A new CIO was swiftly appointed. 
However, they too are facing similar challenges as the previous administration with respect to 
responsible investing practices. While specific campaign demands can vary by movement, 
excluding companies from investment portfolios, often referred to with the term “divestment”, 
is a popular and easy to articulate call to action. Groups such as 350.org3 have continuously 
campaigned for fossil fuel divestment. It is estimated that 985 institutional investors with over 
$6.24TN assets under management have pledged to divest from fossil fuels (Arabella Advisors 
(2018)). However, while fossil fuels are the latest sectors to be targeted for exclusion by 
campaigners, they are certainly not the first. Prior campaigns have focused on socially 
controversial stocks, such as those in the alcohol4 and tobacco5 industries, as well as companies 
associated with the South African Apartheid (Welch and Wazzan (1999), Grossman and Sharpe 
(1986)). 
 
3 https://350.org; https://350.org/350-campaign-update-divestment/; http://gofossilfree.org;  
4 http://www.add-resources.org/norwegian-ngo-campaign-divest-from-the-alcohol-industry.5907103-315784.html; 
https://www.ipe.com/countries/norway/klp-blacklists-nok3bn-of-alcohol-and-gambling-
investments/www.ipe.com/countries/norway/klp-blacklists-nok3bn-of-alcohol-and-gambling-
investments/10031380.fullarticle;  
5 https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-europe-funds-tobacco-divestment/european-fund-firms-largely-resist-tobacco-divestment-
campaign-idUKKCN11C1PW; https://www.ipe.com/countries/uk/uks-nest-quits-smoking-in-two-year-tobacco-
divestment-project/www.ipe.com/countries/uk/uks-nest-quits-smoking-in-two-year-tobacco-divestment-
project/10031682.fullarticle; https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/carmignac-latest-to-dump-tobacco-as-divestment-
movement-grows-20180928; https://www.ft.com/content/e87a9b3c-0708-11e6-9b51-0fb5e65703ce;  
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Divestment campaigns tend to attract considerable media attention, whether they are 
directed at prominent universities,6 other endowments,7 or for-profit investors.8 Recently other 
methods of addressing sustainability have also gained popularity, such as impact investing 
(Barber, Morse and Yasuda (2018)) and engagements with companies (Dimson, Karakaş and 
Li (2015), Dimson, Karakaş and Li (2018), Hoepner, Oikonomou, Sautner, Starks, et al. 
(2018)). Nevertheless, according to the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, (2018), 
negative/exclusionary screening is the largest sustainable investment strategy globally, with 
$19.8TN of professionally managed assets being managed in accordance with it.  
However, there can be multiple reasons for industry professionals to consider sector 
exclusions, such as making an impact (Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001), Atta-Darkua 
(2019)), risk management,9, avoiding guilt or complicity for climate change (Nagell (2011)), 
avoiding reputational damage,10  a branding tool to attract investor funds (Hartzmark and 
Sussman (2018), Ceccarelli, Ramelli and Wagner (2019)), or a means to express moral, cultural 
or religious beliefs (Ibrahim (2007)). While divestment campaigns can mention a combination 
reasons why investors should engage in the practice, distinguishing between the importance of 
each can be hard. Moreover, campaigners are can often be outsiders to the organisations whose 
behaviour they are attempting to affect.  
Investors who screen sectors out of their portfolios usually disclose their reasons at 
announcement time However, we know little about the decision-making processes that 
underpin divestment and blacklisting policies. Multiple reasons may have been considered, and 
their relative and absolute importance can vary by investor. Furthermore, once an exclusion is 
made, other investors process and react to the signal it provides to the market based on their 
assessment of the relevance of the stated reason. 11 How the specified motivation aligns with 
their own views is likely to affect their response to it.  Moreover, prediction of other investor 
reactions can be improved by establishing whether market participants as a whole have similar 
beliefs on negative screenings or if there are clusters of differing opinions on the matter. 
Divestment activists could also benefit from knowing which arguments may gain more 
 
6 https://www.vox.com/2019/5/13/18282438/fossil-fuel-divestment-climate-finance; 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/07/cambridge-university-agrees-explore-fossil-fuel-divestment-
plan; 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/04/national-trust-to-divest-portfolio-from-fossil-fuels; 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-20/large-exxon-shareholder-starts-divesting-over-climate-change;  
8 https://www.ft.com/content/57d71893-5ae6-3a14-80ae-b82fdfbd1729;  
9 For example, to avoid the potential problem of stranded assets, as in https://www.carbontracker.org/terms/stranded-assets/  
10 For example, Church of England’s decision to sell out of Wonga.com, see https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
28257351 
11 Both the reported reason and the one which they consider to be the true underlying reason for the exclusion 
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sympathy with financial professionals. Finally, firms which are targets of such campaigns 
would be able to better anticipate their exposure to them when they are aware of the priorities 
and beliefs of the finance industry. 
Therefore, the main contribution of the paper is to document professionals’ views on the 
merits of various motives of sector exclusions. Previous work has discussed governance-
motivated exit (McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016)) and climate risks leading to divestment 
(Krueger, Sautner and Starks (2018)). However, to our knowledge we are the first to examine 
relative and absolute support for a wide spectrum of reasons to divest, such as attracting 
investor funds, changing firm behaviour, conforming to moral or cultural/religious beliefs, 
avoiding guilt or complicity, and as a tool for risk management. Furthermore, we also examine 
professionals’ beliefs surrounding the return and risk properties of selected controversial and 
non-controversial sectors and how these align with their divestment beliefs. Finally, we collect 
data on respondent climate beliefs and characteristics and evaluate how these relate to negative 
screening opinions.  We also group respondents into clusters based on their exclusion beliefs 
and show how these are associated with selected sector risk and return beliefs and climate 
change beliefs.  
First, we document how sympathetic professionals are towards different motives for 
negative screenings. Industry professionals assert that exclusions can be most useful as a 
branding tool to attract funds from ethically concerned investors. Evidence for this channel is 
provided in empirical work by Hartzmark and Sussman (2018) and Ceccarelli, Ramelli and 
Wagner (2019). The second most supported reason to use divestment was to conform to moral 
beliefs. This is followed by two motives related to global warming – addressing climate change 
views and addressing responsibility for climate change harms. Statements related to portfolio 
risk management received the lowest levels of support.  
When we group respondents based on their divestment beliefs, the first group ("sceptics") 
contains those who generally do not believe that negative screenings are useful, across all 
potential reasons we present. The second cluster ("questioners") contains professionals who 
support divestments for Branding and Belief purposes, but not for other reasons. Finally, the 
last group ("devotees") contains members who generally consider sector exclusions useful 
across all reasons we present. We present our results by cluster in order to account for potential 
under-sampling of certain groups based on their divestment beliefs. 
Next, we document professionals’ beliefs about the return and risk properties of selected 
sectors. Respondents do not report expecting controversial sectors to have higher returns than 
non-controversial sectors. However, they disagree the least about the returns of non-
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controversial sectors. Since investor disagreement is linked to higher expected stock returns 
(Carlin, Longstaff and Matoba (2014)), this finding lends support to empirical findings that 
controversial stocks outperform (Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)). 
Furthermore, we find that return expectations are not connected to exclusion preferences. 
In contrast, there is a connection when we examine risk expectations. “Devotees” tend to form 
risk estimates with the least resemblance to past sector risk profiles than “sceptics” or 
“questioners”. In general, members across all opinion groups expect non-controversial sectors 
(Consumer Goods, Technology) to have better risk return trade-offs than environmentally 
controversial sectors (Coal, Mining, Oil & Gas). Therefore, our results suggest that divestment 
scepticism is not driven by a conviction that controversial stocks offer superior performance to 
non-controversial stocks.  
Finally, we query climate change opinions. Respondents almost universally believe that 
global warming is happening (98%), and a large majority (87%) also consider that human 
activities are its cause. Furthermore, they also acknowledge that global warming can have 
adverse consequences, with over half (57%) stating that global warming has started to harm 
people currently, which rises to 77% among “sceptics”. However, despite this, emotional 
attachment to global warming rises with support for exclusions, providing indication that 
“emotional” arguments for divestment may not be the most optimal method to convert 
“sceptics” to “devotees”. 
Finally, we show indicative findings that divestment preferences are associated with 
perceptions of institutional Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) priorities. The 
proportion of cluster members who believe that their institution places higher importance on 
ESG factors than peer institutions and other investor categories increases with group support 
for negative sector screenings, and vice versa.  
Our respondents tend to work in the financial and/or investment industries. The majority of 
their institutional headquarters are located in Europe, with the UK being the most represented 
country.  We also document that “sceptics” tend to be older and consequently have longer 
investment-related experience than the other two groups.  
The next section reviews the relevant literature in the field. Section 3 describes the survey, 
and Section 4 documents and discusses the survey results. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2 Related Literature 
In this section we review the literature on divestment and exclusion, and describe the recent 
literature on survey evidence on responsible investing. 
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2.1 Reasons to exclude 
One reason to engage in divestments is to harm excluded firms and force them to change 
their behaviour. Historically, in the 1960-80s, a comprehensive divestment campaign targeted 
companies doing business in South Africa during the Apartheid regime in the country. 
However, analysis by Teoh, Welch and Wazzan (1999) examine corporate divestment from 
South Africa and find that it had little impact on firm valuations or on the general South African 
capital market. More recently, Atta-Darkua (2020) provides evidence that firms negatively 
screened by the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth fund experience a negative return impact around 
the exclusion announcements.12 Theoretically, Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) build a 
model where divestment increases cost of capital for firms.  Companies then alter their 
behaviour if this is cheaper than the rise in cost of capital. In contrast, Davies and Van Wesep 
(2018) argue that divestment can be ineffective in the long run if managers are motivated by 
long run profitability and stock returns. This is because standard manager compensation 
methods such as stock options can be more profitable when prices are depressed in the short 
run, which can be a result of divesting activity. At the same time, Durand and Vergne (2015) 
provide evidence that media stigmatization can affect firm behaviour. They analyse diversified 
firms with exposure to the arms industry and show that increasing media criticism of the 
companies’ arms divisions in the media increases the probability that firms divest their 
divisions. In a related vein, Homanen (2018) provides evidence that banks involved with the 
controversial Dakota Access Pipeline suffered significant decreases in deposit growth. The 
results suggest that firm depositors can behave in a coordinated fashion and thereby punish 
activities with which they disagree. 
Sector exclusions can also be a form of risk management performed by investors. In fact, 
activists for divestment have claimed that fossil fuel reserves will become stranded assets13 in 
the future.14 Therefore, the argument is that in order to avoid the risk of poor returns in the 
future, investors should divest from these stocks in the present. This could be due to regulatory 
risks and/or the potential of new products (such as renewables) to displace them. Historically, 
the transportation industry has experienced a number of industry rises and declines, from canals 
 
12 Exclusion announcements are announced following the physical divestment of the Fund. Therefore, the measured return 
impact is the result of other investors’ reactions.  
13 Stranded assets can be defined as “assets that have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluation or 
conversion to liabilities.” (Maynard and Bordon (2017) ) 
14 For example, Shin Furuno from 350.org: ““European and American financial institutions are moving quickly not only to 
restrict new finance to coal projects but to divest from all coal related companies, in recognition of the risk that coal will 
become a stranded asset.”, see https://350.org/press-release/energyfinanceinjapan2018/ 
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being replaced by railways that in turn faced stiff competition from road transport (see Nairn 
(2002)). Divestment by other investors can also be seen as a threat to the prices of targeted 
stocks (Ansar, Caldecott and Tilbury (2013)) as it has the potential to depress them.15 However, 
even in the absence of apparent future threats to particular sectors, there can still be a risk 
management case for divestment. Gintschel and Scherer (2008) argue that the revenue 
exposure which some sovereign wealth funds have to oil can result in a different optimal asset 
allocation for their portfolios. Retail investors could also consider company or sector 
divestment in order to account for the employment-related risks which they may face.16 In the 
past, pension funds (Meulbroek (2005)) and employee pension 401(k) pension accounts17 
(Benartzi (2001)) had been found to allocate high levels of portfolios to company stock.18 
Another argument for exclusions could be that it may help attract investors. There is some 
evidence to support such an idea. For example, Hartzmark and Sussman (2018) examine the 
introduction of sustainability categories in Morningstar fund data, which resulted in net 
outflows from low sustainability funds and inflows to high net sustainability funds. Therefore, 
some investors seem to value sustainability. Furthermore, Ceccarelli, Ramelli and Wagner 
(2019) show that funds which are close to gaining Morningstar’s Low Carbon Designation 
adjust their holdings towards lower fossil fuel involvement.  Such adjustments increase their 
chances of gaining the Low Carbon designation, which was associated with an increase in fund 
assets.  
Investors’ moral, cultural and religious beliefs can also affect how they construct and 
manage portfolios.  For example, Nilsson (2008) examines how investors’ pro-social attitudes 
towards Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) are associated with portfolio allocations to SRI 
funds.  The conclusion is that both “altruistic” and “profit-oriented” factors play a role. 
Furthermore, investors who find social, ethical and environmental (SEE) issues relatively more 
important, and feel that their investment decisions can make an impact, have higher 
proportional allocations to SRI funds. Furthermore, investors conforming to Islamic finance 
cannot invest in firms in the alcohol, pork or gambling sectors (Ibrahim (2007)). 
Investors could also face reputational risks when they invest in sectors which may be seen 
as running contrary to their mission. This can be the case even if the investments are in 
 
15 For example, see evidence by Atta-Darkua (2019) 
16 Intuitively, if employees are more likely to become unemployed when the company or sector is performing poorly, a total 
portfolio hedging argument would argue for under-allocation to company stock. 
17“A 401(k) is a retirement savings plan sponsored by an employer”, Source: https://guides.wsj.com/personal-
finance/retirement/what-is-a-401k/  
18  Benartzi (2001) argues that this is particularly puzzling given the likely positive association between the returns on 
company stock and on human capital. 
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investment funds, whose direct investments may not be monitored by the investor. For example, 
the Church of England faced backlash and embarrassment when it emerged that part of its 
portfolio was indirectly invested in a prominent payday lender in the UK.19 The revelation 
came after the Church’s leader, the Archbishop of Canterbury, had criticized the company’s 
practices in the press and vowed to work on putting them out of business. The Church ended 
its investment in the company following the criticism.20 While a strategy aiming to avoid 
reputational risks would argue against such controversial investments, theoretically there can 
be a case to engage in them in order to achieve “mission hedging”. Roth Tran (2018) argues 
that it may be preferable for endowments to invest more heavily in firms whose activities are 
contrary to the organisation’s mission as opposed to divesting. Then they can benefit from 
higher returns when there is a higher need for their services. For example, a charity cancer 
combatting lung cancer investing in tobacco firms would be able benefit from having more 
resources to achieve its mission when tobacco stocks perform well. However, Baker, Hollifield 
and Osambela (2019) argue that the hedging argument may not prevail if investors coordinate 
investment strategies to internalise the negative externalities of polluting firms. This is also the 
case if they incur nonpecuniary disutility from holding firm stock. The first motive can explain 
divestment behaviour only when a large proportion of investors engages in coordinating 
behaviour. However, this is not a necessary condition for the disutility argument, which is 
comparable to taxing a proportion of investors for holding shares in the designated firms. 
Nagell (2011) argues that one aspect of investor responsibility is “taking steps to reduce the 
risk that an investment directly or indirectly contributes to harm”. This motive can also be 
framed as avoiding complicity for undesirable actions of portfolio firms and can also lead to 
investors engaging in exclusions. However, the author notes that it is challenging to determine 
the conditions under which investors could be considered accountable for firm behaviour. It is 
difficult to establish complicity with either a counterfactual (what would happen if the investor 
did not own shares) or a balance of probabilities method (does owning shares change the 
probability of the firm causing harm). As industry participants frequently point out, divestment 
affects shares trading in the secondary markets. Since firms primarily raise funds via initial 
shares offerings, they are likely to be minimally financially impacted by sell-offs in the 
 
19 Definition of pay day loan from Investopedia: “A payday loan is a type of short-term borrowing where a lender will 
extend high-interest credit based on a borrower’s income and credit profile. A payday loan’s principal is typically a 
portion of a borrower’s next paycheck. These loans charge high-interest rates for short-term immediate credit. These 
loans are also called cash advance loans or check advance loans.”, source: 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/payday-loans.asp 
20 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28257351  
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secondary markets.21 Nagell (2011)  notes that another argument for complicity would rely on 
the argument of Kutz (2007) that complicity lies in “the individual intention to take part in the 
collective act”. However, in this case, it is hard to place responsibility on shareholders for 
management behaviour due to the management structure of corporations which imposes a 
separation of ownership and control. and Kutz (2007) himself argues that the link cannot be 
made in cases of firms. Nevertheless, some investors can consider themselves complicit in the 
actions which their portfolio firms make.2223242526 
Certain investor characteristics can impact the portfolio decisions of investors. For example, 
Starks, Venkat and Zhu (2017) show that investor horizon is positively associated with 
preferences for high-ESG stocks.   
2.2 Alternatives to exclusion 
Impact investing is a socially responsible strategy which focuses on allocating resources to 
investments with externalities which inventors want to promote. Therefore, impact investing 
can be viewed as the opposite of negative screening where the aim is to withhold resources 
from firms. Chowdhry, Davies and Waters (2018) build a model where impact investors 
allocate funds to firms with considerable social value. They then use their ownership stakes to 
incentivize profit-minded managers to follow social goals in addition to their profit maximizing 
objectives. In the venture capital universe, Barber, Morse and Yasuda (2018) examine the 
performance of private equity firms and argue that investors are willing to accept lower returns 
 
21 E.g. See https://www.pragcap.com/my-view-on-esg-investing/ , accessed in July 2019 
22 As Nagell (2011) notes, the original Norwegian Ministry of Finance commissioned Graver report ((Graver, Bergo, 
Cappelen, Lohman, et al. (2003)), which proposed ethical guidelines for the Norwegian GPFG (Government Pension 
Fund Global), the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world23, argues that “Even though the issue of complicity raises 
difficult questions, the Committee considers, in principle, that owning shares or bonds in a company that can be expected 
to commit grossly unethical actions may be regarded as complicity in these actions.”. The committee’s proposed ethical 
guidelines fed into government-proposed ethical guidelines which argued that “The Fund should not make investments 
which constitute an unacceptable risk that the Fund may contribute to unethical acts or omissions”24. However, the 
Fund’s opinion on the matter may have evolved over time since the most recent ethical guidelines are milder in their 
interpretation only focusing on company contributions to products or conduct which falls outside the guidelines and not 
explicitly drawing a connection to complicity by the Fund.25 Furthermore, the latest ethical guidelines are currently under 
review, as of April 201926. 
23 See, for example, the ranking of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute: https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-
rankings/sovereign-wealth-fund , accessed in July 2019 
24 Ethical Guidelines for the Government Petroleum Fund – Issued 22 December 2005, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/The-Government-Pension-Fund/Ethical-Guidelines-for-the-
Government-Pension-Fund---Global-/the-ethical-guidelines.html?id=434894, link no longer active as new guidelines 
have been enacted. Old guidelines. Quoted paragraph cited in Halvorssen (2011) and https://whoprofits.org/flash-
report/a-case-study-the-norwegian-governments-pension-fund/ , accessed July 2019 
25 “Companies may be put under observation or be excluded if there is an unacceptable risk that the company 
contributes…”, link: https://etikkradet.no/files/2017/04/Etikkraadet_Guidelines-_eng_2017_web.pdf, accessed in July 
2019 
26 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/utvalg-skal-vurdere-de-etiske-retningslinjene-for-spu/id2640389/, Accessed July 
2019 
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for impact funds. In contrast, for mutual funds, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2005) argue that 
the cost of investing in socially responsible funds is relatively low for an index investor.  
Divestment is not the only option when investors are dissatisfied. They can also use voice 
(engagement) or remain passive (Hirschman (1971)). There is evidence that successful 
engagement with companies on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Dimson, Karakaş and 
Li (2015)) and environmental and social issues (Dimson, Karakaş and Li (2018)) can improve 
firm performance. Similarly, Hoepner, Oikonomou, Sautner, Starks, et al. (2018) find 
decreased downside risk associated with successful environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) engagements. Smith (1996) examines responses to corporate governance-aimed 
activism by CalPERS27  and find improved shareholder value for firms adopting proposed 
changes or agreeing a resolution with CalPERS, but no effect on firm performance. Broader 
investor  activism also seems to have benefits.  Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner (2017) show 
positive returns to hedge fund activism. Similarly, Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2008) 
document improved performance stemming from engagements for an activist investor (Hermes 
UK Focus Fund).  
2.3 Sector Returns 
As part of our survey, we examine respondent beliefs about selected sector risk and returns 
for a selection of controversial and non-controversial sectors. Empirically, Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) provide evidence that “sin” stocks outperform comparable “non-sin” firms. 
They define “sin” stocks as those in the alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries, which we refer 
to as socially controversial. Similarly, Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant (2008) show that portfolios 
of “sin” stocks28 outperform common benchmarks. In contrast, Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) argue 
that after adjusting for the Fama French five factors (Fama and French (2015)), the 
outperformance of “sin” stocks disappears.  
Controversial stocks earning higher returns is also consistent with work by Carlin, 
Longstaff and Matoba (2014). They show that there is a positive risk premium for disagreement 
and that stocks with higher investor differences of opinion are associated with higher expected 
returns and higher return volatility. Fama and French (2007) also note that disagreement about 
the distribution of future asset payoffs can give rise to deviations from CAPM.  Miller (1977) 
argues that in the presence of short selling constraints, higher disagreement about stock prices 
results in relatively high prices. This is because optimists can buy shares while pessimists 
 
27 California Public Employees' Retirement System: https://www.calpers.ca.gov  
28They also include stocks in the weapons and biotech alterations industries in their definition of sin stocks 
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cannot express their negative price opinions, Furthermore, future returns are expected to be 
low. Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) also argue that when investor breadth is reduced29 future 
returns would be lower. However, dispersion of return beliefs signifies higher return 
uncertainty, which risk averse investors would need to be compensated for. If this mechanism 
dominates over the optimism mechanism then returns will also be higher in the longer term 
(Atmaz and Basak (2018)).This could especially be the case for controversial stocks which are 
not patronised by certain norm-constrained investors as the remaining investors may already 
be taking larger positions in such stocks than they would if norm-constrained investors were 
not blacklisting them. 
2.4 Surveys 
Other papers have also employed surveys as a method to gain an insight into the perception 
and behaviour of investors in the responsible investing space. Brodback, Guenster and Mezger 
(2019) provide survey evidence that altruism is positively associated with the decision to invest 
socially responsible.  Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim (2018) examine how investors make use of 
ESG data and their motivations to do so. Krueger, Sautner and Starks (2018) document that 
investors believe that climate change regulation risks have already began to affect investment 
portfolios. Ilhan, Krueger, Sautner and Starks (2019) survey investors on firm climate risk 
disclosures. They find that respondents who consider current climate risk reporting to be 
deficient believe that there are higher levels of mispricing in the equity markets. Furthermore, 
they show that the majority of investors report preferring risk management and engagement 
tactics compared to divestment as a strategy to combat climate risks. In contrast, in this paper 
we discuss how respondent climate change beliefs are connected to expected sector 
performances. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016) document the corporate governance 
preferences of institutional investors including their opinions the factors which determine the 
effectiveness of the threat of exiting companies.  Riedl and Smeets (2017) combine survey, 
experimental and administrative data and show that socially responsible investment decisions 
can be explained by social preferences and signalling. In contrast, financial incentives play a 
smaller role since investors are prepared to achieve lower financial performance.30  
 
29 fewer investors have long positions in stocks 
30 More broadly, Dorn and Huberman (2005) combine survey and trading data and demonstrate that more risk tolerant and 
less experienced investors have less diversified portfolios and higher portfolio turnover. Venture capitalists have also 
been surveyed on their decision-making process in sourcing, evaluating and selecting investments (Gompers, Gornall, 
Kaplan and Strebulaev (2019)) as well as on their practices on firm capital structure, governance and value creation 
(Gompers, Kaplan and Mukharlyamov (2016)). Finally, in corporate finance, Poterba and Summers (1995) conduct a 
survey on CEOs on their firm time horizons and the hurdle rates they apply to cash flows. Similarly, Westphal (1999) 
combines top management and outside director survey data on CEO-board relationships with archival data on CEO 
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3 Survey Description 
The survey was designed to explore industry professionals’ perceptions of the various 
reasons behind sector exclusion and their attitudes towards them. Furthermore, it also includes 
questions on the financial performance of selected sectors compared to the broad market 
performance.  Attitudes towards global warming are also explored. Finally, institutional 
demographic data is collected in order to classify responses into relevant categories.  
 
Initially, the survey was piloted on post-experience graduate-level31 students attending an 
elective on Investment Management in Judge Business School (44 responses). Questions were 
then adjusted for the next iteration based on the answers and feedback provided by the students. 
The adjusted survey was taken to conferences in Amsterdam and Brussels (N = 70) and a 
research student sample32 at Judge Business School (N = 12). The survey was completed by 
further 200 investment professionals. The total current sample from the professional 
conferences is 263 and the total student sample is 63.33 
There is a potential for selection bias in our survey, since respondents who feel more 
strongly about divestment could be more likely to fill in the survey. In order to provide 
representation to a broader range of views, in addition to the overall results we group 
professionals into clusters based on their exclusions views. We then tabulate the results by 
clusters, so that we can demonstrate the views of a range of participants.  
4 Survey Results 
4.1 Sector exclusion views 
The first question in the survey asks respondents to evaluate different statements in terms 
of how useful sector exclusion would be to achieve them (“Would you consider sector 
exclusion to be a useful tool for ...?”). Table 2 displays the answer choices and scores. The 
choices can be combined into groups depending on the attitudes to divestment which they aim 
to probe. Two options refer to it as a tool for achieving a positive impact (“Addressing climate 
change issues” and “Putting pressure on companies to improve practices”). Three statements 
 
compensation and performance and board composition and show how social ties can affect frequency of advice to CEOs 
and firm performance.  
 
31 MBA and MFin (Master of Finance) 
32 Finance research master students 
33 The initial conference sample of 270, becomes 263 when we remove responders from the professional conferences who 
identify as students. In accordance, the total student sample rises to 63 when self-identified students from other events are 
included. 
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refer to negative screenings as a risk management measure (“Addressing industry regulation 
risks”, “Addressing industry-wide setbacks”, and “Addressing risks and holdings outside of 
portfolios”). One alternative considers them as a branding tool (“Attracting funds from 
ethically concerned investors”) and two others frame it as a tool to avoid criticism (“Addressing 
investor reputational damage”) or guilt\complicity (“Addressing responsibility for climate 
change harms”). Finally, we also ask whether they consider exclusions to be a useful tool to 
express their beliefs connected to morality (“Conforming to moral beliefs”) or religious or 
cultural norms (“Conforming to religious or cultural beliefs”). The answers were scored on a 
Likert scale,34 using 1 for Strongly Disagree and 5 for Strongly Agree. “Don’t know”, answers 
left blank and cases where multiple answers are ticked for the same question are omitted. Using 
the responses, we calculate an average score for the support each statement has. A score of 3 
would indicate neutral support, higher score would indicate that on average respondents viewed 
the statement positively, and a lower score would indicate the opposite. A standard deviation 
is displayed to show the level of variation in answers.  
Panel B shows these average scores for the professionals’ sample, ordered from highest to 
lowest ranking. “Attracting funds from ethically concerned investors” (average score of 4), 
which is related to the role of sector exclusion as a branding tool was the most supported tool. 
The role of exclusions to attract investor funds is supported by empirical findings (see 
Hartzmark and Sussman (2018), Ceccarelli, Ramelli and Wagner (2019)). Following it, 
statements which received average scores of above 3.5 belonged to the groups related to using 
divestments to conform to beliefs, achieving a positive impact, or avoiding criticism or guilt. 
The least supported uses, which received scores of below 3.50, were all connected to portfolio 
risk management (“Addressing industry regulation risks”, “Addressing risks and holdings 
outside of portfolios”, “Addressing industry-wide setbacks”).  
Figure 1 shows the mean scores and variation of opinion “frontier” for the statements.35 In 
general, statements with higher levels of mean support tend to have higher variation of opinion 
(standard deviation of responses). A particular outlier is statement 7 which examines exclusion 
as a branding tool and has a relatively high score and low dispersion of opinion. Statements 3, 
6, and 7, which are connected to branding and risk management, tend to have relatively low 
mean scores and variation in scoring and fall below the regression line. Therefore, 
 
34 For a description, see Boone and Boone (2012) 
35 95% Confidence window constructed using bootstrap, n = 10,000 
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professionals are relatively more unanimous in their opinions on risk management and 
branding-motivated exclusions which they rank bottom and top, respectively.  
Turning back to Table 2, in Panel C, the similarities among the statements in the assigned 
groups become easier to examine. In the Panel we display the proportional support at each level 
(1 to 5, Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). Statement #7 (branding tool) is the only statement 
to achieve over 40% of professionals who strongly agree with it (43%). The statements related 
to risk management have similar answer distributions, suggesting our grouping is consistent. 
Panel D of Table 2 shows the mean scores from the student sample. We tabulate the results 
for the statements where we have more than 50 responses. This results in keeping 60% of the 
statements we have for the professionals’ sample since some of the statements were added 
following the initial pilot study. Overall, students seem mildly supportive of divestments, with 
average scores ranging from 3.19 to 3.48. Unlike in the professionals’ sample, they are more 
sympathetic towards a risk management argument. Using exclusions to address regulation risks 
receives the highest support, while the least popular motivation is addressing climate change 
issues.  
The correlations among statements tend to be high for the professionals (see correlation 
matrix in Panel E). However, in the Internet Appendix (Table B. 1) we show that statements 
have marginally lower correlations with outside of group statements than with all statements 
(Panel B).36  
The relatively high correlations could indicate that respondents feel similarly about the 
different statements, Therefore, next, we examine if this is the case or whether there are groups 
with differing opinions. We find that professionals can be assigned to groups depending on 
their sector exclusion beliefs. This also allows us to present the rest of the results for each 
cluster of opinion. We use a k-means clustering algorithm to classify the respondents into 
categories based on their expressed preferences across statements 1 to 10 of Q1.1.  The Internet 
Appendix describes the clustering procedure for the professionals’ sample in more detail.  It 
aims to create groups with similar preferences.  The cluster centroids are the mean preferences 
of a cluster member across the different statements.37 These are shown in Table 3: 
We have ordered the clusters from least supportive of the usefulness of divestments to most 
supportive. Panel A clusters the professional sample. The “sceptics” group contains 34 
respondents who somewhat disagree that divestments are a useful tool across all reasons 
 
36 Statement 7 (Attracting funds from ethically concerned investors) is the only one in its group so both correlations are the 
same for it. 
37 Centroids can also be described as central points of the cluster preferences 
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suggested in the survey. The 72 members of the “questioners” cluster are ambivalent about the 
usefulness of negative screenings, but somewhat agree that they can be a branding tool and 
used to express beliefs. Finally, the “devotees” group contains 145 respondents who somewhat 
agree that sector exclusions can be a useful tool to achieve all statements. We have a tilt towards 
approving of divestments in our sample. Therefore, we will use the cluster results to present 
the opinions of professionals whose views are less popular, such as those of the “sceptics”.  
Such opinions may well be more prevalent in the general population than they are in our 
sample, where we only have 34 respondents who hold them. 
Panel B performs the same procedure for the student sample, using the six statements where 
we have high response coverage from Panel D of Table 2. Students can be grouped into clusters 
similar to those of the professionals (“sceptics”, “questioners”, “devotees”). The proportion of 
the three groups in the student sample (14%, 25%, 60%) is similar to the proportions of the 
professionals (14%, 29%, 58%). However, there can be multiple explanations for this 
consistency. On one hand, it could be the case that graduate students with finance knowledge 
have similar overall exclusion views to those of professionals. On the other hand, the survey 
may be more appealing to certain profiles than to others, resulting in their over or under-
sampling in the survey for both cohorts. For the remainder of the paper we focus on the 
professionals’ sample, since in practice they are likely to have a more substantial impact on 
divestment decisions within organisations than the students. 
4.2 Sector risk and return opinions 
We ask professionals to answer question about their views on the risk and return properties 
of several sectors. Five of the them could be considered controversial (Alcohol, Coal, Mining, 
Oil & Gas and Tobacco). Of those, three could be considered environmentally controversial 
(Coal, Mining, and Oil & Gas) and the other two can be considered socially controversial 
(Alcohol and Tobacco). Two sectors have not currently been targeted for divestment 
(Consumer Goods and Technology). Results are displayed in Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6. 
We discuss the main results and also split the results by cluster in order to explore the 
possibility that return and risk opinions may vary depending on overall exclusions preferences. 
We do not aim to suggest that one causes the other, since the direction of causality could go 
both ways. Instead, we explore how differences in negative screening opinions are associated 
with sector risk and return beliefs.  
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4.2.1 Sector Returns estimates (Q1.3) 
Professionals shared their opinions on the returns of sectors in Q1.3 “How would you 
expect the stock market returns from each of these sectors to compare to overall market returns 
over a 10-year period?”. Responses were coded from 1 to 3, where 1 is “At least 1% a year < 
market”, 2 is “About the same” and 3 is “At least 1% a year > market”. Empty, unclear38 and 
“Don’t know” answers were omitted from the analysis.  The results are summarised in Table 
4 and a full breakdown is shown in the Internet Appendix (Table E. 1). We classify mean 
responses within the 1.5 to 2.5 range as “same” as the market, responses above that as “higher”, 
and those below as “lower”. In the total sample (Panel A), Technology was expected to 
outperform (“higher”, mean > 2.5), while Coal was expected to underperform (“lower”, mean 
< 1.5). All other sectors were expected to perform broadly in line with the market (mean scores 
between 1.5 and 2.5). The summarised results are supported by the proportional breakdowns 
shown in the Internet Appendix, where 79% of respondents expect Technology stocks to out-
perform the market, while 74% expect the Coal to underperform it. This belief is consistent 
across clusters (Panels B to D). Therefore, it seems that returns expectations are not affected 
by the exclusion preferences.  
We also display standard deviations of these estimates.39 The dispersion of opinion about 
returns is the lowest for non-controversial (Consumer Goods and Technology) sectors. Again, 
this holds for the full sample and across all clusters of opinion. Carlin, Longstaff and Matoba 
(2014) argue that investor disagreement is a contributing factor to higher expected stock 
returns. Therefore, our finding that controversial stocks have a higher divergence in expected 
returns provide support for empirical results that they tend to outperform non-controversial 
stocks (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009)). In consequence, while respondents do not report 
expectations that controversial sectors will outperform noncontroversial sectors ex-ante, the 
fact that they tend to disagree the more about their returns relative to those of controversial 
sectors could be a contributing factor to controversial sector outperformance ex-post. 
In Panel A of Table 7 we show how these expectations compare to the sector returns in 
four markets over the past 10 years. We select the World, European, USA and UK markets. 
While there are overlaps among the four data series,40 they represent markets which are likely 
to be followed by our respondents. The UK and European markets are chosen specifically in 
 
38 Selecting more than one response, response tick being between multiple answers, etc. 
39 However, these are not strictly defined as the data is not continuous. 
40 UK, European and USA stocks will be contained in the World index and UK stocks are part of the European market.  
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mind of the UK and European bias in the sample (see the demographics in Panel C of Table 
11). We describe the specific data series we use for each market in the Internet Appendix. The 
sources we use are French (2019), FTSE Russell (2019), and Thomson Reuters (2019).41  
The return expectations of the professionals with respect to Coal and Technology are 
consistent with the returns data.  Historically, Coal underperformed in all markets where we 
have data,42 and Technology outperformed in all four markets. However, expectations are not 
fully based on past returns. Oil & Gas stocks also under-performed in all four markets, but this 
is not reflected in return expectations. Given that Alcohol stocks outperformed in three out of 
the four markets we study, respondents could have also expected the sector to out-perform, but 
they did not. Therefore, it seems that respondents are not predicting future returns solely based 
on past performance.   
In summary, professionals do not expect controversial sectors to outperform non-
controversial sectors. However, they have lower disagreements of opinion about expected 
returns of non-controversial relative to controversial sectors, which could result in such 
outperformance in practice. These return expectations do not seem to be connected to 
divestment opinions. Return expectations do not fully reflect past return performance data. 
4.2.2 Sector Risk estimates (Q1.5) 
Next, in Q1.5 we asked respondents about their opinion on the variability of sector returns 
(“How would you expect the volatility of each of these sectors (annualised standard deviation) 
to compare to market volatility over a 10-year period?”). Answers are coded in the same 
manner as Q.13 and summarized in Table 5 (full breakdown in Internet Appendix (Table E. 
2)). On average, Technology and the environmentally controversial sectors (Coal, Mining, Oil 
& Gas) are expected to have larger variation than the market (Panel A). Therefore, respondents 
do not seem to expect environmentally controversial sectors to be less risky in terms of standard 
deviations than the comparable non-controversial sectors. This is also the case for the “sceptics” 
group (Panel B). The number of controversial sectors expected to have a higher variation than 
the market falls with support for exclusions, with “questioners” predicting such outcomes for 
only two controversial sectors (Mining and Oil & Gas, Panel C), and “devotees” for only one 
controversial sector (Mining, Panel D). Therefore, support for exclusions does not seem to stem 
from an expectation that controversial sectors are more volatile than other sectors.  
 
41 We use the Beverages series to proxy for Alcohol sector in all three markets except the USA because an alcohol series 
was not available. 
42 We have no data for the UK Coal sector returns 
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Examining the historical variations in Panel B of Table 7 shows that the majority of sectors 
have had a higher variation than the market in at least three out of the four markets we 
investigate. Consequently, an agent extrapolating the recent past into the future would have 
grounds to expect most sectors to have higher variation. Consequently, it seems that “sceptics” 
are the ones who appear to be most guided by the recent historic returns record, while “devotees” 
are least guided by it. We also document differences in the level of disagreement about 
expected standard deviations. While non-controversial sectors still have relatively low levels 
of disagreement, the results are not as strong or consistent across groups as for the returns 
disagreement.  
In summary, professionals expect Technology and environmentally controversial sectors to 
have higher variations than the market. Higher support for exclusions is associated with a lower 
number of controversial sectors expected to have high return variation. Therefore, respondents 
more in favour of exclusion are not more likely to expect controversial sectors to be more risky 
(in terms of standard deviations) than non- controversial sectors. Furthermore, respondents. 
who are more supportive of exclusion also tend to rely less on past sector performance to 
predict future return variations.  
However, since standard deviation is a symmetric measure which captures both negative 
and positive return variation, next we examine perceptions of negative return variations.   
4.2.3 Sector Negative Performance Risk estimates (Q1.4) 
Finally, we examine the sector negative performance risk estimations of professionals, by 
looking at their answers to Q1.4 “Over each of 2020, 2021, ….2029, what is the worst 1-year 
under-performance relative to the market that you expect to observe for each sector? 
(maximum absolute difference between market and sector returns, when the sector return is 
lower than the market return)”. The answers are tabulated in Table 6 (full breakdown available 
in Internet Appendix (Table E. 3)).Since they contain subsequent ranges of negative 
performance return outcomes, with the initial and final range having different lengths from the 
middle range, we explore two potential mappings. The first one is categorical, where the higher 
the range the higher the categorical number it is assigned. The second one is based on each 
range’s mid-point43 (displayed in Panel A). Since both mappings result in the same overall 
ranking of adverse performance risks we make use of the first mapping technique when 
describing the results. We summarise them by assigning “base” value to results where the mean 
 
43 except for the last range, which is open, where the mid-point is selected based on the range on the previous three answer 
options 
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categorical ranking is between 1.5 and 2.5, “low” if below 1.5, “high” if it is between 2.5 and 
3.5, and “very high” is it is above.  
Overall, Coal is expected to have high negative performance risk relative to the other 
sectors. This pattern is broadly repeated across most groups.  Adverse performance risk 
expectation for Coal are the most pronounced for “sceptics”. This can be seen clearly in the 
Internet Appendix (Table E. 3)) where a quarter of “sceptics” expect Coal to have an outcome 
in the worst category.  Among the clusters, “Questioners” are the only ones to also expect 
Mining to have “high” relative negative performance risk.44 Devotees expect most sectors to 
have similar adverse performance risk, falling into the “base” category.45 
Examining the results using 10-year historical data across our four markets, in Panel C of 
Table 7, Coal has had the strongest negative performance return risk compared to the market, 
and in most cases falls into the “very high” category. Sceptics come the closest to estimating 
adverse performance risk similar to its historic performance. “Questioners” are the only group 
to identify Mining as having a similar negative performance risk to prior outcomes. “Devotees” 
seem the least guided by the historic record.  
In summary, exclusion preferences seem connected to adverse performance risk estimates. 
“Devotees”, who tend to support exclusions, nevertheless do not expect controversial sectors 
to have higher risks than non- controversial sectors, despite some controversial sectors having 
experienced high historical underperformances relative to the market.   
4.2.4 Risk Return Frontier  
We combine the return and risk estimates of respondents to show how sectors are mapped 
on a risk and return frontier by mimicking a mean variance portfolio optimization framework 
(see Markowitz (1956), Markovitz (1959) and Sharpe (1970)). The risk and return preferences 
measured via mean returns (Q1.3) and standard deviations of return (Q1.5) are displayed in 
Figure 2. Similarly, in Figure 3 we plot returns (Q1.3) versus negative performance risk (Q1.4).  
Using both metrics of risk, for the total sample (Panels A), the two non-controversial sectors, 
Consumer Goods and Technology, strictly dominate the others in terms of achieving the 
highest return for the lowest risk. Therefore, they form part of a frontier of superior risk return 
profiles. Across the clusters, socially controversial sectors (Alcohol and Tobacco) also form 
parts of the frontier in some cases. However, environmentally controversial sectors (Coal, 
Mining and Oil & Gas) are consistently dominated by the non- controversial sectors.  
 
44 and are close to expecting Oil & Gas to also have “high” risk (score of 2.5 on the border) 
45 For Coal their expectations are closest to the “high” category (2.49) 
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Therefore, the belief that environmentally controversial sectors (Coal, Mining, Oil & Gas) 
offer a poor risk return trade-off is independent of respondent beliefs about the usefulness of 
divestments.  
4.2.5 Summary of risk and return opinions 
In summary, it seems that professionals do not expect controversial sectors to offer superior 
performance to non-controversial sectors, even if they are exclusion “sceptics”. However, they 
exhibit lower dispersion of return opinions for non-controversial compared to controversial 
sectors for the total sample and across the three groups we examine. This disparity in 
disagreement can in practice lead to superior controversial stock returns.  Furthermore, there is 
a connection between support for exclusions and risk expectations. However, this may not go 
in the expected direction. Respondents most in favour of exclusions (“devotees”) expect the 
least negative risk outcomes for controversial sectors relative to non-controversial sectors. 
Furthermore, “Devotees” seem to form risk beliefs least consistent with the recent historic 
profiles of sectors and also tend to anticipate the lowest levels of adverse performance risks 
from controversial sectors. Finally, we examine the efficiency frontiers which can be formed 
based on risk and return expectations. Irrespective of exclusion preferences, on average 
respondents expect environmentally controversial sectors to be dominated by non-
controversial sectors.  
4.3 Climate change views 
In this section, we surveyed professionals about their views on global warming. We aim to 
determine if they are associated with exclusion preferences. We adapt questions from the Yale 
Climate Change in the American Mind Survey (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Rosenthal, Kotcher, et 
al. (2019)) and compare our results to those in the Yale survey (November 2018 wave). We do 
not anticipate the results to be the same since their sample is of the broader US population and 
we survey industry professionals. Our sample has not restricted the geography of respondents 
by design. However, we have distributed the survey in the UK, Europe and Hong Kong which 
in practice has restricted the respondent backgrounds.  
4.3.1 Global warming beliefs 
The first question (Q2.1, in Table 8 Panel A) asked if global warming is happening and 
record almost universal belief that in it, among professionals who expressed an opinion (98% 
Yes in total sample). Support is at least 94% among all clusters. This is in contrast to 
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respondents in the USA, as measured by the Yale survey, where comparably only around 84%46 
answered in the affirmative.  
In the second question (Q2.2 also in Panel A) we asked was which factor is the major cause 
of global warming, assuming it is happening. A large majority reported that it is mostly caused 
by human activities (87%). Across the groups the level of support for that belief was at least 
79%.  “Sceptics” have the highest level of support for the belief that natural changes for the 
environment are to blame (21%). Even so, four out of five “sceptics” still consider human 
activities to be the main cause. The level of support for the belief that human activities are 
responsible (87%) in our survey is higher than that in the Yale survey. There comparable47 
results show that among the USA population 68% support human activities as the driver while 
25% support natural changes in the environment.48 Therefore, our respondents both believe 
that global warming is happening and mostly consider humans responsible.  
Next, we enquire about the potential impacts of global warming (Q2.4 “When do you think 
global warming will start to harm people?”). We display the answers in Panel B. Our 
respondents generally expect negative consequences of global warming to materialise in the 
near term. More than half (57%) think that it has already started harming people. This is 
followed by almost a third (32%) who think it will start harming people in 24 or less years 
(summing the next two categories). Only 10% anticipate negative effects in 25 or more years 
(summing the last two categories). Examining the results by cluster, support for exclusions is 
negatively associated with the belief that global warming is harming people at present.49 In 
contrast, it is positively associated with believing that climate change will start harming people 
in 24 years or less.50 We achieve broadly similar results if we summarise the parentage beliefs 
into average preferences using two weighing schemes (Internet Appendix, Table G. 1). 
Therefore, divestment “sceptics”, while not in support of exclusions, do seem to be aware of 
the potential harms of climate change.  
The Yale survey contains a similar question, which asks specifically about the United States 
(“When do you think global warming will start to harm people in the United States?”). We 
have altered the time periods in our survey so the intervals are not directly comparable for most 
 
46 Of those who express and opinion - ignoring the “Don’t know” answers and only considering the “Yes” and “No” 
responses. 
47 Results adjusted to add up to 100% 
48 Omitting 8% selecting “Neither because global warming isn’t happening” 
49 falling from 77% for “sceptics” to 51% for “devotees” 
50 rising from 10% for ”sceptics” to 38% for “devotees” 
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options. Nevertheless, with some adjustments51 we calculate that 56% of their respondents also 
believe that global warming is affecting people now, which is similar to our results.  
After documenting that despite their divestment views, respondents largely believe in 
global warming, consider it to be mostly caused by humans, and tend to expect it to have started 
to adversely harm humans, we inquire about their emotional attachment to the subject. 
4.3.2 Emotional attachment to global warming 
In Table 9 we tabulate answers to Q2.3 (How concerned are you about global warming?) 
and Q2.8 (How strongly do you feel each of these emotions when you think about the issue of 
global warming?) to examine emotional loadings on the subject of global warming. The 
answers are scored on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Very). We classify responses in 
the middle as “base” (between 2 and 3), those below 2 as “low”, those between 3 and 3.5 as 
“high”, and those above 3.5 as “very high” (in the Internet Appendix (Table G. 2) we show 
proportional support for each statement). 
The professionals load relatively “high” on concern, while the loadings on the other 
emotions are lower (“base” category). Across the clusters, concern rises to “very high” for 
“devotees”. “Questioners” also experience helplessness to a relatively higher level (“high” 
category), and for “devotees” the emotion is also borderline in the “high” category (2.99). 
Therefore, emotional attachment to global warming seems to increase with support for 
exclusions.  Notably, given that “sceptics” have the lowest loadings across all emotions 
connected to global warming, campaigners urging divestment may find it hard to convert them 
to “devotees” via emotional arguments.  
In comparison, among the respondents in the Yale study a lower portion of respondents are 
somewhat or very worried about global warming (69% vs 93% in our survey). Therefore, using 
our scoring mechanism their loading on worry52 would be “base”. The loadings on all other 
emotions would also fall into the “base” category.  
One caveat of this analysis of emotions is that we cannot distinguish if cluster members 
load in the same way on these emotions unconditionally as well as conditionally on global 
warming i.e. whether, for example, they are more hopeful in general or just with respect to 
global warming.  
 
51 if we remove the “Never” responses in the Yale survey in the same manner we exclude “Not Applicable” and “Don’t 
knows” in ours. If we keep the “Never” category, the figure is 48% (% now) 
52 In our survey we use “concerned” instead of “worried” 
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4.3.3 Top of mind of global warning  
Finally, we enquire over our respondents’ exposure to the topic of global warming (Table 
10). We ask how often respondents discuss it with friends and family (Q2.5), with work 
colleagues (Q2.6) and how frequently they hear about it in the media (Q2.7).  
Professionals report discussing global warming with friends and family and with their 
colleagues to a similar extent. In both cases about a fifth (21%) discuss it at least once a week 
and a quarter discuss the issue at least once a month. This is similar for our groups which 
support exclusions. In contrast, “sceptics” report higher near-term exposure (weekly) via 
discussions with work colleagues (30%) than with friends and family (21%). The Yale survey 
includes a question about exposure to global warming via discussions with friends and family. 
However, we adopt a different Likert scale53 so the results are not directly comparable theirs.   
Exposure to global warming in the media is frequent, with over half (56%) reporting 
hearing about it at least once a week and another 27% at least once a month. With minor 
adjustments to the Yale survey, to make their results comparable to ours,54 we show that their 
sample reports lower media exposure. Only 38% are exposed to it via the media at least once 
a week, compared to over half in our survey. Another substantial difference is that 12% of their 
respondents have heard of global warming via the media less than once a year (including never) 
compared to 0% (1 answer) in our sample.  
Therefore, it seems that global warming is an issue that our respondents are exposed to in 
their daily lives at a relatively high frequency. 
4.3.4 Summary of climate change results 
Professionals almost universally believe that global warming is happening, with high levels 
of support across all groups of exclusion support. Similarly, 87% consider human activities its 
major cause. Furthermore, more than half of our respondents (57%) deem it to be harming 
people at present, this rises to 77% among “sceptics”.55 Therefore, the large majority of our 
respondents are not climate change deniers. However, we do note differences in emotional 
attachment to the subject. “Sceptics” are the least emotionally attached to global warming. 
Therefore, “emotional” arguments on the topic may be less likely to persuade them to be 
supportive of divesting environmentally controversial sectors. 
 
53 We choose to adopt the same Likert scale across questions Q2.5 to Q2.7 for comparability across the questions. The Yale 
survey uses “often”, “occasionally”, “rarely” and “never” as their scale for the friends and family question.  
54 Dropping the “Not sure/No answer” category and combining the “Once a year or less often” and “Never” categories into a 
“Once a year or less often” joint category 
55 It could, however, be the case that “sceptics” have a lower estimate as to the maximum damage which global warming can 
cause to humans than the other groups. Unfortunately, the questions in our survey do not allow us to determine this.  
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4.4 Respondent and institutional characteristics 
In this section we document the institutional characteristics of our respondents and show 
how these correspond to the opinion clusters which we have constructed. Some of the questions 
borrow on those asked in the survey of Krueger, Sautner and Starks (2018). Since the data is 
self-reported it is likely that the figures and estimates reflect both the actual characteristics as 
well as the perception of the survey respondents about them.   
4.4.1 Institutional and Individual Characteristics 
First, we ask professionals what category best describes the institution they are employed 
in. We display the results in Panel A of Table 11. We have presented a number of categories 
(see the Q3.1 category in the survey in the Internet Appendix) and also allowed manual input 
where none of them apply.56 For confidentiality reasons, we have tabulated cases where for the 
total sample there are at least five responses in a category. These cover 89.4% of our sample. 
The remainder comprises categories with four or fewer selections, or respondents who did not 
fill in the question. The majority of categories are connected to finance and/or the investment 
industry. The largest categories are financial planning/advisory (14.4%), mutual fund company 
(12.5%), consultancy (10.6%) and family office (9.9%).  Similarly, in Panel B, we show the 
primary position of professionals. Again, we only display cases with five or more answers. 22% 
fall into the “Other” category, which is an amalgamation of positions without enough replies 
to have their own category and not similar enough to the other categories to be allocated to 
them. 57  The next top two categories are Financial Planner/Adviser (17%) and 
Analyst/Strategist (13%). Panel C displays the location of institution headquarters. The sample 
has a UK bias with 37.6% of professionals’ headquarters being based in the country. The next 
largest countries are Norway (15%), Belgium (8%) and the USA (5%).  Cluster members 
characteristics span the different institutional, occupational, and headquarters categories with 
no one category dominating a group. This suggests that institutions, occupations, and 
geographies contain members with varying exclusion opinions.   
Next, in Panel D we display the age groupings of our sample.58 Almost all are between 25 
and 65 years old (96%). Among the clusters, “sceptics” tend to be older (68% are 45 years old 
or more) than the main sample, while “questioners” tend to be slightly younger (55% are 44 or 
younger).  In the last Panel (E) we show self-reported years of investment experience. The 
 
56 The responses listed in the Other category are then allocated to their own category or put into one of the existing 
categories. 
57For example: Sales, trustee, Investment Specialist, Fund adviser, etc. 
58 examining the respondents who filled in the question 
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professionals who reply (212, 81%) report on average 18 years of investment-related 
experience. “Sceptics”, who are the most mature as a group, also have the highest average 
investment experience (22 years). This is unsurprising, since mathematically older 
professionals have had more time in which to gain investment-related experience.  
4.4.2 ESG beliefs and characteristics  
In the next table, Table 12, we show the beliefs of professionals about the ESG preferences 
and characteristics of their institutions. First, we examine the answers to two questions 
regarding ESG factors. In Q2.21 we ask “What importance do your peer institutions (category 
selected above) place on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors compared to 
other investor categories?” and in Q3.22 we ask “What importance do your peer institutions 
place on ESG factors compared to your institution?”. The aim is to probe respondents’ beliefs 
about their own institutional ESG preferences by asking about their peer institutional 
preferences and how these relate to their institutions and other investor categories.  We chose 
to use this indirect method to identify preference rankings in order to avoid answers which 
could have been less forthright if asked directly. Answers are in three ordinary categories 
(lower/less, similar, higher). We code these on a scale of 1 to 3 and classify mean responses 
between 1.5 and 2.5 as “same”, mean answers below 1,5 as “lower”, and mean replies above 
2,5 as “higher”. In the aggregate, in Panel A we see that for the total sample and across clusters, 
the answers to both questions are in the “same” category. This suggests that on average 
participants think that their peers, institution and other investor categories rate ESG factors in 
a similar way.  
To delve deeper into ESG preference beliefs, in Panel B we combine the answers to the two 
questions in a crosstab table. This reduces the sample slightly from 201 (Q3.21) and 196 (Q3.22) 
to 178 as we need respondents to have filled in both questions. The largest cell contains 
professionals who believe that peer institutions place similar importance on ESG compared to 
other investor categories and to their institution (44%). Examining the cells at the borders of 
the crosstab tables allows us to create a ranking of institutional ESG priorities relative to those 
of peer institution and other investor categories. For the total sample, 5% believe that their 
institution places lower importance on ESG factors compared to both peers and other investor 
categories.59 This proportion is the highest among “sceptics” (9%), and decreases with support 
 
59 Q3.22 = 3 (higher) & Q3.21 = 1 or 2 (lower or same). Here we are relying on the transitive property of ordinary statement 
rankings. Thereby, if (1) peers place lower or similar importance on ESG than other investor categories and (2) peers also 
place higher importance on ESG than their institution, then the institution must place lower importance n ESG factors 
than peers and other investor categories. However, we cannot identify the institution versus investor categories ranking in 
cases where, for example, peers place higher or lower importance on ESG factors than both other categories.  
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for exclusions, falling to 4% in “devotees”. In contrast, 18% consider their institutions to place 
higher importance on ESG factors than both peer institutions and other investor categories.60 
This increases with support for divestments, starting at 13% for “sceptics” and rising to 18% 
for “devotees”.61 Therefore, group support for negative screenings is positively associated with 
the perception that institutions place higher importance on ESG factors than other market 
participants. Furthermore, it is negatively associated with the belief their institution places a 
lower importance on ESG factors.  
Finally, in Panel C, we calculate the self-described percentages of portfolios related to ESG 
factors and impact investing. The sample sizes are relatively small (153 and 134 respectively).62 
Based on the professionals who fill in an answer, about a third (32.6%) of portfolio assets are 
said to address ESG. In contrast, only 8% are said to be dedicated to impact investing. The 
proportional allocations to both do not seem to be affected either positively or negatively by 
support for exclusions. 
4.4.3 Characteristics of Investment Portfolios 
In the next table, Table 13, we display the investment portfolios characteristics of the 
respondents’ institutions. Panel A focuses on the sizes of portfolios. The majority of portfolios 
are larger than $1mn, with only 3% being under that threshold. The rest are mostly evenly split 
among the other four categories ($1m - $99m, $100m - $999m, $1bn - $49bn, and >$50bn). 
Proportionally, “sceptics” tend to represent slightly larger portfolios than the rest of the sample. 
Most portfolios have low turnover as their holding periods are at least two years. 64% have a 
typical holding period of over five years and only 6% have a holding period below two years 
(Panel B).   
In Panel C we show the allocation of portfolios across different dimensions. The first one 
is asset classes. On average over half of the institutional portfolios is allocated to equities 
(53%), and a third to fixed income. Real Estate and Alternatives make up 7 and 6% accordingly.  
Slightly over half of the portfolio is invested actively (56%), with 44% being passively 
invested. Similarly, just over half of the typical portfolio is managed in-house (53%) versus 
externally (47%). Portfolio asset allocations are similar by group. On average, “questioners” 
and “devotees” have a slightly higher active allocations than “sceptics”. A higher proportion 
of “sceptics”’ portfolios are managed in-house.  
 
60 Q3.22 = 1 (lower) & Q3.21 = 2 or 3 (same or higher) 
61 The figure is 17% for “questioners” 
62 Not all respondents would have an investment portfolio they can refer to, be aware of portfolio asset allocations, or be 
willing to answer the question. 
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4.4.4 Summary of institutional characteristics 
The majority of professionals are employed in institutions in the finance and/or investment 
industry. For the total and among clusters, the sample is biased towards European countries 
and the UK in particular. Members of our clusters are not concentrated in particular institutions, 
professions or countries. “Sceptics” are older and consequently have longer investment-related 
experiences than the main sample. Perceptions of institutional ESG priorities differ by cluster. 
The higher the cluster support for exclusions the higher the proportion of its members who 
believe that their institution places higher importance on ESG factors than other market 
participants, and vice versa. However, support for exclusions does not seem to be related to 
portfolio proportions addressing ESG issues or dedicated to impact investing.  
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown the results of a survey of professionals on their sector exclusion 
opinions and how these are connected to sector performance expectations and climate change 
beliefs. We document that professionals express the highest levels of support for using negative 
screenings as a branding tool to attract funds from ethically concerned investors. In consist, 
they were least sympathetic towards using divestment as a risk management tool. We also show 
that professionals can be assigned to groups (“sceptics”, ”questioners”, and “devotees”) based 
on their exclusion beliefs. 
Furthermore, respondents do not report an expectation that controversial sectors would 
outperform non-controversial sectors. However, they exhibit greater differences in opinion 
about the return characteristics of non-controversial stocks compared to controversial stocks. 
Since investor disagreement has been linked to higher returns this could provide one 
explanation for the higher observed controversial stock returns in the literature. In general, non-
controversial stocks are expected to have a better risk return trade-off to environmentally 
controversial sectors This implies that expecting a higher return or lower risk from 
controversial stocks is not a driving force for divestment scepticism among industry 
professionals.  Furthermore, divestment “devotees” are least likely to make use of recent 
historical data when forming expectations about future sector performances. 
Finally, we record almost universal belief in global warming.  However, emotional 
attachment to the subject increases with support for exclusions, making “emotional” appeals 
unlikely to convert “sceptics” to “devotees”.  
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6 Figures 
Figure 1 Question 1.1 Variation in mean scores and standard deviations. 
This figure is a scatterplot of the means scores and standard of the responses in the professional sample to the 
statements in Q1.1 “Would you consider sector exclusion to be a useful tool for ...?”. 95% Confidence interval 
(bootstrap, n= 10,000) Legend: Addressing climate change issues: 1, Addressing industry regulation risks: 2, 
Addressing industry-wide setbacks: 3, Addressing investor reputational damage: 4, Addressing responsibility for 
climate change harms: 5, Addressing risks and holdings outside of portfolios: 6, Attracting funds from ethically 
concerned investors: 7, Conforming to moral beliefs: 8, Conforming to religious or cultural beliefs: 9, Putting 
pressure on companies to improve practices: 10 
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Figure 2 Q 1.3 & Q1.5 Estimated Return and Risk profiles of sectors 
This Figure shows scatterplots of the mean estimates of respondents in the total sample (professionals) and the clusters of 
exclusion preferences for the expected return and risk of selected controversial and non-controversial sectors based on their 
answers to Q1.3 and Q1.5.  
Legend: Alcohol: A, Coal: C, Consumer Goods: CG. Mining: M, Oil & Gas: O, Technology: TE, Tobacco: TO 
 
Panel A Overall Results Panel B Sceptics 
  
Panel C Questioners Panel D Devotees 
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x 
Figure 3 Estimated Negative Performance Risk and Return Profile for Q1.4  
This Figure shows scatterplots of the mean estimates of respondents in the total sample (professionals) and the clusters of 
exclusion preferences for the expected return and negative performance risk of selected controversial and non-controversial 
sectors based on their answers to Q1.3 and Q1.4. (Using Map1)  
Legend: Alcohol: A, Coal: C, Consumer Goods: CG. Mining: M, Oil & Gas: O, Technology: TE, Tobacco: TO 
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7 Tables 
Table 1 Sample Selections 
This table lists the events at which the survey was distributed, number of collected responses, and the primary 
audience at each event. 
Event # Responses Primary audience type 
Class at the Judge Business School, January 
2019, UK 
44 MBA and MFin (Master of Finance) students 
ICGN Academic day and Conference, 
February 2019, Netherlands 
23 Academics and industry professionals interested 
in corporate governance issues 
Trends Investment Summit 2019, February 
2019, Brussels 
47 Asset owners and investment managers 
Class at the Judge Business School, February 
2019, UK 
12 MPhil (Research masters) students 
Science of Retirement Conference, February 
2019, UK 
86 Financial Planners and Advisers 
Sparrows Capital Charities Trustees Event, 
March 2019, UK 
22 Charity Trustees (2 duplicates discarded) 
Invesco Sovereign Investment Programme, 
March 2019, UK 
30 Sovereign Wealth Funds and Central Banks 
Hong Kong Conferences, March 2019, UK 11 Senior asset managers 
Emerging Markets Workshop, Norway, May 
2019 
15 Senior asset managers 
Sustainability Seminar, CFA, Norway, May 
2019 
36 Responsible Investing professionals 
Total 326  
ss 
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Table 2  Question 1.1 
This table describes the answers to Q1.1among multiple dimensions. Q1.1 is “Would you consider sector 
exclusion to be a useful tool for ...”   Answers: Strongly disagree (1), Somewhat disagree (2), Neither agree or 
disagree (3), Somewhat agree (4), Strongly disagree (5).Panel A shows how each answer statement can be mapped 
to an underlying mechanism. Panel B displays the mean support, standard deviation of responses and number of 
responses for each statement among the professionals sample. The mean score is calculated by assigning a number 
of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) to each answer summing the scores and dividing them by the number 
of responses. Panel C provides further detail by breaking down the percentage allocation to each response category 
(of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)) for the statements, for the professional sample. Panel D displays 
the mean support, standard deviation of responses and number of responses for each statement among the students 
sample. Panel E shows the correlations among the responses for the professional sample.    
Panel A Questions mapping to underlying mechanisms 
Question code Underlying mechanism 
Addressing climate change issues Q1.1_1 Achieving a positive impact 
Addressing industry regulation risks Q1.1_2 Risk management 
Addressing industry-wide setbacks Q1.1_3 Risk management 
Addressing investor reputational damage Q1.1_4 Avoidance of criticism 
Addressing responsibility for climate change harms Q1.1_5 Avoidance of guilt/complicity 
Addressing risks and holdings outside of portfolios Q1.1_6 Broader risk management 
Attracting funds from ethically concerned investors Q1.1_7 Branding tool 
Conforming to moral beliefs Q1.1_8 Expression of beliefs 
Conforming to religious or cultural beliefs Q1.1_9 Expression of beliefs 
Putting pressure on companies to improve practices Q1.1_10 Achieving a positive impact 
 
Panel B: Responses of Professionals, N = 263 
Question code mean std n 
Attracting funds from ethically concerned investors Q1.1_7 4.07 1.08 251 
Conforming to moral beliefs Q1.1_8 3.77 1.19 246 
Addressing climate change issues Q1.1_1 3.70 1.22 258 
Addressing responsibility for climate change harms Q1.1_5 3.69 1.23 251 
Putting pressure on companies to improve practices Q1.1_10 3.62 1.28 253 
Addressing investor reputational damage Q1.1_4 3.58 1.13 245 
Conforming to religious or cultural beliefs Q1.1_9 3.50 1.29 239 
Addressing industry regulation risks Q1.1_2 3.37 1.13 248 
Addressing risks and holdings outside of portfolios Q1.1_6 3.23 1.07 227 
Addressing industry-wide setbacks Q1.1_3 3.14 1.06 236 
 
Panel C Proportional Allocations to each score (in %), Professionals 
Statement Code\Score 1 2 3 4 5 
Addressing climate change issues Q1.1_1 7 14 11 39 29 
Addressing industry regulation risks Q1.1_2 7 16 25 37 15 
Addressing industry-wide setbacks Q1.1_3 7 20 34 30 9 
Addressing investor reputational damage Q1.1_4 6 13 20 40 21 
Addressing responsibility for climate change harms Q1.1_5 7 14 11 39 29 
Addressing risks and holdings outside of portfolios Q1.1_6 6 17 37 28 12 
Attracting funds from ethically concerned investors Q1.1_7 5 5 12 36 43 
Conforming to moral beliefs Q1.1_8 7 9 15 37 31 
Conforming to religious or cultural beliefs Q1.1_9 10 13 23 27 28 
Putting pressure on companies to improve practices Q1.1_10 10 12 11 39 28 
 
Panel D Students, N = 63.  
Statement code mean std n 
Addressing industry regulation risks Q1.1_2 3.48 1.08 62 
Putting pressure on companies to improve practices Q1.1_10 3.44 1.24 63 
Addressing risks and holdings outside of portfolios Q1.1_6 3.35 1.02 63 
Conforming to moral beliefs Q1.1_8 3.32 1.24 63 
Addressing industry-wide setbacks Q1.1_3 3.29 1.05 62 
Addressing climate change issues Q1.1_1 3.19 1.38 63 
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Panel E Correlation among the responses, Pearson correlations, Professionals 
 Q1.1_
1 
Q1.1_
2 
Q1.1_
3 
Q1.1_
4 
Q1.1_
5 
Q1.1_
6 
Q1.1_
7 
Q1.1_
8 
Q1.1_
9 
Q1.1_1
0 Q1.1_1 .00 0.86 0.62 0.95 1.00 0.59 0.93 0.98 0.90 .99 
Q1.1_2 0.86 1.00 0.92 0.97 0.85 0.89 0.69 0.85 0.87 0.86 
Q1.1_3 0.62 0.92 1.00 0.81 0.61 0.98 0.43 0.65 0.77 0.64 
Q1.1_4 0.95 0.97 0.81 1.00 0.94 0.79 0.83 0.95 0.91 0.94 
Q1.1_5 1.00 0.85 0.61 0.94 1.00 0.58 0.93 0.98 0.89 0.99 
Q1.1_6 0.59 0.89 0.98 0.79 0.58 1.00 0.46 0.65 0.80 0.61 
Q1.1_7 0.93 0.69 0.43 0.83 0.93 0.46 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.92 
Q1.1_8 0.98 0.85 0.65 0.95 0.98 0.65 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.98 
Q1.1_9 0.90 0.87 0.77 0.91 0.89 0.80 0.89 0.94 1.00 0.90 
Q1.1_1
0 
0.99 0.86 0.64 0.94 0.99 0.61 0.92 0.98 0.90 1.00 
 
Table 3 Q1.1 Cluster Centroids of Sector Exclusion Preferences 
This table shows how respondents in the professional (Panel A) and student (Panel B) samples have been assigned 
to clusters based on their exclusion preferences. Each cell contains the centroid value for a given statement across 
each cluster, and can vary from 1 to 5 in accordance with the range of values in the statement responses (1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)). The last column shows the number of respondents in each cluster. Respondents 
are assigned the cluster which is the closest match to their exclusion preferences. The cluster formation and 
assignment procedure is a k-means clustering algorithm described in the Internet Appendix.  
Panel A: Professionals Sample 
Statement\Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 # 
Sceptics 1.91 2.11 2.24 2.24 1.79 2.13 2.33 1.76 1.76 1.89 34 
Questioners 3.07 2.86 2.71 3.39 3.15 3.07 4.12 4.02 3.95 3.07 72 
Devotees 4.43 3.94 3.66 4.01 4.4 3.65 4.39 4.08 3.69 4.27 145 
 
Panel B: Students Sample 
 Statement\Cluster 1 2 3 6 8 10 # 
Sceptics 1.56 2.11 1.78 2.22 1.56 1.78 9 
Questioners 1.69 3.63 3.63 3.81 3.19 3.38 16 
Devotees 4.43 3.94 3.66 4.01 4.4 3.65 38 
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Table 4 Return views of professionals (Q1.3) 
This table shows the mean estimates, standard deviation of estimates, and number of respondents for the total sample 
(professionals) and the clusters of exclusion preferences for Q1.3 which queries their beliefs about selected controversial and 
non-controversial sector returns.  
Q1.3 “How would you expect the stock market returns from each of these sectors to compare to overall market 
returns over a 10-year period?” Answer statements: At least 1% a year < market: 1; About the same: 2; At least 
1% a year > market: 3 
Classification: mean score < 1.5 is “lower”, between 1.5 and 2.5 is “same” and >2.5 is “higher” 
 
Panel Sector code mean std n 
Panel A: Overall results Alcohol Q1.3_A same 0.72 216 
 Coal Q1.3_C lower 0.65 213 
 Consumer Goods Q1.3_CG same 0.56 226 
 Mining Q1.3_M same 0.75 218 
 Oil & Gas Q1.3_O same 0.77 224 
 Technology Q1.3_TE higher 0.56 233 
 Tobacco Q1.3_TO same 0.76 220 
Panel B Sceptics Alcohol Q1.3_A same 0.83 24 
 Coal Q1.3_C lower 0.75 27 
 Consumer Goods Q1.3_CG same 0.63 28 
 Mining Q1.3_M same 0.79 28 
 Oil & Gas Q1.3_O same 0.86 28 
 Technology Q1.3_TE higher 0.67 28 
 Tobacco Q1.3_TO same 0.86 28 
Panel C: Questioners Alcohol Q1.3_A same 0.70 64 
 Coal Q1.3_C lower 0.63 61 
 Consumer Goods Q1.3_CG same 0.51 66 
 Mining Q1.3_M same 0.72 62 
 Oil & Gas Q1.3_O same 0.75 64 
 Technology Q1.3_TE higher 0.55 66 
 Tobacco Q1.3_TO same 0.71 64 
Panel D: Devotees Alcohol Q1.3_A same 0.71 121 
 Coal Q1.3_C lower 0.66 118 
 Consumer Goods Q1.3_CG same 0.58 125 
 Mining Q1.3_M same 0.76 122 
 Oil & Gas Q1.3_O same 0.76 126 
 Technology Q1.3_TE higher 0.56 131 
 Tobacco Q1.3_TO same 0.76 121 
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Table 5 Variation of returns views by professionals (Q1.5) 
This table shows the mean estimates, standard deviation of estimates, and number of respondents for the total 
sample (professionals) and the clusters of exclusion preferences for Q1.5 which queries their beliefs about selected 
controversial and non-controversial sector variation (via standard deviation).Q1.5 “How would you expect the 
volatility of each of these sectors (annualised standard deviation) to compare to market volatility over a 10-year 
period?” Answer statements: At least 1% < market: 1; About the same: 2; At least 1% > market: 3 
Classification: mean score < 1.5 is “lower”, between 1.5 and 2.5 is “same” and >2.5 is “higher” 
Panel Sector code mean std n 
Panel A: Overall results  Alcohol Q1.5_A same 0.69 197 
 Coal Q1.5_C higher 0.73 201 
 Consumer Goods Q1.5_CG same 0.63 203 
 Mining Q1.5_M higher 0.63 203 
 Oil & Gas Q1.5_O higher 0.65 204 
 Technology Q1.5_TE higher 0.57 201 
 Tobacco Q1.5_TO same 0.80 199 
Panel B: Sceptics Alcohol Q1.5_A same 0.75 26 
 Coal Q1.5_C higher 0.51 27 
 Consumer Goods Q1.5_CG same 0.69 26 
 Mining Q1.5_M higher 0.48 27 
 Oil & Gas Q1.5_O higher 0.48 28 
 Technology Q1.5_TE higher 0.53 27 
 Tobacco Q1.5_TO same 0.79 27 
Panel C: Questioners Alcohol Q1.5_A same 0.74 59 
 Coal Q1.5_C same 0.77 59 
 Consumer Goods Q1.5_CG same 0.61 61 
 Mining Q1.5_M higher 0.68 58 
 Oil & Gas Q1.5_O higher 0.62 56 
 Technology Q1.5_TE higher 0.49 59 
 Tobacco Q1.5_TO same 0.80 56 
Panel D: Devotees Alcohol Q1.5_A same 0.65 109 
 Coal Q1.5_C same 0.75 111 
 Consumer Goods Q1.5_CG same 0.63 112 
 Mining Q1.5_M higher 0.64 114 
 Oil & Gas Q1.5_O same 0.70 116 
 Technology Q1.5_TE higher 0.62 111 
 Tobacco Q1.5_TO same 0.79 113 
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Table 6 Negative performance risk estimates of responders (Q1.4) 
This table shows the mean estimates, standard deviation of estimates, and number of respondents for the total 
sample (professionals) and the clusters of exclusion preferences for Q1.4 which queries their beliefs about selected 
controversial and non-controversial sector negative performance risk. The different mapping techniques are 
shown in Panel A. Panel B displays the results using the first mapping method (Map1), as the two mapping 
methods result in the same sector rankings. Q1.4 “Over each of 2020, 2021, ….2029, what is the worst 1-year 
under-performance relative to the market that you expect to observe for each sector?” (maximum absolute 
difference between market and sector returns, when the sector return is lower than the market return)  
Classification: “base” is Map 1 between 1.5 and 2.5, “low” if below, “high” between 2.5 and 3.5, “very high” if 
above. 
 
Panel A: Mapping answer Map1 (Categorical) Map2 (Mid-point-based) 
 0-9% 1 4.5 
 10-29% 2 19.5 
 30-49% 3 39.5 
 50-69% 4 59.5 
 >70% 5 79.5 
 
 Sector code Mean_1 Std_1 n 
Panel B: Overall Results Alcohol Q1.4_A base 0.85 179 
(same ranking by mapping method) Coal Q1.4_C high 1.12 187 
 Consumer Goods Q1.4_CG base 0.82 177 
 Mining Q1.4_M base 1.10 179 
 Oil & Gas Q1.4_O base 1.08 183 
 Technology Q1.4_TE base 1.22 173 
 Tobacco Q1.4_TO base 1.16 182 
Panel C: Sceptics Alcohol Q1.4_A base 1.01 22 
 Coal Q1.4_C high 1.49 24 
 Consumer Goods Q1.4_CG base 0.98 21 
 Mining Q1.4_M base 1.27 23 
 Oil & Gas Q1.4_O base 1.25 21 
 Technology Q1.4_TE base 1.49 19 
 Tobacco Q1.4_TO base 1.46 22 
Panel D: Questioners Alcohol Q1.4_A base 0.96 54 
 Coal Q1.4_C high 1.07 54 
 Consumer Goods Q1.4_CG base 0.80 54 
 Mining Q1.4_M high 1.14 54 
 Oil & Gas Q1.4_O base 1.15 54 
 Technology Q1.4_TE base 1.16 54 
 Tobacco Q1.4_TO base 1.10 54 
Panel E: Devotees Alcohol Q1.4_A base 0.76 100 
 Coal Q1.4_C base 1.05 105 
 Consumer Goods Q1.4_CG base 0.82 98 
 Mining Q1.4_M base 1.05 98 
 Oil & Gas Q1.4_O base 1.03 104 
 Technology Q1.4_TE base 1.19 96 
 Tobacco Q1.4_TO base 1.13 102 
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Table 7 Real returns data for comparison 
In this table we show the mapping for the World, USA, European and UK sectors to our sector risk and return 
questions.  We use the past 10 year returns (2009-2018) for each market in their currency. World and USA markets 
are shown in USD currency. Europe is in EUR and the UK is in GBP. The source for the World, European and 
US markets and sector data is  FTSE Russell (2019) and (for Coal sector) Thomson Reuters (2019) data.  We use 
Ken French (2019)  database for the US market and sectors. The specific series used are listed in the Internet 
Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Real return mapping to Q1.3(return) using data from 2009 to 2018 
metric Annualised 10-year returns in % Corresponding Category 
Sector\market World  EUR US UK World  EUR US UK 
Alcohol 12 16 13 15 higher higher same higher 
Coal  5 2 -12  lower lower lower   
Consumer goods 11 14 9 11 same higher lower higher 
Mining 2 10 5 7 lower same lower same 
Oil & Gas 3 7 3 5 lower lower lower lower 
Technology 17 12 18 20 higher higher higher higher 
Tobacco 11 9 14 6 same same same lower 
Market 10 9 13 8 same same same same 
 
Panel B: Real return mapping to Q1.5(standard deviation) using data from 2009 to 2018 
metric Return 10y  standard deviations Corresponding Category 
Sector\market World  EUR US UK World  EUR US UK 
Alcohol 14 20 11 21 same higher lower higher 
Coal  48 129 67  higher higher higher  
Consumer goods 14 15 9 19 same higher lower same 
Mining 42 52 42 56 higher higher higher higher 
Oil & Gas 17 14 17 20 higher same higher higher 
Technology 20 13 19 34 higher same higher higher 
Tobacco 18 21 18 21 higher higher higher higher 
Market 14 13 13 19 same same same same 
 
Panel C: Real return mapping to Q1.4 (negative performance risk) using data from 2009 to 2018 
metric Maximum 10y under-performance 
Corresponding Category 
Sector\market World  EUR US UK World  EUR US UK 
Alcohol 9 9 8 7 low low low low 
Coal  48 71 81  high very high 
very 
high 
  
Consumer 
goods 6 3 15 5 low low base 
low 
Mining 48 49 37 44 high high high high 
Oil & Gas 20 19 24 21 base base base base 
Technology 2 13 3 0 low base low low 
Tobacco 25 30 25 17 base base base base 
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Table 8 Respondent Climate Change views: Global Warming 
This table presents the proportional allocation of respondent answers to questions related to global warming. Panel 
A shows answers for Q2.1 and Q2.2 and Panel B displays responses to Q2.4. The results are shown for the total 
professionals sample and the three clusters of exclusion opinions. The wording of the questions is: 
Q2.1 Do you think that global warming is happening? – Answer statements: Yes, No 
Q2.2 Assuming global warming is happening, do you think it is caused mostly by… ? 
Answer statements: Human activities; Natural changes in the environment; Other (please specify): 
Q2.4 When do you think global warming will start to harm people? 
Answer statements: It is happening now, In <10 years, In 10-24 years, In 25-50 years , In > 50 years  
Panel Cluster  Code Total Sceptics Questioners Devotees 
Panel A: Global  
Warming views:  
Responses for Q2.1  
and Q2.2 (in %) 
Q2.1  %Yes 98 94 99 99 
Q2.1  %No 2 6 1 1 
Q2.1  n 247 33 67 136 
Q2.2  %Human 87 79 87 88 
Q2.2  %Environment 7 21 3 7 
Q2.2  %Both 6 0 10 6 
Q2.2  n 250 34 68 138 
Panel B: Estimates 
for the timeline 
of Global Warming 
 Impact (Q2.4) 
% It is happening now Q2.4 %Now 57 77 61 51 
% In <10 years Q2.4 %l10 17 6 12 21 
% In 10-24 years Q2.4 %10-24 15 3 18 16 
% In 25-50 years Q2.4 %25-50 6 6 7 6 
% In > 50 years Q2.4 %m50 4 6 1 5 
Q2.4 n Q2.4 n 249 31 67 141 
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Table 9 Respondent Climate Change views: Global Warming concerns (Q2.3) 
and other feelings (Q2.8) 
This table shows the mean estimates, standard deviation of estimates, and number of respondents for the total 
sample (professionals) and the clusters of exclusion preferences for Q2.3 and Q2.8, which queries their level of 
emotional attachment towards global warming among selected emotions. . The wording of the questions is: 
Q2.3 How concerned are you about global warming? Answer statements: 1: Not at all concerned, 2: Not very 
concerned, 3: Somewhat concerned, 4: Very concerned 
Q2.8 How strongly do you feel each of these emotions when you think about the issue of global warming? Answer 
statements:  1: Not at all, 2: Not very, 3: Moderately, 4: Very; Feelings listed: Afraid, Angry, Helpless, Hopeful, 
Outraged 
Classification: “base” if between 2 and 3, “high” is between 3 to 3.5”, “very high” if above, “low” if below 2.  
 
Panel Item code mean std n 
Panel A: Overall results  Concern Q2.3 high 0.66 260 
 Afraid Q2.8_AF base 0.80 261 
 Angry Q2.8_AN base 0.93 260 
 Helpless Q2.8_HEL base 0.89 256 
 Hopeful Q2.8_HOP base 0.84 259 
 Outraged Q2.8_O base 0.96 249 
Panel B Sceptics Concern Q2.3 high 0.97 34 
 Afraid Q2.8_AF base 0.96 34 
 Angry Q2.8_AN base 1.16 34 
 Helpless Q2.8_HEL base 1.06 33 
 Hopeful Q2.8_HOP base 1.02 34 
 Outraged Q2.8_O base 1.11 33 
Panel C Questioners Concern Q2.3 high 0.65 72 
 Afraid Q2.8_AF base 0.73 72 
 Angry Q2.8_AN base 0.93 72 
 Helpless Q2.8_HEL high 0.88 71 
 Hopeful Q2.8_HOP base 0.80 72 
 Outraged Q2.8_O base 0.93 69 
Panel D: Devotees Concern Q2.3 very high 0.58 143 
 Afraid Q2.8_AF base 0.78 144 
 Angry Q2.8_AN base 0.86 143 
 Helpless Q2.8_HEL base 0.85 141 
 Hopeful Q2.8_HOP base 0.83 142 
 Outraged Q2.8_O base 0.96 137 
 
xx 
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Table 10 Top of mind on Global Warming (Q2,5, Q2.6 and Q2.7) 
This table presents the proportional allocation of respondent answers to questions related to how top of mind 
global warming is for them (Q2.5-Q2.7). The results are shown for the total professionals sample (Panel A)and 
the three clusters of exclusion opinion (Panels B-D). The wording of the questions is:  
Q2.5 How often do you discuss global warming with your friends and family?   
Q2.6 How often do you discuss global warming with your work colleagues?   
Q2.7 How often do you hear about global warming in the media (TV, radio, newspapers/news internet, etc.?)   
Answer statements: 1: Once a year or less often, 2: Several times a year, 3: At least once a month, 4: At least once 
a week. 
 
 
 Answer Option code Q2.5 Q2.6 Q2.7 
Panel A: Total results % Once a year or less often % 1 18 24 0 
 % Several times a year % 2 36 31 16 
 % At least once a month % 3 25 25 27 
 % At least once a week % 4 21 21 56 
 n n 258 257 261 
Panel B: Sceptics % Once a year or less often % 1 18 27 3 
 % Several times a year % 2 33 30 9 
 % At least once a month % 3 27 12 29 
 % At least once a week % 4 21 30 59 
 n n 33. 33 34 
Panel C: Questioners % Once a year or less often % 1 18 23 0 
 % Several times a year % 2 37 27 18 
 % At least once a month % 3 25 29 21 
 % At least once a week % 4 20 21 61 
 n n 71 70 72 
Panel D: Devotees % Once a year or less often % 1 17 22 0 
 % Several times a year % 2 36 32 17 
 % At least once a month % 3 26 26 28 
 % At least once a week % 4 21 20 55 
 n n 143 143 144 
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Table 11 Sample Characteristics 
This table shows answers to questions related to the sample characteristics for the total sample (professional) and 
the three clusters of exclusion preferences. Panels A to D present the proportional allocation of respondent self-
declared employment institution (Panel A, Q3.1), occupation (Panel B,Q3.11), institutional location(Panel C, 
Q3.10), and age group (Panel D, Q3.13). Panel E displays the .mean years of investment experience of the 
professionals, as well as its standard deviation and sample size. In Panels A to C we only display categories where 
there are at least five respondents who fall into the given category. Furthermore, the sample row at the bottom of 
Panels A to C shows the total sample and total members of each cluster, not the number of respondents to each 
question.  
 
 
Panel 
 
Cluster 
 
Total 
%  
Total 
%  
Sceptics 
%  
Questioners 
%  
Devotees 
Panel A: 
Sample institutions 
 
(Q3.1 How is 
the institution 
at which 
you are 
employed 
best  
described?) 
 
Financial Planning/Advisory 38 14.4 14.7 13.9 12.4 
Mutual Fund Company 33 12.5 11.8 18.1 11.0 
Consultancy 28 10.6 11.8 8.3 10.3 
Family office 26 9.9 5.9 12.5 10.3 
Bank 22 8.4 8.8 5.6 10.3 
Other 16 6.1 2.9 5.6 7.6 
Sovereign wealth fund 15 5.7 2.9 6.9 6.2 
Public pension fund 11 4.2 2.9 4.2 4.8 
Individual investor 9 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Endowment, charity 9 3.4 2.9 1.4 4.8 
Private pension fund 9 3.4 2.9 4.2 3.4 
Wealth Management 7 2.7 2.9 4.2 2.1 
Academic 6 2.3 2.9 1.4 2.8 
Insurance company 6 2.3 2.9 0.0 3.4 
% Sample in above categories 89 89.4 79.4 88.9 92.4 
Panel B: 
Sample 
Occupations 
 
(Q3.11 What 
is your 
 primary  
position?) 
Other 58 22.1 23.5 19.4 24.1 
Financial Planner/Adviser 44 16.7 8.8 16.7 17.9 
Analyst/Strategist 35 13.3 8.8 13.9 14.5 
CFO/COO/Chair 28 10.6 8.8 11.1 11.0 
Fund Manager 18 6.8 2.9 8.3 6.9 
CEO 11 4.2 0.0 5.6 4.8 
Academic 10 3.8 2.9 2.8 4.1 
ESG Specialist 10 3.8 5.9 6.9 2.1 
CEO; CFO/COO/Chair 10 3.8 8.8 0.0 4.8 
CIO 8 3.0 8.8 5.6 0.7 
MD 7 2.7 2.9 0.0 3.4 
% Sample in above categories 91 90.9 82.4 90.3 94.5 
Panel C: Sample  
Institutional 
Location 
(Q3.10 In which 
country is 
your institution’s  
headquarters  
based?) 
UK 99 37.6 41.2 33.3 37.9 
Norway 40 15.2 11.8 20.8 13.8 
Belgium 21 8.0 2.9 8.3 9.0 
USA 14 5.3 5.9 4.2 6.2 
Ireland 7 2.7 0.0 2.8 3.4 
France 6 2.3 5.9 1.4 1.4 
Netherlands 6 2.3 0.0 4.2 2.1 
% Sample in above categories 73 73.4 67.6 75.0 73.8 
# Sample 263 263 34 72 145 
Panel D: 
Sample Age Group 
(Q3.13 What 
 is your  age group?) 
< 25 years  1 0 0 1 
25-44 years  47 32 55 45 
45-65 years  50 62 42 51 
> 65 years  3 6 3 2 
n  253 34 71 138 
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Panel E: Sample 
Investment Experience 
(Q3.12 How many years of 
investment-related experience do you 
have?) 
Cluster/metrics mean std n 
Total 18 10 212 
Sceptics 21 10 31 
Questioners 17 9 60 
Devotees 18 10 112 
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Table 12 Sample ESG Beliefs and Characteristics 
This table shows answers to questions related to ESG beliefs of the respondents and the characteristics of the 
investments portfolios at the institutions where they are employed, for the total sample (professional) and the three 
clusters of exclusion preferences. Panels A and C display the mean estimates, standard deviation of estimates, and 
number of respondents for each question, while Panel C presents how the answers are proportionally allocation 
among two questions, using a crosstab. The specific questions and answer statement are described in each panel. 
 
Panel A Perceived importance of ESG for peers and institution 
Q3.21 What importance do your peer institutions (category selected above) place on Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) factors compared to other investor categories? 1: Less than other investors, 2: Similar, 
Higher than other investors 
Q3.22 What importance do your peer institutions place on ESG factors compared to your institution? Answer 
statements: 1: Less than my institution, 2: Similar, 3: Higher than my institution 
Classification: “same” between 1.5 and 2.5. “lower” if below”, “higher” if above 
 
Question Q3.21 Q3.22 
Cluster Mean  Std  N  Mean  Std  N  
Total same 0.65 201 same 0.60 196 
Sceptics same 0.69 26 same 0.62 27 
Questioners same 0.58 58 same 0.53 57 
Devotees same 0.69 111 same 0.63 107 
 
Panel B Crosstabs of respondent answers to Q3.21 (rows) and Q3.22 (columns).  
In percentages, Numbers sum up to 100. Questions and their answer statements are described in Panel A 
 
 Q3.21 / Q3.22 lower same higher 
Total Sample lower 2 7 1 
N=178 same 7 44 4 
 higher 11 15 9 
Sceptics lower 0 9 4 
N=23 same 4 39 4 
 lower 9 26 4 
Questioners lower 0 4 2 
N = 52 same 8 52 4 
 lower 10 17 4 
Devotees, lower 4 9 0 
N=98 same 6 41 4 
 lower 12 11 12 
 
Panel C Portfolio allocations to ESG and Impact Investing. (in %) 
Q3.3 How much of your portfolio addresses ESG issues? 
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Q3.4 How much of your portfolio is dedicated to impact investing? 
 
 Q3.3 Q3.4 
Cluster Mean Std  N  Mean  Std  N  
Total 32.6 38.8 153 8.0 19.1 134 
Sceptics 35.1 43.0 22 8.4 23.4 19 
Questioners 39.8 41.1 43 7.7 16.8 40 
Devotees 28.5 36.2 81 8.4 20.0 69 
xx 
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Table 13 Characteristics of Investment Portfolios 
This table presents the proportional allocation of respondent answers to questions related to the characteristics of 
the investment portfolio of the institutions t which they are employed (Q3.5-Q3.9). The results are shown for the 
total professionals sample and the three clusters of exclusion opinion. The wording of the questions is:  
Panel A Q3.5 What is the total size of assets under management or advice for your institution? 
Panel B Q3.6 What is the typical holding period for investments in the portfolios that you manage or advise? 
Panel C  
C1: Q3.7 What percentage of your portfolio is invested in each of the following asset classes? 
C2: Q3.8 What percentage of your portfolio is invested actively versus passively? 
C3: Q3.9 What percentage of your assets are managed in-house vs outsourced? 
 
Panel Size / Cluster Code/Cluster Total Sceptics Questioners Devotees 
A: Total % < $1m 1 3 0 3 3 
Assets % $1m - $99m 2 23 12 21 24 
Under % $100m - $999m 3 25 33 25 24 
Management % $1bn - $49bn 4 26 29 25 27 
 % >$50bn 5 23 25 26 22 
 n n 219 24 68 119 
B: Typical % Short (< 6 months) 1 1 0 3 0 
holding % Medium (6 - 23 months) 2 5 14 6 3 
period % Long (2 - 5 years) 3 29 18 26 36 
 % Very long (> 5 years) 4 64 68 64 61 
 n n 221 28 66 118 
C1: Portfolio Fixed income Q3.7_F_C 33 37 31 34 
allocation Equities Q3.7_E_C 53 53 55 53 
 Alternatives Q3.7_A_C 7 4 7 7 
 Real Estate Q3.7_R_C 6 6 6 6 
 Sample Q3.7 n 181 23 53 98 
C2: Active- Active Q3.8_A_C 56 51 59 57 
Passive Passive Q3.8_P_C 44 49 41 43 
 Sample Q3.8 n 198 26 61 103 
C3: In-house/ Managed in-house Q3.9_I_C 53 63 53 50 
outsourced Externally managed Q3.9_E_C 47 37 47 50 
 Sample Q3.9 n 194 24 60 104 
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Appendix 
 
Sector Exclusion survey 
 
Welcome to our survey. We are researchers from Judge Business School, the University of 
Cambridge: 
 
Vaska Atta-Darkua, PhD Candidate 
 
Professor Elroy Dimson 
 
We are interested in understanding perceptions of sector exclusions from portfolios. You will 
also be asked to answer some questions about the prospects for equity sectors. This questionnaire 
aims to solicit no information that can be used to identify you. All responses will be kept completely 
confidential.  
 
It should take you around 10-15 minutes to complete. 
 
Consent form 
Please read this form carefully. If you are happy to participate in this study, tick the consent 
box below. 
Ö I have read the participant information, and consent to participate in this research study about sector 
exclusion. 
Ö I have had the opportunity to ask the researcher any questions that I have about the study and my 
involvement in it. I am aware that I can contact the researcher Vaska Atta-Darkua 
v.darkua@jbs.cam.ac.uk at any time or in the next instance I can also contact her supervisor Elroy 
Dimson e.dimson@jbs.cam.ac.uk. 
Ö I agree that data may be shared with other researchers at the University of Cambridge for future 
research. I understand that all efforts will be made to ensure I cannot be identified (except as may 
be required by law). 
Ö I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
I consent 
 
I do not consent, I do not wish to participate 
 
www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/about-this-site/privacy-policy 
www.information-compliance.admin.cam.ac.uk/data-protection/research-participant-data  
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1 Exclusion Views 
This section will ask a range of questions about your opinions on sector exclusion. The practice of 
excluding sectors consists of selling out of and no longer purchasing shares of stocks in certain 
sectors, which the investor has decided not to hold. 
 
Q1.1 Would you consider sector exclusion to be a useful tool for ...?   (tick accordingly) 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
 
Addressing climate change issues       
Addressing industry regulation risks       
Addressing industry-wide setbacks       
Addressing investor reputational damage       
Addressing responsibility for climate change harms       
Addressing risks and holdings outside of portfolios       
Attracting funds from ethically concerned investors       
Conforming to moral beliefs       
Conforming to religious or cultural beliefs       
Putting pressure on companies to improve practices       
 
Q1.2 Are there other situations where you would consider sector exclusion to be a useful tool which 
were not mentioned above? If so, please describe them below. 
 
Q1.3 How would you expect the stock market returns from each of these sectors to compare to 
overall market returns over a 10-year period? 
 At least 1% a year < 
market 
About the 
same 
At least 1% a year > 
market 
Don't 
know 
Alcohol     
Coal     
Consumer Goods     
Mining     
Oil & Gas     
Technology     
Tobacco     
 
Q1.4 Over each of 2020, 2021, ….2029, what is the worst 1-year under-performance relative to the 
market that you expect to observe for each sector? (maximum absolute difference between market 
and sector returns, when the sector return is lower than the market return) 
 0-9% 10-29% 30-49% 50-69% > 70% Don’t 
know 
Alcohol       
Coal       
Consumer Goods       
Mining       
Oil & Gas       
Technology       
Tobacco       
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Q1.5 How would you expect the volatility (annualised standard deviation) of each of these sectors to 
compare to market volatility over a 10-year period? 
 At least 1% < market About the same At least 1% > market Don’t know (DK) 
Alcohol     
Coal     
Consumer Goods     
Mining     
Oil & Gas     
Technology     
Tobacco     
 
2 Climate Change views 
In this section we will ask questions about your climate change views and the visibility of climate change 
issues. Global warming refers to the idea that the world’s average temperature has been increasing over 
the past century, may be increasing more in the future, and that the world’s climate may change as a result.  
 
Q2.1 Do you think that global warming is happening? (tick accordingly) 
Yes No Don’t know (DK) 
 
Q2.2 Assuming global warming is happening, do you think it is caused mostly by… ? 
Human activities Natural changes in the environment Other (please specify): DK 
 
Q2.3 How concerned are you about global warming? 
Not at all concerned Not very concerned Somewhat concerned Very concerned DK 
 
Q2.4 When do you think global warming will start to harm people? 
It is happening now In <10 years In 10-24 years In 25-50 years In > 50 years DK NA 
 
Q2.5 How often do you discuss global warming with your friends and family? 
Once a year or less often Several times a year At least once a month At least once a week DK 
 
Q2.6 How often do you discuss global warming with your work colleagues?  
Once a year or less often Several times a year At least once a month At least once a week DK 
 
Q2.7 How often do you hear about global warming in the media(TV, radio, newspapers/news internet, 
etc.?) 
Once a year or less often Several times a year At least once a month At least once a week DK 
 
Q2.8 How strongly do you feel each of these emotions when you think about the issue of global warming?  
 Not at all Not very Moderately Very Don’t know 
Afraid      
Angry      
Helpless      
Hopeful      
Outraged      
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3 Investment Profile 
This section is going to ask questions about your institution to help us classify the responses into 
categories.  
Q3.1 How is the institution at which you are employed best described? (tick accordingly) 
Public pension fund Private equity  Consultancy 
Private pension fund Mutual fund company Family office 
Insurance company Endowment, charity Academic 
Hedge fund Sovereign wealth fund Individual investor 
Regulatory body Bank Other (please specify): 
 
Q3.21 What importance do your peer institutions (category selected above) place on Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) factors compared to other investor categories?  
Less than other investors Similar  Higher than other investors Don’t know (DK) 
 
Q3.22 What importance do your peer institutions place on ESG factors compared to your institution? 
Less than my institution  Similar  Higher than my institution  Don’t know (DK) 
 
Q3.3 How much of your portfolio addresses ESG issues? ______% If NA, please leave empty. 
 
Q3.4 How much of your portfolio is dedicated to impact investing?  ______% If NA, please leave empty. 
 
Q3.5 What is the total size of assets under management or advice for your institution? 
 
Q3.6 What is the typical holding period for investments in the portfolios that you manage or advise? 
Short (< 6 months) Medium (6 - 23 months) Long (2 - 5 years) Very long  (> 5 years) DK NA 
 
Q3.7 What percentage of your portfolio is invested in each of the following asset classes? If NA, please leave 
empty. 
____% in fixed income ____ % in equities ____% in alternatives ____% in real estate 
 
Q3.8 What percentage of your portfolio is invested actively versus passively? If NA, please leave empty. 
____% in active investments ____ % in passive investments 
 
Q3.9 What percentage of your assets are managed in-house vs outsourced? If NA, please leave empty. 
____% managed in-house ____ % outsourced to external managers 
 
Q3.10 In which country is your institution’s headquarters based?  
__________________________________ 
 
Q3.11 What is your primary position? 
 
Q3.12 How many years of investment-related experience do you have?  ____ years If you prefer not to say, leave 
empty. 
  
Q3.13 What is your age group? 
< 25 years 25-44 years 45-65 years > 65 years Prefer not to say 
Thank you for participating in this survey. We would like to know any feedback you may have on 
the survey questions and your experience filling it in. If you have any feedback, please share it  below 
or email it to Vaska Atta-Darkua at v.darkua@jbs.cam.ac.uk  
< $1m $1m - $99m $100m - $999m $1bn - $49bn > $50bn DK NA 
CEO MD CIO Fund Manager Analyst/Strategist 
CFO/COO/Chair Academic Student ESG Specialist Other (please explain):  
 

3.7. Appendix
Conclusion
This thesis has conducted several investigations into the exclusion practices employed by
investors. It aims to contribute to the existing knowledge in the field by approaching the subject
from multiple viewpoints. The first chapter examined how firms can be affected by exclusion
announcements. In turn, the second chapter analysed the potential implications for investment
portfolios when negative screenings are employed. Finally, the third chapter directly queried
industry professionals on their opinions on the matter.
The first chapter focused on the ethical exclusions of the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund
and documented a negative returns impact on screened firms following the announcements,
which was not reversed in the short run. This was accompanied by modest mimicking divesting
behaviour by other ethics-sensitive investors. Therefore, the chapter concluded that firm equity
value can be negatively affected by exclusion announcements. This impact is likely to be
connected to the observed reduction in firm investor base.
Next, the second chapter discussed the potential costs of sector exclusion strategies for a
long-term well-diversified investor, and found them to be non-trivial. The analysis focused on
the part of the portfolio which is being negatively screened and replaced by alternative assets.
Using a dataset from 1900 to 2018 for the UK and USA, a simple exclusion strategy where an
investor effectively goes short a particular sector and long the equity market was found to be
subject to substantial drawdowns over time. Additionally, due to large country concentration
within some sectors, such a strategy would introduce unwanted geographical tilts to the investor
portfolio.
The third and final chapter of the dissertation conducted a survey on industry professionals
in order to establish their views on the topic of exclusions. Respondents rated divestment most
useful for attracting funds from ethically concerned investors, followed by conforming to moral
beliefs. In contrast, the least popular use was risk management. We also grouped our sample into
three groups based on their exclusion beliefs - “sceptics”, “questioners”, and “devotees”. We
found that “sceptics” form sector risk estimates with higher resemblance to historic performances
than divestment “devotees”. Moreover, scepticism towards negative screenings did not seem to
stem from an expectation that controversial stocks have superior performance.
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3.7. Appendix
Overall, I believe that the research described in the dissertation is important as it sheds light
on the topic of ethical and investment exclusions. The thesis results can prove useful both to
firms which are at risk of exclusion or have already been divested as well as to investors currently
employing negative screenings or considering it as a practice to engage in.
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